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and equal citizenship for racial minorities, particularly for African American soldiers and 
their families. On the other, the lifting of racially exclusive immigration laws signaled 
changing conceptions of who could become an American citizen at all, paving the way 
for the mass migration of Asian immigrants in the second half of the twentieth century. 
The dissertation reads the Korean War as the event that set these twin processes of 
integration and immigration in motion—processes that transformed the racial order in the 
post-45 period in the United States. It examines recent and contemporary works of 
literature by American writers of color, including novels by Ha Jin, Rolando Hinojosa, 
Chang-Rae Lee, and Toni Morrison, in order to work through the profound but often 
unthought effects of the Korean War for minority subjects in U.S. culture. Through these 
readings, the dissertation argues that the Korean War heralded a new mode of liberal 
inclusion for racial minorities in the United States.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Early in Chang-Rae Lee’s The Surrendered, Hector, the former American GI, 
thinks back on his participation in the Korean War three decades earlier. Growing up in a 
working-class white neighborhood, he had been eager, but too young, to enlist in the 
army after the Pearl Harbor attacks; when war broke out in Korea five years later, he 
jumped at the chance to leave home and go fight on the other side of the world. But once 
he was in Korea and forced to both witness and commit atrocities against not just enemy 
soldiers but civilians and refugees, his enthusiasm waned. Before these incidents, 
he had been a willing enough soldier in their war. Or maybe not their war exactly, 
but Mao’s war, or Truman’s, or someone else’s; it was a war that from the 
beginning had been nobody’s cross, inciting only mild attacks of patriotism and 
protest, jingoism and pacifism, a war both too cold and too hot and that managed 
to erase fifty thousand of his kind and over a million of theirs. (99) 
For Hector, the stakes of this war, unlike World War II, are unclear, even though he 
risked his life to fight it. Was it a war being fought on behalf of the Koreans – “their 
war,” “their kind” – whose land and way of life hung in the balance? If so, the very 
division between North and South that had caused the war would seem to negate the 
distinction he was drawing between “his kind” and “theirs”: after all, “their kind” was 
irrevocably split across new national and ideological borders, and “his kind” in turn was 
far from homogenous itself. Or was the Korean conflict being used as a pretext for the 
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Cold War superpowers – Mao, Stalin, Truman – to prove the superiority of their lands 
and their ways of life to the rest of the world? If so, then the consequences of the war 
would determine more than just the fate of Korean peninsula; indeed, the war’s results 
might threaten the continued existence of the planet altogether. And if none of these 
options was quite right, then whose war was it? How could it be everyone’s war and 
nobody’s war at the same time?  
For a white American soldier like Hector, the Korean War also became “someone 
else’s war” in another sense: one of the effects of the war was to newly integrate 
populations and communities of color into the mainstream of American society. Because 
the Korean War was the first war to be fought by formally desegregated U.S. troops, 
Korea became the site of an unprecedented experiment in racial integration an ocean 
away from, and several years before, the Supreme Court ruling that would declare 
segregation unconstitutional stateside in 1954. During the Korean War, in other words, 
among the fifty thousand of “our kind” who were killed in the war were soldiers of color 
who had been invited to participate in the war on a purportedly equal basis for the first 
time. At the same time, the Korean War was a war that sorted “their kind” into enemies 
and friends and facilitated the eventual transformation of the latter into potential 
American citizens. Before the war, Koreans, along with other Asians, were largely denied 
legal entry into the United States; afterwards, first through special dispensations for 
refugees, war brides, and adoptees and later through wider reforms, immigration policies 
were liberalized, allowing for mass migrations. Thus, to use the language of Lee’s novel, 
over time, as a direct consequence of the war, “their kind” was increasingly becoming 
Hector’s kind as well. 
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Someone Else’s War: Korea and the Postwar U.S. Racial Order argues that the 
Korean War heralded a new mode of liberal inclusion for racial minorities in the United 
States. In this dissertation, I examine how, on the one hand, the desegregation of the U.S. 
armed forces during the war inaugurated state-mandated institutional racial integration as 
a putative path to full and equal citizenship for racial minorities, particularly for African 
American soldiers and their families. At the same time, I trace how the lifting of racially 
exclusive immigration laws signaled changing conceptions of who could become an 
American citizen at all. My dissertation thus reads the Korean War as the event that set 
these twin processes of integration and immigration in motion—processes that 
transformed the racial order in the post-45 period in the United States.  
The 1950s are widely viewed in American studies as a period of global and 
domestic racial struggle and progress, exemplified in contentious processes of 
decolonization overseas and desegregation at home. The post-World War II years were a 
period not only of U.S. ascendancy in the Cold War contest to establish a new world 
order, but also of newly articulating racial formations both within and beyond U.S. 
borders. Historians of the global Cold War have shown how U.S. efforts to integrate 
newly decolonized nations into the U.S.-led sphere of liberal capitalist democracy in the 
Cold War took the form of developmental programs, diplomatic missions, and cultural 
initiatives as well as covert action and outright war across the emerging Third World. 1 At 
                                                
1 For an overview of the Cold War as a conflict between competing modernities, see Odd Arne Westad’s 
The Global Cold War. For discussions of the U.S. deployment of cultural propaganda during the Cold War, 
see Penny Von Eschen’s Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War and Serge 
Guilbaut’s How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art. For analyses of developmental discourse in the 
global Cold War, see David Ekbladh’s The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction 
of an American World Order and Maria Josefina Saldaña-Portillo’s The Revolutionary Imagination in the 
Americas and the Age of Development.  
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the same time, scholars of race in the U.S. in this period have highlighted the domestic 
turn toward formal equality for people of color, arguing that the state’s new investment in 
racial liberalism was also tied to the U.S. bid for ascendancy in the Cold War.2 The 
Korean War, at once a local civil war for national unification, a regional war over the 
political fate of East Asia, and the first hot war of the global Cold War, brought together 
a number of apparently remote racialized struggles in this turbulent period of geopolitical 
reordering. However, the place of the Korean War within the U.S. Cold War racial order 
has been largely subsumed under a bipolar framework of superpower competition and 
overlooked in the existing scholarship on race, U.S. ascendancy, and the Cold War.  
In her groundbreaking work Cold War Civil Rights, for example, historian Mary 
Dudziak argues that from the years immediately after World War II until the mid-1960s, 
the story of race in America “was thought to have a critical impact of U.S. prestige 
abroad” (250). To claim the position of leader of the free world in the context of the Cold 
War conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States would need to address and manage 
the domestic racial conflicts that contradicted its desired image as a democratic nation. In 
this way, she shows that as the U.S. government “tried to project a story of progress” 
abroad, Cold War concerns created an urgent “imperative for change” and facilitated key 
civil rights reforms, including desegregation, at home (250). More recently, Jodi 
Melamed has situated the “liberal antiracisms” adopted by the U.S. state after World War 
II as part of a larger geopolitical reordering (9). She argues that the period after World 
War II saw the “inauguration of a formally antiracist, liberal-capitalist modernity under 
                                                
2 See especially Mary Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, 
Thomas Borstelmann’s The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena, 
and Nikhil Pal Singh’s Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy. 
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the management of U.S. global ascendancy” that ousted the dominant formation of 
“white supremacist modernity” that had governed race prior to that moment (8). With 
regard to Asia in particular, Christina Klein argues that U.S. expansion after World War 
II demanded “an ideology of global interdependence rather than one of racial difference,” 
leading to a formation she names “Cold War Orientalism” (16). Klein ties this logic of 
affiliation rather than just difference or domination to Asia’s newfound importance to the 
United States’ ambitions for global ascendancy.   
Each of these scholars describes a transformation in the domestic management of 
race linked to the ascendancy of the United States as a global superpower in the years 
after the Second World War. Yet the Korean War, America’s first “hot war” of the Cold 
War, factors into these analyses minimally, if at all. We might attribute this silence to the 
Korean War’s status as the so-called “forgotten war,” or to a tendency to define the Cold 
War primarily in terms of ideological and diplomatic superpower conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union rather than through its “proxy” wars across the Third 
World.3 This dissertation provides a critical counterpart, and corrective, to this important 
existing scholarship by bringing a necessary focus on the Korean War to the scholarly 
conversation on race and the Cold War. If Cold War Civil Rights works by way of 
“setting an American story within an international context” – Dudziak points out that “An 
international framework helps us discover what happened at home” (253) – then my 
project asks: what happens when we set the international story of the Korean War within 
                                                
3 For an analysis of the Korean War as the “forgotten war,” see the work of Bruce Cumings, especially 
Origins of the Korean War, Volume II, in which he notes, “The Korean War is called ‘the forgotten war’ in 
America, because it is forgotten…By calling the Korean conflict a ‘forgotten war,’ we both name it, and we 
remember it—a paradox: what is it that we are remembering to forget?” (767). 
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an American context? How do the transnational militarized zones of Korea come to shape 
racial formations in the U.S. domestic context? Seeking to redress understandings of the 
Korean War as a peripheral skirmish with little bearing outside of its immediate context, I 
show how the Cold War American project of remapping the Korean peninsula both 
typifies and complicates a Cold War American project of resignifying race domestically 
and globally.  
To address these questions, I turn to a site where the legacy of the Korean War for 
people of color in the United States is being actively confronted, contested, and rewritten: 
contemporary fiction. My approach to the literary archive of this project is inspired by 
recent scholarship in Asian Studies that has called for a collective critical reengagement 
with the lingering effects of the Cold War. In 2010’s The Other Cold War, Heonik Kwon 
names this process the “decomposition of the cold war.” For Kwon, an anthropologist, 
the conventional view of the cold war presents an “image of the global that encompasses 
local social process,” rather than one that is “revealed and made through the local” (10). 
This privileging of the global has taken a certain picture of the Cold War to be central 
(the idea of the Cold War as a “long peace” in the “West,” for example) and 
peripheralized others (the Cold War as endless violence and war in the “East” and global 
South) in ways that map onto longer histories of colonialism, imperialism, and 
Eurocentrism. Kwon argues that a rethinking of the conceptual relationship between what 
is taken to be central and peripheral, between the “global dynamic” and “local 
processes,” will help us put into practice this decomposition of the cold war, which for 
him involves two shifts of perspective regarding cold war history: first, a shift from 
geopolitical to social history, and second, a shift “from the exemplary central positioning 
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of the cold war as imaginary or metaphoric war to a comparative positioning that 
privileges neither this peculiar history of war without warfare nor the peripheral 
unbridled reality of state terror and civil war” (9). This latter shift does not entail a simple 
“de-centering” of Europe or the “West,” but rather requires a “comparative positioning” 
of multiple local sites across different spaces, especially spaces actively contending with 
the consequences of the Cold War (9). It is for this reason that he sees the 
“decomposition of the cold war” as a “participatory, ethnographic question”: he proposes 
that the question of the end of the Cold War is “fundamentally an anthropological 
problem,” and as such, his book takes up an anthropological investigation of local 
practices and rituals linked to the traumas of the Cold War in Asia and their lived effects 
in the present (8).  
For Kuan-Hsing Chen, the ongoing effects of the Cold War in Asia have “become 
embedded in local history” and “been inscribed into our national, family, and personal 
histories” (118). As he puts it in 2010’s Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization, “the 
cold war is still alive within us,” as “the subjectivities formed during the cold war remain 
within us” (119). As such, he argues that we must “undertake the critical work of 
confronting the ongoing problematic of the cold war,” a task he somewhat inelegantly 
names “de-cold war.” To “de-cold war,” he states, “does not mean simply to rid ourselves 
of a cold-war consciousness or to try to forget that period in history”; rather, it means “to 
mark out a space in which unspoken stories and histories may be told, and to recognize 
and map the historically constituted cultural and political effects of the cold war” (120). 
“De-cold war”-ing, for Chen, goes hand in hand with the also-essential twin processes of 
decolonization and what he calls deimperialization, respectively the “attempt of the 
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previously colonized to reflectively work out a historical relation with the former 
colonizer, culturally, politically, and economically” and the former colonizer’s need to 
“examine the conduct, motives, desires, and consequences of the imperialist history that 
has formed its own subjectivity” (3-4). He argues that because the processes of 
decolonization and deimperialization were interrupted in Asia by the formation of the 
Cold War geopolitical structure, decolonization can only truly take place once we choose 
to actively grapple with the effects of the Cold War. This claim recalls Chungmoo Choi’s 
argument that after the defeat of Japan ended its colonial rule in Korea, South Korea 
experienced a “deferred postcoloniality,” as liberation from Japan gave immediate way to 
the U.S. neocolonial occupation and domination of South Korea. Both Choi and Chen 
look to cultural studies to take on the work of decolonizing, de-imperializing, and “de-
cold war”-ing, offering analyses of social movements and popular memory that speak to 
the embeddedness of the Cold War formations in daily lives and relationships. 
This dissertation looks to recent and contemporary works of literature by 
American writers of color in order to work through the profound but often unthought 
effects of the Cold War for minority subjects in U.S. culture. Whereas Kwon looks to 
anthropological inquiry to enact the decomposition of the cold war and Chen to cultural 
studies, I look to literature as a sphere in which the unspoken stories and histories of the 
Korean War have been brought to light with increasing urgency in recent years.4 And 
whereas both Kwon and Chen focus their analysis on sites in Asia, where the often 
                                                
4 The novels I read in this dissertation represent selections from a wave of recent American literary works 
that have marked a renewed popular interest in the place of the Korean War in our cultural and historical 
memory. See in addition to the works discussed in this dissertation Heinz Insu Fenkl’s Memories of my 
Ghost Brother (1996), Susan Choi’s The Foreign Student (2004), Philip Roth’s Indignation (2008), Jayne 
Anne Philips’ Lark and Termite (2009), Robert Olmstead’s The Coldest Night (2010), and Paul Yoon’s 
Once the Shore (2009) and Snow Hunters (2013) among many others. 
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painfully felt effects of the Cold War in everyday life are clear in mainstream culture, the 
texts I turn to in this dissertation represent a renewed attempt by American writers to 
excavate a story that has been largely discarded and willfully forgotten by the dominant 
culture. Of particular importance for our reading of American narratives of the Korean 
War, and of the Cold War in Asia generally, is an engagement with the difficult task of 
deimperialization: if the Korean War marks the inauguration of the ongoing neocolonial 
U.S. occupation of South Korea and the arrival of the U.S. as a global military 
superpower, then reading narratives of the Korean War offers us the opportunity to 
critically engage that history of occupation and empire-building, a task sorely needed in a 
nation whose imperial projects and ambitions have continued unabated into the present. 
At the same time, the voices of the Cold War subjects of color represented in these texts 
articulate a vexed relationship to U.S. power: if the Korean War also marks the 
inauguration of a new mode of liberal inclusion for racial minorities in the United States, 
as I argue in this dissertation, then these texts offer an invaluable account of the complex 
dynamic of belonging and distance under formation during the Korean War, from the 
perspective of the present racial formation.  
 Each of the literary works that I read in this dissertation takes the Korean War as a 
setting and a starting point for its main characters and traces the trajectories of these 
characters over the following decades as they pass through institutions and structures of 
racialization and citizenship. Indeed, each work concerns the question of the attainment 
of full and equal citizenship by subjects of color who have been previously excluded 
from that endeavor, whether as nonwhite Americans facing segregation and systematic 
discrimination or as Asians legally barred from entering the United States. And in each 
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work, the story of the attainment of full and equal citizenship is predicated on a 
character’s enlistment in the military and participation in the war as a soldier. Because 
military service often operates as an index of national belonging, soldiering is a 
particularly useful frame for thinking about race and citizenship. In his study of soldiers 
and the management of racialized populations in the total war regimes of the U.S. and 
Japan, for example, Takashi Fujitani observes that during World War II, soldiering was a 
site in which “not only the soldiers themselves but also the racialized communities that 
they represented passed most paradigmatically and dramatically from the outside to the 
inside of the national community” (82). My readings of the literary works in this 
dissertation are grounded in an analysis of the figure of the soldier. In attending to 
questions of gender related to this figure, my project has also been informed by feminist 
and queer critiques of U.S. militarism that not only oppose war, imperialism, and state 
power, but question the political aims of assimilating marginalized communities into the 
institution of the military.5 If the development of policies and practices of liberal 
inclusion over the past sixty years has largely resulted in the absorption of minority 
subjects into institutions of state power, then my analyses of the integration of the soldier 
and his family during and after the Korean War are invested in envisioning the potential 
radical alternatives to this outcome for the present and the future. 
The first chapter of the dissertation, “Becoming Asian American: Repatriation 
and the Communist Soldier in Ha Jin’s War Trash,” traces the workings of Cold War 
                                                
5 For feminist critiques of U.S. militarism in Asia, see Cynthia Enloe’s The Morning After: Sexual Politics 
at the End of the Cold War and Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International 
Politics, Grace M. Cho’s Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy, and the Forgotten War, and 
Katharine Moon’s Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korean Relations. For queer critiques of 
militarism and assimilationist attitudes toward the military, see statements by queer and queer of color 
grassroots organizations including the Audre Lorde Project and FIERCE. 
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ideological belief in Ha Jin’s War Trash (2004), a fictionalized account of an uprising in 
a UN prison camp on South Korea’s Koje Island during the Korean War. If the Cold War 
project in East Asia can be crudely thought of as dividing Asian territory – and Asian 
subjects – into “good” (anticommunist) and “bad” (communist) categories, then this 
chapter reads War Trash as a novel about the making of “good” Asian Americans in the 
Korean War. Ha Jin’s narrator is unavoidably caught up in Cold War politics in the Koje 
Island prison camp, but he himself never subscribes to any particular ideology. Rather, 
the narrator sees himself above all as a pragmatic individual, and it is Ha Jin’s voicing of 
the “universal human” through the narrator that critics have most lauded in the novel. But 
my chapter argues that over the course of the novel, what is coded as “universal” or 
“human” is firmly anchored to the liberal politics of the USA, the land of the free. I read 
Ha Jin’s historical fiction against firsthand accounts of the Koje Island prison uprisings 
and the legal documents that managed the uprisings. Following the narrator on his 
journey from Chinese Communist soldier to prisoner of the UN Command in Korea to 
repatriated victim of the Communist state to, finally, Asian American patriarch of a 
multicultural family, this chapter explores the transformation of Asian subjects in the 
Cold War from enemy aliens to potential U.S. citizens.  
Where Ha Jin’s War Trash concerns the transformation of the foreign enemy into 
the domestic ally, the subject of the next chapter concerns the assimilation of the 
colonized subject into mainstream institutions of U.S. power. Chapter Two, “From the 
Río Grande to the 38th Parallel: Genealogies of Empire in Rolando Hinojosa’s Klail City 
Death Trip Series,” turns to the work of Chicano author and Korean War veteran 
Rolando Hinojosa. In several fictional works written in a period from 1973 through 2006, 
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Hinojosa chronicles the Korean War from the perspective of the Mexican American GI in 
Korea, an unlikely agent of U.S. national-imperial domination. This chapter reads the 
stories of these characters in relation to the liberal narrative of civil rights as a story of 
increased access, integration, and upward mobility for racial minorities, particularly 
taking into account the role of military service and the GI Bill in this narrative. In 
Hinojosa’s work, we find that this story of racial liberalism is also a story of continuing 
colonial domination. Hinojosa’s work shows us how in the Korean War, the state enlisted 
its former colonial subjects living in one historical border space – Mexican Americans in 
Texas – to help impose a new colonial regime in a border war across the globe, offering 
the promise of upward mobility to soldiers of color in return for their willingness to risk 
their lives in allegiance to its goals. Engaging with scholarship in Chicano studies and 
transnational American studies as well as theories of racial formation in the postwar 
period, this chapter contends that to understand this complicated colonial and racial logic, 
we must read the Korean War in a long genealogy of U.S. imperial border wars.  
The dissertation’s second chapter argues that Hinojosa’s tales of the “Texas 
Mexican” soldier present the potential benefits of joining the military and the upward 
mobility it can afford to the soldier of color. In contrast, Chapter Three looks at a text that 
depicts the trauma of desegregation, suggesting the extent to which the military’s move 
toward inclusiveness itself enacts a different kind of violence upon its intended 
beneficiaries. This chapter, “Going Color-Blind: The Black Soldier in Toni Morrison’s 
Home,” assesses the place of the Korean War in constructing a Cold War paradigm of 
color-blindness. The desegregation of the U.S. armed forces during the Korean War, the 
first U.S. war fought by integrated units, marked the arrival of an era of legislating formal 
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equality for racial minorities under the legal doctrine of color-blindness. In this chapter, 
examining color-blindness as a symptom of racial trauma in Home, I argue that the Cold 
War paradigm of racial color-blindness cannot redress past violence, but rather functions 
as a new system of racial harm. In this way, I show, opening up the process of resolving 
wartime traumas for the characters in Home brings about the restoration of color to their 
worlds. 
The first three chapters of the dissertation assess the figure of the soldier of color 
and the role he plays in the construction of a Cold War racial order from several 
perspectives: the Communist enemy and his potential rehabilitation in Chapter One, the 
colonized subject and his integration into dominant national formations in Chapter Two, 
and the Black soldier and the traumas of color-blindness in Chapter Three. The final 
chapter of the dissertation considers the fates of two figures linked to the presence of the 
American GI in Korea: the war orphan and the war bride.  Chapter Four, “‘June, from the 
war’: Refugee Rescues in Chang-Rae Lee’s The Surrendered,” argues that wartime 
institutions linked to the heteronormative family underpin patterns of Asian migration to 
the U.S. in the second half of the twentieth century. In this chapter, I read Chang-Rae 
Lee’s novel The Surrendered, which centers on the war orphan and the war bride, figures 
who are granted entry to the United States through their adoption or marriage into the 
newly multiracial American family before the 1965 immigration reform that would allow 
for wider immigration from Asia. This chapter explores the dissonances between these 
early gendered refugee figures and the Asian American immigrant community that 
followed suit, examining how the violence of the Korean War became the condition of 
possibility for historical and contemporary modes of Asian American citizenship.  
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Chapter One 
 
 
 
 
Becoming Asian American:  
 
Repatriation and the Communist Soldier in Ha Jin’s War Trash 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Early in Ha Jin’s War Trash, the narrator, Yu Yuan, shares the story of an 
incident that will scar him for the rest of his life. It is 1951, less than a year into the 
Korean War, and Yu is one of twenty thousand Chinese and North Korean prisoners of 
war incarcerated in a UN prison camp on Koje Island, South Korea. The camp has 
organized itself into two fiercely divided factions: the pro-Nationalists have declared 
their intent to reject repatriation to China and are agitating instead to be sent to “Free 
China,” or Taiwan, while the Communists demand that they, and every Chinese prisoner, 
be returned home to China as dictated by international law. Given the increasingly violent 
tactics the leadership on each side uses to intimidate and coerce the prisoners, Yu faces a 
difficulty: for reasons entirely unrelated to this political split, he desires to return to 
mainland China, where his aging mother and beloved fiancée await his return. In the 
upcoming individual “screenings” in which each prisoner will declare his intent to either 
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assent to or refuse repatriation before a panel of international observers, he plans to 
choose to go back home. But after a night of drinking with the pro-Nationalists, who are 
trying to recruit him to their side, Yu is clubbed in the back of the head and blacks out. 
He wakes up in the Nationalists’ tent, and to his horror, he sees “two English words 
tattooed on my belly, right below my navel: FUCK COMMUNISM” (97).  
Naturally, Yu is terrified by the new slogan on his body, certain that he will never 
be able to return to China. But over the course of the novel, the tattoo comes to represent 
not just the brutality of the situation he faces, but an unlikely way for him to manipulate 
those who control his fate. When necessary, he is able to deploy the tattoo as evidence of 
his allegiance to the pro-Nationalists (he was willing to get tattooed with an 
anticommunist slogan!) as well as his resistance to their demands (they tattooed him in 
retribution for his noncompliance!). By the end of his time in the prison camp, he has 
switched sides no less than five times, all the while privately maintaining his resolve to 
return home to China when the war ends. Once he makes it back to China, he finds a 
clinic where he can finally have his “embarrassing mark” removed (341). The doctor at 
the clinic removes the tattoos of some of his fellow returned POWs completely, while in 
other cases he “just removed a word or two to make a dark phrase unintelligible or give it 
a new meaning”: he “would play with the alphabet” (341). In Yu’s case, he decides, the 
procedure will be simple. The doctor leaves the word FUCK and suggests that they “just 
[erase] all the letters in the word COMMUNISM except the U and the S” (341). As a 
result of the operation, the original tattoo is transformed into one with a message more 
fitting for Yu’s new situation: it now reads, “FUCK …U…S…” (341).  
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 The story of Yu’s tattoo does not end with this transformation. In fact, the 
continuing problem of the tattoo takes center stage in the prologue and final chapter that 
frame the novel and explain its origins. The prologue, which introduces Yu as a doting 
grandfather visiting his family in the suburbs of Atlanta in the present day, begins with 
the following words:   
Below my navel stretches a long tattoo that says ‘FUCK …U…S…’ The skin 
above those dots has shriveled as though scarred by burns. Like a talisman, the 
tattoo has protected me in China for almost five decades. Before coming to the 
States, I wondered whether I should have it removed. I decided not to, not 
because I cherished it or was nervous about the surgery, but because if I had done 
that, word might have spread and the authorities, suspecting I wouldn’t return, 
might have revoked my passport. (3) 
What has protected him in China has become a liability on his extended visit to the 
United States. Even now, after all these decades, his tattoo remains a source of “constant 
concern” (3); walking down the street, he fantasizes that an “invisible hand might grip the 
front of my shirt and pull it out of my belt to reveal my secret to passersby” (3). He 
unsuccessfully attempts to hide the tattoo from his young grandchildren; in the novel’s 
final pages, he schedules an appointment with a surgeon in the U.S. to try to have it fully 
removed once and for all. But before this, he explains that his true motivation for writing 
the memoir we hold in our hands is to tell the story behind the tattoo to his grandchildren, 
who he hopes will one day “read these pages so that they can feel the full weight of the 
tattoo on my belly” (5). The letters etched on his body, then, have prompted the words on 
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the page before us, and we are left in the position of Yu’s American grandchildren, 
attempting to unpack the meaning of the words on his skin and on the page.  
 The image of an elderly Chinese man sporting a crude “FUCK U.S.” tattoo, trying 
in vain to hide his brutal Cold War past while taking his American grandchildren 
shopping in a suburban strip mall, exemplifies a contradiction that the novel will go on to 
pose again and again: how can we reconcile the militancy of Yu Yuan’s tattoo with the 
reasoned moderation of the narrative voice that bears it? Yu Yuan emerges in the novel 
as the picture of an individual free thinker who is uniquely equipped to move between the 
poles of the Cold War, humanizing the absurdity of war with the complexity and depth of 
his thoughts, feelings, and motivations. Indeed, reviews of the novel have lauded above 
all the universal humanity of the narrator’s voice. According to the reviewer at The New 
York Times, Yu Yuan’s narrative voice, while “not especially familiar…to an American 
ear,” is “recognizably, authentically, universally human” in every sentence, revealing a 
“moral perspective” that gives the novel an “inescapable relevance” to us all (Banks). 
The reviewer at The Kansas City Star similarly declares that the novel “is not a story of 
Korea, or POWs, or even Yu Yuan, but of what it means to be human” (Volin). For these 
reviewers, it is the novel’s very foreignness – of its stilted language, of its unfamiliar 
settings – that provides the ground against which to bring out the narrator’s essential 
humanity. But such a view elides what I assert in this chapter is a much simpler marker of 
Yu’s recognizable humanity: his final conversion into an American subject. I will argue 
in this chapter that it is Yu Yuan’s concluding turn as kindly Asian American patriarch, 
preserving his history in English for his American grandchildren – and, conveniently, for 
Ha Jin’s American readers – that makes our narrator such a legible and laudable bearer of 
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humanity. In traversing the ground from Communist Chinese soldier to prisoner of war to 
Chinese citizen to Asian American grandfather, I want to suggest, Yu Yuan becomes 
recognizably human. But how did this Chinese Communist enemy soldier and prisoner 
become transformed over the decades into an Asian American family man?   
 Asian American racialization since World War II has been bound up with the 
fates of U.S. wars and the demands of U.S. foreign policy. The lifting of Chinese 
exclusion in 1943, for example, is generally viewed by historians as a wartime measure 
designed to counter Japanese charges of American anti-Asian racism and to court China 
as an ally during World War II.6 By the same token, the wartime enmity of the U.S. and 
Japan led to the mass internment of Japanese Americans, suspected wholesale of holding 
loyalty to Japan rather than the United States. Japanese Americans’ conversion into 
enemy and menace was clearly tied to the United States’ military ambitions during World 
War II.7  The provisions for immigration from Asia made in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, or the McCarran-Walter Act, similarly reflected the United 
                                                
6 As historian Mae Ngai notes, “The exigencies of war also led Congress to repeal Chinese exclusion in 
1943, in order to stanch Japanese war propaganda in Asia that criticized U.S. policy as racist” (233) – 
although, as she observes, “Congress’s continued antipathy towards Chinese migration was evident in the 
annual Chinese quota of 105” (203). Yen Le Espiritu similarly argues that during World War II, the 
treatment of Chinese, Korean, Filipino, and Indian Americans improved “because their ancestral nations 
were allies of the United States” (49). Takashi Fujitani disagrees with the latter point, arguing that the 
United States’ investment in disavowing racism in this period meant that “The fate of all U.S. minorities,” 
including both the above Asian American ethnicities and Japanese Americans, “was tied to a larger 
propaganda campaign that tried to represent the United States as a nation that did not discriminate against 
any racial or ethnic minority” (12). In Fujitani’s analysis, the larger goal of lifting exclusionary 
immigration laws was “to mobilize an ever-greater diversity and number of people for national projects” 
(13). 
7 Takashi Fujitani has shown the blatantly racist incarceration of Japanese Americans was at odds with the 
U.S. state’s investment in disavowing racism in this period. As such, he argues, internment was justified as 
having been “motivated only by military concerns, not by racism” (13). Similarly, the use of the nuclear 
bomb in Japan “had to be legitimated by the logic of military necessity, rather than viewed simply as a 
means to exterminate an enemy cast as nonhuman” (13). He argues that serving as soldiers for the United 
States military became a way for Japanese Americans to move from the “outside” to the “inside” of the 
nation and prove their loyalty during the war. See also Colleen Lye’s America’s Asia, in which Lye ties 
Japanese American internment to American New Deal liberalism. 
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States’ military agenda at the beginning of the Cold War: the act lifted racial restrictions 
to immigration, but maintained numerical quotas for many nations and imposed 
particularly restrictive quotas on the so-called “Asia Pacific Triangle.”8 At the same time, 
steeped in Cold War rhetoric, the McCarran-Walter Act allowed the government to 
deport immigrants suspected of subversive activities and to bar suspected Communists 
from entering the country. It was in this historical context that the United States 
formulated a plan according to which Chinese and North Korean soldiers imprisoned by 
the United Nations on Koje Island during the Korean War – the literal enemies of the 
United States – were offered the unprecedented opportunity to refuse repatriation to their 
homeland of Communist China and instead declare their allegiance to the anticommunist 
free world. This policy of “no forced repatriation” was derived from the conviction that, 
in President Truman’s words, U.S. troops “must not use bayonets to force these prisoners 
to return to slavery and almost certain death at the hands of the Communists” 
(“Truman”); its apparent purpose was to provide propaganda value for the United States 
as Communist prisoners defected en masse to the “free world” in a highly publicized 
fashion.  
On Koje Island, unlike in the internment camps, the U.S. state was willing to 
disaggregate Asian subjects from their countries of origin. Instead, it was now apparently 
willing to wager that ancestry or ethnicity did not necessarily determine loyalty or 
ideology. If the Cold War years saw the transformation of Asian subjects from foreign 
enemy and Communist menace to potential productive American citizen, then, I will 
                                                
8 Under the McCarran-Walter Act’s provisions for the “Asia Pacific Triangle,” “Persons of Asian descent 
born or residing anywhere in the world could immigrate only under the Asia-Pacific quotas of one hundred 
per country,” with an overall Asia-Pacific quota of 2000 (Ngai 237).  
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show in this chapter, in War Trash, Ha Jin naturalizes that transformation by humanizing 
the Chinese Communist soldier. In his fictionalized account of the events on Koje Island, 
Ha Jin takes great pains to depict its protagonist and narrator as not just Chinese, but 
human, and, ultimately, American. War Trash does not lionize the UN’s implementation 
of the policy of “no forced repatriation” on Koje Island. Rather, the novel suggests that 
the process of electing or refusing repatriation at Koje was facile, artificial, and too 
coercive to be a legitimate litmus test for people’s convictions and desires. It shows the 
disastrous consequences of the failure of the UN Command at Koje for the unfortunate, 
and unwitting, individuals caught up in the crisis. And it insists that that entire incident is 
an unmitigated failure on both sides of the war. But over the course of his time in the 
prison camp, the narrator Yu Yuan comes to exemplify the qualities of a true American: 
open-mindedness, compassion, intelligence, loyalty, a well-calibrated moral compass, 
and most important, individuality. In War Trash, to humanize the Chinese Communist 
soldier is to infuse him with American values. Through his encounter with the U.S. 
military in Asia, Yu Yuan comes to embody the exemplary American.  
This chapter begins by considering how scholars have theorized the place of the 
American rhetoric of freedom in the ideological framing of the Cold War conflict 
between the American-led “free world” and the Soviet-led Communist world. I next 
examine prisoner of war repatriation in the Korean War as an issue that animated this 
ideological conflict between “freedom” and “slavery” in the American popular 
imagination, taking the public outcry over the twenty-three American POWs who elected 
not to repatriate to the United States as an exemplary case that serves as a necessary 
frame for our understanding of American representations of the struggle over Chinese 
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and North Korean POW repatriation on Koje Island. Then, turning to the historical 
“screening” of Communist prisoners of war on Koje Island during and after the Korean 
War, I explore how a mechanistic concept of ideological belief circumscribes American 
understandings of the North Korean and Chinese POWs, focusing in particular on the 
process of “screening,” in which prisoners’ ideological affiliations are determined by 
their individual responses to a set of questions asked by UN soldiers. Finally, the chapter 
returns to Ha Jin’s War Trash to work through the narrator’s agonizing decision to 
repatriate to China and the unexpected trajectory that ensues, eventually transporting him 
from his chosen life under Communism to the land of the free itself, the United States.   
 
II. Discourses of Freedom and Slavery in the Early Cold War 
 
 The struggle for power between the United States and the Soviet Union that 
defined the Cold War era is often characterized as, first and foremost, an ideological 
battle between two superpowers committed to diametrically opposed, inevitably warring 
worldviews: capitalism versus communism, freedom versus totalitarianism. As President 
Truman put it in the speech announcing his now-eponymous doctrine in 1947, the United 
States’ primary objective in the Cold War era was to guarantee for itself and its allies “a 
way of life free from coercion,” entailing a commitment to “help free peoples to maintain 
their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek 
to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.”9 Other Cold War documents, including NSC-
                                                
9 The full text of the “Truman Doctrine” speech can be found at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp. 
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68, the policy paper that famously laid out U.S. foreign policy and military objectives for 
the Cold War, referred more plainly to a grand, apocalyptic battle between American 
freedom and communist “slavery.” But as Cold War scholar Anders Stephanson has 
noted, this framing of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union as a 
battle between “freedom” and “slavery” is itself an American construction with a long 
genealogy. In his essay “Liberty or Death: The Cold War as U.S. Ideology,” Stephanson 
argues that this pairing of terms dates back to the very inception of the United States as a 
nation. He links Cold War phraseology – “Better dead than red!” – to such iconic 
American utterances as Patrick Henry’s “Give me liberty or give me death” and Abraham 
Lincoln’s admonition that our nation, a “house divided,” could not permanently endure as 
a land “half slave and half free.” He explains that in the conceptual field formed by the 
pair “freedom” and “slavery,” freedom is understood to be “always already under threat, 
internally as well as externally” and hence in need of constant vigilance and defense (85). 
In its American Cold War iteration, then, “slavery” – variously named fascism, 
communism, and totalitarianism in the 1940s and 1950s – is defined as that which 
“cannot tolerate the very existence of freedom as an idea and must systematically attempt 
its liquidation” (85).10 For this reason, Stephanson argues, not only the United States, the 
                                                
10 Stephanson notes that this construction of the enemy also has a longer lineage. He links the notion of an 
arbitrary, lawless, tyrannical power – namely, Stalin’s Soviet Union – to Montesquieu’s concept of the 
“Oriental despot,” the secretive, all-powerful ruler who crushes his anonymous subjects with his despotic 
will. This imagined contrast between east and west, Stephanson argues, becomes an integral part of the 
emerging liberal understanding of a legitimate social order defined by the consent of its members. 
Stephanson posits that the United States saw the coalition of World War II as “an embryonic form of 
‘international community’ in that contractual sense” and hence came to see the Soviet Union as “lawlessly 
break[ing] the given agreements” (89). In this way, he concludes, the “contractual theory of liberal 
‘society’ served…to exacerbate the negative view of the Soviet adversary” (89). See also William Pietz’s 
essay “The ‘Post-Colonialism’ of Cold War Discourse,” in which he argues that the theory of 
totalitarianism “made police terror into Oriental despotism” (70), thus “displacing the human essence of 
fascism into the non-Western world” (58) as a means of preserving the integrity of Western civilization. 
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“vanguard defender” of freedom, but the “basic principles of humankind” are represented 
as being at risk of annihilation by the Soviet system, and in this way, the ideological 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is elevated to a question of 
“antagonistic ‘ways of life’” (87). For Stephanson, this ideologically constructed 
antagonism makes the Cold War fundamentally an American project.  
How did the United States deploy the concept of freedom in the Cold War, and to 
what ends? The United States’ self-styled ideological position as the defender of the 
world’s freedom against the constant threat of encroaching communism became essential 
to its bid for global hegemony in the 1950s. In the military arena, the defense of freedom 
became a key justification for the implementation of an ambitious vision of national 
security that, according to Melvyn Leffler, demanded the strategic establishment of a 
global network of U.S. military bases in the interest of maintaining a sphere of influence 
throughout the Western hemisphere and preserving a favorable balance of power across 
Europe and Asia.11 The rhetoric of defending freedom, in this view, facilitated the United 
States’ larger and longstanding goal of seizing global power through military and 
economic domination.12 At the same time, as Penny von Eschen has shown, the U.S. 
actively drew upon the cultural capital of the concept of freedom in its attempt to “win 
hearts and minds” globally. In particular, eager to counter charges of racism that could 
potentially damage its reputation as leader of the “free” world, the U.S. State Department 
sponsored tours of popular jazz musicians such as Louis Armstrong and Dizzy Gillespie 
                                                
11 See Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-
48,” 348-349. 
12 Other revisionist historians including William Appleman Williams and Thomas McCormick have placed 
the United States’ Cold War agenda in a longer history of U.S. economic and territorial expansion. 
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throughout the decolonizing Third World in the 1950s and 1960s in an effort to promote 
American culture.13 Such concerted efforts to disseminate American cultural forms, a 
second way that the U.S. state worked to “spread freedom,” often preceded or coincided 
with its military efforts in the same regions. 
Development projects in the newly minted Third World were another important 
way that the United States waged its ideological battle for freedom in these years. 
According to historian David Ekbladh, because systems “with broad prescriptions for the 
organization of political, social, cultural, and economic life” such as liberalism and 
communism banked on the promise of a better way of life for their adherents, 
development discourse became “crucial to understanding how the United States 
confronted other ideological systems when they emerged as threats” (2). In fact, historian 
Odd Arne Westad characterizes the Cold War as a contest between the United States and 
the Soviet Union to take up the mantle of modernity in the wake of World War II and the 
crumbling of the Eurocentric world order. Countering mainstream views of the Cold War 
as an era of rigid bipolarism, Westad argues that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were in 
many ways more similar than they were different: both claimed to offer the Third World 
“a road to high modernity through education, science, and technological progress” (92). 
He sees the Cold War as less a monolithic ideological face-off than a conflict between 
                                                
13 In a similar vein, others have investigated the state’s deployment of other artistic forms such as Abstract 
Expressionism during the Cold War. See Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: 
Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) and 
Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: 
New Press, 2001). For other studies on the U.S. state’s efforts to manage international perceptions of 
domestic race relations during the Cold War, see Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the 
Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002), Nikhil Pal Singh, Black is a Country: 
Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2005) and Thomas 
Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003). 
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competing modes of modernity, each of which aimed to prove its superiority by winning 
over – and developing – the decolonizing nation-states of the Third World. The “proxy” 
battlefields of the Third World thus take central importance in Westad’s view of the Cold 
War, which he sees as largely “a continuation of European colonial interventions” of 
old—with the important distinction that the objectives of the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
were no longer “exploitation or subjection” but rather “control and improvement” (5). 
Like Westad, Maria Josefina Saldaña-Portillo argues that American development 
discourse in this era replaced the erstwhile colonial “civilizing mission” with a rhetoric of 
freedom, marked by “imperatives of self-determination, independence, free trade, 
industrialization, and economic growth” for its beneficiaries (20).  
Finally, in contrast to the above critiques of the United States’ attempts to spread 
freedom as neocolonial in nature, some have examined U.S. power in the decolonizing 
Third World as an “anticolonial” force in this era. Melani McAlister describes the 
postwar United States as anticolonial in that it “took over from the European colonial 
nations the role of a preeminent world power” after World War II (46). If anticolonial 
movements, supported by the Soviet Union, opposed the continuation of European 
colonial rule, then the “genius of U.S. foreign policy” in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
McAlister argues, was its ability to “develop a better appreciation of the potential of third 
world nationalism and anticolonialism than the old colonial powers did” (47). In other 
words, strategically supporting certain national independence movements in the Third 
World could offer the United States the opportunity to challenge both European and 
Soviet power. U.S. policymakers could draw on the anti-British, revolutionary rhetoric 
that “formed the heart of American national origin stories” to suggest that “an American-
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dominated international order would best guarantee the expansion of democracy and 
secure the liberty of all nations” (47).14 In this way, even the United States’ neoimperial 
expansion – military, economic, and cultural – in the Third World in the 1940s and 1950s 
could be corralled under the rubric of spreading freedom.  
The overarching story of the Korean War tells us that the United States entered 
the war in order to protect the freedom and sovereignty of the South Koreans, who were 
soon to be victims of an unwanted communist takeover. As such, it was the first U.S. war 
to be fought under the emerging ideological conditions laid out above. In 1951, reports 
that 22,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war held in UN camps in South Korea 
wanted to defect to the “free world” would have served to confirm the American 
narrative about the horrors of the communist “slave world.” However, the domestic 
propaganda value of this mass defection was overshadowed by the apparently more 
shocking news that twenty-three American POWs in Korea had rejected repatriation in 
favor of settling down in China to live under the communist system, an unexpected turn 
of events that activated American anxieties about the vulnerability of freedom in the 
postwar world.  
Although the twenty-three nonrepatriates represented only a negligible fraction of 
the total number of American POWs in Korea, their much-publicized choice to repudiate 
the American way occasioned a panicked national conversation about American 
weakness in the postwar world, the same world it was supposed to be leading. The failure 
                                                
14 As scholars of U.S. empire have demonstrated, such a contradiction between the American rhetoric of 
freedom and the United States’ imperial expansion and subjugation of other peoples has been present from 
westward territorial expansion to the annexation of Puerto Rico, Guam, and Hawaii to colonial 
interventions in the Philippines to the present-day military occupation of the Middle East and other regions 
around the globe. See for example Amy Kaplan’s discussion of westward expansion in The Anarchy of 
Empire. 
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of American soldiers to properly stand up to their Communist captors in Korea was seen 
as symptomatic of the same “give-up-itis” that had led to the American failure to win a 
decisive victory in the war overall, an affliction that tainted even those POWs who did 
manage to return from Korea.15 Upon their return home, as historian Susan Carruthers 
notes, American POWs became one of “the most intensively cross-questioned groups in 
history—by American social scientists…as much as by Communist captors in North 
Korea” (“Redeeming” 275). Indeed, she argues, the prisoners’ captivity “came to 
function as something akin to a Rorshchach test for social commentators,” who believed 
they could diagnose “every ailment believed to afflict the body politic as a whole” by 
“dissecting the infirm bodies and fragile psyches of America’s POWs” through a host of 
psychological, criminological, and “characterological” studies (179). The flaws 
discovered in the bodies and minds of the POWs, she explains, “suggested that America 
itself was an unfit competitor in the Cold War” (“Redeeming” 276). In other words, it 
was not Communist brainwashing tactics but American susceptibility to those tactics that 
bore the brunt of the blame for the American defections.  
For Eugene Kinkead, who reported on the Korean War in The New Yorker 
throughout the 1950s, the twenty-three American defectors to China were merely 
evidence of a larger scale of collaboration between U.S. prisoners of war and their 
communist captors, something “new in history” that revealed a unique weakness at the 
heart of contemporary American society. Countering these claims in a 1970 article, H.H. 
                                                
15 A number of sensationalistic studies and profiles of the twenty-three nonrepatriates were published in the 
years after the war. See for example Virginia Pasley, 21 Stayed: The Story of the American GIs Who Chose 
Communist China: Who They Were and Why They Stayed, Albert Biderman, March to Calumny: The Story 
of American POWs in the Korean War, and Eugene Kinkead, In Every War But One.  
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Wubben argues that the only “new” thing about the case of the American POWs in Korea 
was the assumption that such “selfish undisciplined behavior as existed among the POWs 
was…a direct consequence of a characterological deterioration in the nation itself” (19). 
In earlier instances of American soldiers’ being taken prisoner in war, he notes, there was 
“no tendency to denigrate American civilization” as such as a result of their failings (9). 
But in the case of the Korean War, potential American deficiencies – harmful models of 
progressive education, homegrown communist subversion, excessive materialism – were 
investigated for their contributions to this new “societal sickness” on display in Korea 
(7). This perceived weakness was linked to new gender and racial formations of the 
1950s as well. Betty Friedan famously takes the American POW in Korea to task in The 
Feminine Mystique for his compromised masculinity. She describes the prisoner as “an 
apathetic, dependent, infantile, purposeless being … reminiscent of the familiar 
‘feminine’ personality” (286). In her withering diagnosis, American men in the Korean 
War proved themselves “psychologically incapable of facing the shock of war, of facing 
life away from their ‘moms’” (277). At the same time, as Adam Zweiback notes, an 
imagined susceptibility to promises of Communist egalitarianism among African 
Americans was believed to have strongly influenced the three black soldiers who chose to 
remain in China. Widespread discussion of the three black nonrepatriates in the press at 
the time, he observes, highlighted public perceptions of a special link between 
Communism and civil rights in the mid-1950s (347).  
As Carruthers observes, the civilizational anxiety about the weakness of 
American power activated by the return (and non-return) of American POWs from Korea 
reflected a larger paradox. “Across Asia, western Europe, the Middle East, and South 
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America,” she writes, “U.S. influence was expanding rapidly in the years after World 
War II,” but many Americans “had no sense that they were witnessing their state’s ‘rise 
to globalism.’ Quite the reverse” (173). To some onlookers, the POWs’ captivity was a 
sign of danger that the American way could be eclipsed by other ideological systems. 
And if captivity functioned as a “testament to U.S. vulnerability” (173), then the 
kidnapping of U.S. Brigadier-General Dodd, commander of the UN camp on Koje Island, 
on May 7, 1952 by the prisoners under his watch was an even more alarming sign of 
American powerlessness. That Dodd’s successor, General Colson, conceded in writing to 
the prisoners’ major demands in order to secure Dodd’s freedom after a 78-hour ordeal 
made the kidnapping even more embarrassing for the U.S. military. The United States 
had hoped that the policy of non-forcible repatriation would be a major propaganda 
victory, as highly publicized mass defections by Chinese and North Korean prisoners 
would demonstrate to its enemies and the world the superiority of democracy. But 
instead, the policy gave rise to the opposite scenario, as Colson’s letter was widely 
publicized in the communist press as evidence for North Korea’s claims of UN and U.S. 
brutality in the prison camp. In the months leading up to this event, the ideological 
affiliations and divisions among prisoners were especially scrutinized as the opposition 
between freedom and slavery became a concrete matter of individual choice. 
 
III. Screening the Prisoner of War on Koje Island 
 
 The UN prisoner-of-war camp on Koje Island, which housed more than 170,000 
North Korean and Chinese prisoners over the course of the Korean War, was viewed by 
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commentators at the time as a virtual laboratory for Cold War ideological division. In 
Mutiny on Koje Island, a sensationalistic, semi-journalistic account of the events on Koje 
Island published in Tokyo in 1965, the American psychology professor and apparent East 
Asia expert Hal Vetter describes the camp as “a huge tank,” a “vast electrolytic bath in 
which a process of polarization was at work. Anode—Communism; cathode—anti-
Communism” (64). In this metaphor, the early riots in the prison are “merely bubbles 
breaking” on the surface; “the real agitation” remains “down below,” but will eventually 
erupt in the coordinated uprisings across the prison camp and the shocking kidnapping of 
General Dodd (64). Stanley Weintraub, an American soldier who served as a UN prison 
guard in Korea at this time, similarly begins his memoir, War in the Wards: Korea’s 
Unknown Battle in a Prisoner-of War Hospital Camp, with a metaphor of depth to 
describe the ideological commitments of the prisoners under his watch. “Deeper than skin 
markings,” he writes, “on the part of prisoners of every ideological complexion, was a 
fanaticism and hatred intensified by the corrosive effects of captivity” (6).  
In these depictions, the prisoners at Koje are at heart essentially ideological 
creatures, true products and soldiers of the Cold War. But the polarization in the camp 
that so struck these observers had larger resonances given the recent history of the region: 
after all, the Chinese civil war had resulted in the split of China into the Communist 
People’s Republic of China on the mainland and the Nationalist Republic of China on 
Taiwan, each of which continued to claim legitimate sovereignty over the entirety of 
“China,” in 1949, a year before the start of the Korean War. As such, the ideological 
frame that these American observers placed on the polarization in the camp mapped the 
foreign policy concerns of the U.S. national security state onto preexisting regional 
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conflicts that were not fully understood or taken into account by the American 
commanders of the camp. The United States’ resulting clumsiness in handling the 
repatriation crisis on Koje Island speaks to what Jodi Kim describes as the triangulation 
of the Cold War in Asia: rather than taking sides in a global, top-down opposition 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, prisoners in the camp were taking sides 
in the closer and more urgent battle between the pro-Nationalists and the pro-
Communists. In this battle, as we will see below, the United States saw an opportunity to 
make a statement that served its own Cold War ends. 
 In Mutiny on Koje Island, Vetter reprints the set of questions used by the UN 
Command to individually screen prisoners in April 1952. He reports that prisoners’ 
responses to these questions, which had been “carefully selected to elicit true and 
unbiased answers” (37), were to be noted on their identification papers, and they were to 
be segregated and held separately thereafter according to their chosen final destinations: 
1. Will you voluntarily be repatriated to Communist China? 
2. Will you forcibly resist repatriation? 
3. Have you carefully considered the impact of such actions on your 
family? 
4. Do you realize that you may remain here on Koje-do long after those 
electing repatriation have returned home? 
5. Do you realize that the United Nations cannot promise that you will be 
sent to any certain place? 
6. Are you still determined that you would violently resist repatriation? 
7. What would you do if you are repatriated in spite of this decision? (37) 
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Commenting on this sequence of questions, Vetter finds it “difficult to imagine how a 
fairer test of the prisoner’s intentions could be devised”; indeed, he argues, the questions 
are “weighted heavily in favor of repatriation” (38), demonstrating all the more the 
strength of the convictions of those prisoners who elected not to repatriate. His view that 
these questions were intended to encourage rather than deter prisoner repatriation aligns 
with that of contemporary U.S. commentators such as Jaro Mayda, whose article on “The 
Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law” in the journal of the American 
Society of International Law cites the “circumstances under which the prisoners were 
polled” as “persuasive proof” of the UN Command’s desire to return as many prisoners 
as possible to North Korea and China (421).16 In Mayda’s analysis, the UN Command 
ultimately took up the “voluntary repatriation” policy only reluctantly; he refers the 
reader to US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s claim that “a prisoner of war who does 
                                                
16 International legal scholars publishing in the United States at the time generally agreed that the U.S. and 
UN were in the right to refuse to “forcibly” repatriate prisoners of war despite the clause in the Geneva 
Convention that seemed to specifically disallow such a refusal. Jan Charmatz and Harold Wit, writing in 
the Yale Law Journal in February 1953, find that “even the sacrosanct principle of territorial sovereignty 
can be overridden to protect human rights”; in the case of a state that “treats its nationals in such a way as 
to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity may be legally permissible” 
(408). Josef Kunz similarly argues at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in 
April 1953 that the UN’s liberal interpretation of the Geneva Convention is “fully justified from a 
humanitarian and ethical point of view” (110). That same month, in the International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, J.A.C. Gutteridge argues further that the principles of “no detention by force and no 
repatriation by force” are “implicit” in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as they are “consistent 
with the maintenance of the general rule…[that] all prisoners of war shall be free to return to their 
homelands” when hostilities end (216). In July 1952, Pitman B. Potter calls the repatriation crisis a 
“sociological situation” in which, since the “old law [is] defective from ethical and humanitarian view 
points, the captor must frankly refuse to be bound by it” despite the legal and practical risks associated with 
such an action. Writing a year later in the same journal, the American Journal of International Law, Potter 
concludes that the very use of the term “prisoner of war” is “somewhat anomalous” in the Korean case and 
asks whether a “state of war” truly exists in Korea: “if so, between whom and whom?” (661). As such, he 
suggests that the “old rules” concerning the treatment of prisoners of war need to be revised to “cover 
captives taken in an international police action” (662). Lastly, in the autumn 1953 issue of the International 
Journal, Norman Alstedter claims that the “Western World’s unity was tested possibly more severely by 
the Korean truce negotiations than by Communist aggression in Korea” in the first place (256) and argues 
that the “western powers” must become “organized for making a unified policy” for “affairs in the Far 
East” (265). Charmatz and Wit agree, adding that the “burden” of providing for any nonrepatriates “should 
not be placed on detaining powers alone, but rather on some international organization” (414).  
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not want to go back is a problem … something one does not want to happen” (421). 
Demaree Bess in the Saturday Evening Post similarly argues that the seven questions 
above “were frankly designed to encourage the return of the maximum number” of 
prisoners (53).17 According to Bess, “powerful political pressures had been building up in 
Washington to get a Korean truce at almost any price” (52) – including the cost of the 
consigning thousands of prisoners of war to life under communism. 
 Susan Carruthers agrees that the UN’s screening process on Koje Island aimed to 
pressure prisoners to return home rather than refuse repatriation. In the postwar era, she 
argues, the United States maintained an “ideological investment in escape—in captive 
peoples’ right to flight” that belonged to a postwar historical moment that saw “freedom 
of movement” as a universal and fundamental right for all peoples (88).18 The primary 
concern of the United States government at this particular moment in the Korean War and 
the larger Cold War, she argues, “lay neither in offering prisoners real freedom of choice 
nor in securing the largest possible number of ‘converts,’” but rather in “[tapping] the 
symbolic potential of defection while averting the calamitous blow to U.S. prestige that 
would ensue if UN Command forces ended up repatriating anticommunist prisoners at 
gunpoint” (184). In her view, in its “indoctrination efforts” in 1951 and beyond, the U.S. 
primarily aimed not to foment a mass defection, but rather to “win ideological converts” 
                                                
17 On the Saturday Evening Post and its significance to the “middlebrow” culture of Cold War America, see 
Christina Klein’s Cold War Orientalism.  
18 She further notes that in practice, however, the United States “was less welcoming to mobile humanity 
than advocates of [freedom of movement] implied” (88), both refusing to let certain Americans leave its 
borders (Paul Robeson, Josephine Baker) and denying entry to the vast majority of “escapees” from 
Communist states. Although Truman recommended that a “right of asylum” be included in U.S. 
immigration law in the form of a “Special Migration Assistance Act,” Congress instead passed the 
McCarran-Walter Act, which Carruthers argues “did its best simply to sidestep the question of refugee 
resettlement” (80). See chapter four of this dissertation for a discussion of U.S. refugee policies in relation 
to the adoption of Korean War orphans. 
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who might carry the lessons of freedom with them back home (184). According to 
Carruthers’ reading of the situation, the UN never intended for repatriation to become 
such a contentious issue as to hold up negotiations, but rather wanted to come to an 
agreement with China and North Korea as quickly as possible. For this reason, when 
China refused the U.S. proposal for voluntary repatriation in early 1952, the UN 
responded by “trying to reduce the number of nonrepatriates” by “[posing] leading 
questions that emphasized the desirability of returning home” and “stressing that the UN 
Command would accept no responsibility for those who refused repatriation” in the 
questionnaire documented above (184). At the same time, she notes, the nonrepatriate 
category was narrowed “to exclude those who merely preferred not to return” (184) – 
marking a shift from the language of “voluntary” repatriation to that of “no forced” or 
“non-forcible” repatriation – in order to further lessen the number of nonrepatriates, 
placating China while protecting anticommunist prisoners and maintaining a symbolic 
victory in the eyes of the rest of the world. 
From the 1950s Saturday Evening Post to Carruthers’ recent scholarly work, the 
U.S. narrative that emerges about the screenings on Koje tells us that it was the staunch 
anticommunism of the majority of the prisoners that precipitated the crisis over 
repatriation. Naturally, the story from China and North Korea looks considerably 
different. For example, Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington’s Koje Unscreened, 
published in 1953 in Beijing by the “Britain-China Friendship Association,” begins from 
the premise that the Koje Island prison camp was a “mosaic of unrelieved terror, 
bloodshed and deceit” on the part of the United States (or as they sarcastically put it, the 
United “Nations”). In their view, the repatriation controversy was nothing less than a 
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“deliberately conceived and carried out…policy” whose ultimate goal was “the wrecking 
of the truce talks, the continuation and expansion of the Korean War” (105).  Burchett 
and Winnington, British journalists who base their assessments on their firsthand 
observations of the camp as well as interviews with current and former guards and 
prisoners, contrast North Korea’s insistence upon the “internationally agreed principle of 
the return of all prisoners of war” with what they perceive as the “Made-in-USA issue” of 
voluntary repatriation, “the only issue preventing the armistice in Korea” for the last 
eighteen months of the war (67). In this light, the screenings become a site of 
intimidation, violence, torture, and even murder beneath a ruse of humanitarianism. One 
among many accounts of the individual screening process in the book depicts a prisoner 
“brought individually to the table and asked ‘Do you wish to return to the mainland or go 
to Formosa?’” 
When the prisoner replied that he wanted to return to China, he was asked ‘Why?’ 
while the [pro-Kuomintang] guards gathered in, expectantly twirling their clubs. 
‘Why do you want to go to the mainland? Are you still loyal to the Communists?’ 
If he still insisted, a beating followed that left the prisoner covered in bloody dust 
and the question was put again … It was made very clear that the way out of his 
misery lay toward Formosa and the Kuomintang army. (27)19 
According to Burchett and Winnington, conditions were no less coercive outside the 
interrogation chamber, where prisoners who wanted to return to China were forcibly 
tattooed with anticommunist slogans by Kuomintang agents and forced to sign bogus 
                                                
19 Burchett and Winnington note that this example, from November 1951, was “the first case we were able 
to trace of the type of ‘screening’ that later became universal” (27).  
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petitions refusing to return to China with their names in their own blood.20 Any prisoner 
who desired to be repatriated “was at once branded as a ‘diehard Communist,’ with all 
the brutal treatment that entailed” (136). Far from a neutral or equitable exchange, the 
individual screening, like the prison camp at large, becomes a nightmarish site of 
intimidation in which the full force of the U.S. war machine is brought to bear on its 
captives, one by one. In this counternarrative to the UN’s version of what took place at 
Koje and why, the individual screening becomes the very site of ideologically-driven fear 
and intimidation, rather than the site of its alleviation, and “voluntary repatriation” 
becomes an excuse to artificially prolong the Korean War rather than an unfortunate but 
necessary measure to protect prisoners of war from totalitarian persecution. As Burchett 
and Winnington put it, “‘Forcible repatriation’ or ‘voluntary repatriation’ was in fact only 
a camouflaged term for ‘forcible detention’ of prisoners,” a “certain stumbling block to 
peace in Korea” that was “eagerly accepted by [the] American government” (3).21 
 Given these divergent understandings of the motive for and the meaning of the 
UN’s individual screening process at Koje, I would like to return here to the sequence of 
                                                
20 It is clear that these acts of tattooing and blood petitions did take place on Koje Island; what is contested 
is who carried out these acts and under what conditions. For the UN, tattooed prisoners and names signed 
in blood provided incontrovertible evidence of the desperation of the prisoners not to return to China and 
North Korea; for those on the other side, these same things served as proof of the abuse and torture that 
prisoners faced under UN Command. 
21 The UN’s response to these charges at the time was to deny any such wrongdoing in the camps, 
condemning the lies generated by the other side as an attempt to manufacture its own propaganda victory in 
the Cold War. Burchett and Winnington quote one U.S. officer who claims that the North Korean and 
Chinese POWs were only “being taught the fundamental concepts of democracy…the basic principles of 
democratic life, freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom from disease and 
freedom from fear … There is nothing that remotely resembles coercion or intimidation” (Burchett and 
Winnington 35). But some of the UN’s own agents also held doubts about the integrity and efficiency of 
the screening process, not to mention conditions in the camp in general. General K.S. Thimayya, the Indian 
officer who led the “Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission” charged with overseeing the repatriation 
screening process at the war’s close, stated that in his view, the “terror tactics” employed by Rhee’s South 
Korean regime and the Kuomintang “negate[d] all assumptions or assertions about Freedom of Choice”; in 
fact, he believed that “any prisoner who desired repatriation had to do so clandestinely and in fear of his 
life” (Carruthers 215).  
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questions asked to the Chinese prisoners of war during the UN Command’s individual 
screenings in the camp in April 1952. The administration of a loyalty questionnaire as a 
method of determining national allegiance and fitness for citizenship is, of course, a 
familiar process in the annals of Asian American history. During the World War II-era 
internment of Japanese Americans, the questionnaire given to all internees notoriously 
featured two questions regarding the extent of their national loyalties: question 27, which 
asked if the subject would be willing to serve in the U.S. armed forces “wherever 
ordered,” and question 28, which asked, “Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the 
United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by 
foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the 
Japanese Emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?” Those who 
answered with two yeses were declared loyal, while those who answered “no” to both 
questions, the so-called “no-no boys,” were considered to be disloyal to the United States, 
housed in special camps, and threatened with deportation. As many have noted, the 
second of these questions is a particularly difficult one: to answer “yes” is to admit a 
preexisting loyalty to the Japanese Emperor even in the act of affirming “unqualified” 
loyalty to the United States, a contradiction in terms that has the effect of categorically 
casting suspicion on all Japanese Americans.22 Like the questionnaires administered to 
Japanese American internees, the individual screenings on Koje Island were intended not 
just to assess prisoners’ loyalties, but to potentially reassign their nationalities. The 
                                                
22 See also Caroline Chung Simpson’s An Absent Presence for an analysis of Japanese American 
internment and the Cold War; Mae Ngai’s Impossible Subjects for a discussion of internment and U.S. 
immigration policy; Colleen Lye’s America’s Asia for a discussion of internment and the Asian American 
racial form; and Takashi Fujitani’s Race for Empire for a treatment of internment and the Japanese 
American soldier.  
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screenings similarly featured a rhetorically complicated series of questions administered 
to subjects under duress: captives interrogated by their captors, with their futures hanging 
in the balance.  
The first in the set of screening questions, “Will you voluntarily be repatriated to 
Communist China,” allows for the prisoner to elect or refuse voluntary repatriation. This 
question demands a straightforward yes or no answer, but the following six questions do 
not exist unless the prisoner has answered “no” to this first question. From that point on, 
each question depends on an affirmative response by the prisoner in order to maintain the 
rhetorical stability of the questionnaire as a whole, presupposing a subject resistant to 
repatriation. “Will you forcibly resist repatriation? Have you carefully considered the 
impact of such actions on your family? Do you realize that you may remain here on Koje-
do long after those electing repatriation have returned home? Do you realize that the 
United Nations cannot promise that you will be sent to any certain place?” (Vetter 37). 
These questions evoke without directly stating the vast range of negative consequences 
for the prisoners who refuse repatriation and their families: the potential torture, 
imprisonment, or killing of family members, indefinite detention on Koje Island, a 
lifetime of statelessness and exile. The fact that the vast majority of the prisoners clearly 
choose to “forcibly resist” repatriation with full knowledge of the negative consequences 
for them and their families back home – “Are you still determined that you would 
violently resist repatriation?” (my emphasis) – appears then as a testament both to the 
sheer strength of the prisoners’ desire not to return to life under Communism and to the 
irrefutable duty of the UN to abide by that desire. Those who made it to the end of the 
questionnaire, having answered no, yes, yes, yes, yes, and yes to the questions above, 
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would be faced with these final question, the response to which would serve as proof of 
the force of their convictions: “What would you do if you are repatriated in spite of this 
decision?” Only this last question of the seven allows for an answer beyond yes or no, 
and presumably the prisoner’s response to it would provide a gauge for the interrogators 
to distinguish between those who “merely preferred not to return,” in Carruthers’ words 
(184), and those truly determined to forcibly resist being repatriated.  
The questions asked in the screening as well as the conditions under which the 
screenings took place highlight the extent to which ideological conflict overdetermines 
the very concepts of “free choice” and “coercion” in the prison camp on Koje Island. I 
have suggested here that they presuppose a certain sequence of responses that 
demonstrate an already existing militant anticommunist subjectivity, a Cold War 
politicization so deep that it trumps all other human concerns. It is this opposition of 
ideological versus “human” motivations that seems to most trouble American observers. 
Near the end of his memoir, for example, Stanley Weintraub, wondering at various 
prisoners’ decisions to “screen North” rather than South, briefly considers the possibility 
of factors that exceed the purely ideological. Discussing one prisoner, referred to by the 
GIs as “No-face” due to his disfigurement from napalm attacks by UN forces, Weintraub 
recounts that his captain  
queried No-face about why he decided to screen North, since he probably could 
get better medical care here. ‘But I won’t be here all my life, because you won’t 
be. What good will I be to the Koreans, or even to the Nationalists [in Taiwan],’ 
he said, ‘without eyes and without a nose? But back home in China I’ll be a hero, 
even if I’m not good to look at. And my brother has a basket factory. I won’t be 
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good for very much, but probably I can help make baskets and feel useful. It has 
nothing to do with politics.’ (160) 
In relaying this anecdote, Weintraub acknowledges the less ideologically driven, more 
mundane – might we say, more human – reasons for wanting to return to Communist 
China: to be with one’s family, to make a secure living, to feel useful and wanted despite 
a war-inflicted disability. But even in this most sympathetic of cases that professes to 
have “nothing to do with politics,” we see the way that the U.S. anticommunist military 
intervention in Korea has shaped prisoners’ decisions about their life chances in a 
politically uncertain future. From Weintraub’s point of view, this prisoner’s chances of 
survival look better in the South, where he can receive better medical care from U.S. 
military doctors, but the prisoner is not willing to stake his life on the U.S. military’s 
continuing benevolence and stewardship. “I won’t be here all my life, because you won’t 
be”: this comment betrays the political calculation behind a decision supposedly not 
driven by political concerns. (Of course, he was wrong, although he couldn’t have known 
it at the time; U.S. military forces have occupied Korea continuously since the war.) That 
is to say, this prisoner’s choice is “not political” in that it is not his Communist or 
anticommunist allegiance that primarily determines his decision, but it is profoundly 
political in that the Cold War conflict has radically curtailed the available choices for his 
life—not to mention his life itself. In this context, what does it mean to make a decision 
motivated by “human” concerns? 
The American rationale for insisting on a policy of non-forcible repatriation was 
that the United States had a duty to protect the human rights of anticommunist prisoners 
whose lives would be in danger back at home due to Communist reprisals. For 
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Weintraub, the plucky GI in over his head at the prison camp in Korea, surrounded by 
militant, violent communists, the U.S. military’s protection of the human rights of 
prisoners is one of the only things that seems to be going right. Just after the UN 
announces it will be screening prisoners for voluntary repatriation, he writes home to 
explain to his family what is taking place in the camp: 
It may sound corny, but the 16th and 17th of April were momentous days for men 
all over the world as a result of the screening begun and accomplished. It 
signifies a step forward in human history. We dare not turn back. We have 
committed ourselves irrevocably to a policy unheard of before, the principle that 
men have the right to ask for our protection from unwanted Communist 
domination, and that we must guarantee their right to decide for themselves 
whether they prefer to live under Communism or to reject it. The middle ground 
of passive looking-on has about disappeared. (47)  
Here, Weintraub elevates what might appear to us now as mere Cold War hyperbole to a 
groundbreaking principle of human rights.23 The act of screening is figured as nothing 
less than a “step forward for human history,” momentous not just within the walls of the 
                                                
23 While the UN stakes a claim to protecting the “human rights” of its prisoners, the messaging that 
emerges from inside the prison camp claims that it is the UN, not Communist China or North Korea, that is 
transgressing prisoners’ human rights and violating international law. For example, after kidnapping the 
commander of the camp, General Dodd, the prisoners in the communist compounds of the camp on Koje 
Island issued four written demands. These demands call for the guarantee of basic human rights in the 
camp, an end to the “illegal” practice of voluntary repatriation, an end to forcible screenings, and 
recognition by the UN Command of a “PW Representative Group” as a negotiating entity. Their first 
demand, for example, reads, “Immediate ceasing the barbarous behavior, insults, torture, forcible protest 
with blood writing, threatening, confine, mass murdering, gun and machine-gun shooting, using poison gas, 
germ weapons, experiment object of A-bomb, by your command. You should guarantee PW human rights 
and individual life with the base on the International Law” (Vetter 127). Where we might expect to find 
pure Communist propaganda, we find here instead that the prisoners invoke the language of human rights. 
In this sense, the concept of “human rights” functions as a contested property that each side would like to 
claim as wholly its own.  
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hospital that provides the setting for what Weintraub later calls “our private little cold 
war” (74), not just for the North Korean and Chinese prisoners who will live its 
consequences, but for “men all over the world.” The “unheard of” policy that Weintraub 
describes offers a Cold War vision of human progress, one that irrevocably splits men 
into a “we” and a “they,” celebrating the obliteration of any potential “middle ground.” 
This refusal of “passive looking-on” calls upon every individual prisoner – not just the 
fortunate prisoners at Koje, but eventually all the prisoners of Communist domination in 
the world – to make a choice, to irrevocably state a “preference” for Communist systems 
or a rejection of them, even if such a rejection does not necessarily entail the privilege of 
entry or citizenship in any other preferred location. Given that the possibility of neutrality 
has disappeared in this particular vision of human history after the Korean War, U.S. 
troops emerge as the most fitting guarantors of this act of self-determination (“we must 
guarantee their right to decide for themselves”). The exercise of individual freedom of 
choice becomes the marker of a fully human existence, and the Communist world, which 
offers no such freedom, emerges as a shadowy outside to that existence. In fact, the U.S. 
state’s magnanimous act of proffering a choice to those living under Communism is seen 
as an act itself in need of humanitarian protection and enforcement. And if individual 
choice is understood to be the hallmark of humanity, then the Communists, who fear and 
abhor choice as such, have already lost legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of the world. 
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IV. Feeling at Home in America: War Trash  
 
 The narrator of War Trash, Yu Yuan, manages to sidestep the political debate 
ostensibly at the heart of the repatriation crisis. Despite having joined the “Chinese 
People’s Volunteer” Army, he explains, he was not a true Communist even before the 
war began. He had matriculated at the Huangpu military academy before the Communists 
came to power in China in 1949, but was pleased to see the Communist government put 
an end to the corruption that had taken place under the Nationalists. When the Korean 
War started, he felt, as “most Chinese” did, that “it was obvious that MacArthur’s army 
intended to cross the Yalu River and seize Manchuria… As a serviceman I was obligated 
to go to the front and defend our country” (8). Once in the prison camp, he defends the 
Communists when pressed – for example, he states at one point that he “believed in 
socialism,” since the Communists “had brought order and hope to the land” (122) – but 
makes clear to the reader that his participation in any “pro-Communist” activities is 
purely strategic, since he does mean to return to China and will need to answer for 
himself there after the war. He reasons, “Whether I join them or not, they’ll never leave 
me alone, so I mustn’t stand aloof. Either you become their friend or their enemy. The 
Communists don’t believe anyone can remain neutral” (123). His true motivation for 
wanting to return to China, he insists again and again, is to be reunited with his mother 
and fiancée: a personal reason, as he continually reminds the leaders of both sides in the 
camp, not a political one (65). Thus, when it is his turn to undergo the final screening that 
will determine his destination, his desired political or national affiliation does not enter 
his thought process. Rather, as he sits before the various arbitrators and “persuaders” in 
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the UN tent, his mother and fiancée are at the forefront of his mind. Even if he could 
bring himself to move elsewhere and begin a new life without them, he fears that they 
would be harassed or punished by the Chinese government for his desertion; as he writes, 
“it grew clear to me that there was no way I could go elsewhere without implicating my 
mother and my fiancée,” and thus he tells the arbitrator that he wants to repatriate. 
 Once Yu Yuan makes it back to China, however, in an ironic and not entirely 
unpredictable turn of events, he is crushed to find that his reason for returning to China 
no longer exists. His mother has passed away during the three years he’s been gone, and 
his fiancée has since moved on, asking Yu to stop bothering her, since “she couldn’t 
possibly marry a ‘disgraced captive’” (344). Her reaction mirrors that of the Chinese 
government, which regards the repatriated POWs as traitors and failures. Rather than 
being rewarded for their service and loyalty, the returned soldiers, all dishonorably 
discharged, have been relegated to the “dregs of society” (345). But over time, Yu is able 
to salvage his dream of starting a family: he is assigned to teach in a middle school in a 
new city, where he marries one of his fellow teachers, never again returning to his 
hometown. He and his wife raise a son and daughter who both go on to graduate from 
college. Their son “manage[s] to come to the States” and obtain a master’s degree in civil 
engineering, and Yu proudly informs us, “I even have two American grandchildren, and I 
love them dearly” (347). This brings us to the present day, when Yu is visiting his son’s 
family in the Atlanta area, writing down his story for his grandchildren to read one day.  
Yu recovers remarkably quickly from the jettisoning of the future he had 
imagined with his fiancée, the figure whose idealization had sustained him for two years 
in the camp and driven his most important life decisions. But writing from the U.S., Yu 
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looks back on the decades after his repatriation to China with a kind of wistful 
satisfaction: he considers himself “very fortunate compared with the other repatriates” in 
every respect (347), but remembers that when he first returned to China, “I felt as though 
time had played a cruel joke on me. If only I had known about my mother’s death when I 
was Korea; if only I had foreseen that home was no longer the same place” (344). Had he 
known, he tells us, he might have chosen to go to Taiwan and restart his life there, but it’s 
more likely that “at any cost I would have gone to a third country, where I could have 
lived as a countryless man, and probably as a lonely drudge for the rest of my life” (344). 
This specter of a “third country” is on his mind throughout his time in the camp. When he 
first tells the pro-Nationalist leadership that he does not want to go to Taiwan, the first 
thing they ask him is, “Then to the U.S.A.?” (95), to which he responds, “That country 
doesn’t take in Chinese prisoners like us, you know that” (95). But as the final 
repatriation screening looms ever closer, he wonders whether a viable third choice exists: 
“Where in the world can I ever be among my true comrades? Why am I always alone? 
When can I feel at home somewhere?” (305). Later, he thinks to himself in anguish that if 
only a “third choice” existed, “I could disentangle myself from the fracas between the 
Communists and the Nationalists” (313). Finally, just before the screening, he hears from 
an Indian UN officer that “if you were reluctant to go to either mainland China or 
Taiwan, you could apply for a third country” like India, Brazil, or Argentina (325). He 
rejects Brazil and Argentina because of the language barrier and India because of that 
country’s rigid caste system (in which he imagines he would quickly fall to the bottom 
rung). The question that remains, then, is: “Was there another neutral English-speaking 
country where I might go?” (325). 
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As we know, Yu Yuan does not request to be sent to a neutral “third” country, 
instead suffering through his return to an unwelcoming China until he finds his footing.24 
But by the novel’s end, the United States becomes that third country for him: certainly 
not a neutral space in the context of the Cold War, but a place where he can feel at home 
and fulfill his dreams of having a good life with his family. One could argue that it is 
clear throughout the novel that he was always going to land in the U.S.: from the 
beginning, it was his English literacy that saved him, from his ability to communicate 
with the American doctors who operated on his infected wounds after his capture to his 
ability to communicate directly with prison guards and officials to the privileged position 
he occupied as a translator for the leadership of both the pro-Nationalist and pro-
Communist factions within the camp. It was his knowledge of English that allowed him 
to secure a steady job teaching English in a middle school after his return to China, and it 
was his and his wife’s higher education that allowed his children to succeed. Perhaps 
most pointedly, it is his fluency in English that has allowed him to write the memoir that 
constitutes War Trash itself. That this novel about Cold War violence in Asia begins and 
ends with the narrator in the present-day United States, though, is a curious development: 
why has this novel about choosing China been written in the United States?  
Ha Jin comes closest to offering an answer to this question, I think, in the novel’s 
final pages: it is Yu’s reflection on the occasion of the writing of his memoirs that most 
                                                
24 One might read in Ha Jin’s invocation of a “third” or “neutral” country a reference to the Cold War’s 
Non-Aligned Movement, the association of primarily postcolonial nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America that attempted to maintain neutrality and independence from the superpowers during the Cold 
War. India, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was a founding member of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, and Argentina was a member from 1973-1991. Brazil was aligned with the United States 
throughout the Cold War. See Vijay Prashad’s The Darker Nations for an analysis of the Non-Aligned 
movement in the context of the formation of the “Third World” during the Cold War. 
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clearly underscores the underlying Americanness of his story. Before leaving China, Yu 
hears from a former comrade from the prison camp, who tells him that Commissar Pei, 
the leader of the pro-Communist faction, has passed away, his dying words an entreaty to 
his fellow repatriates to “Please write our story!” (349). As though in response to Pei, Yu 
ends the novel with the following words:  
Now I must conclude this memoir, which is my first attempt at writing and also 
my last. Almost seventy-four years old, I suffer from gout and glaucoma; I don’t 
have the strength to write anymore. But do not take this to be an “our story.” In 
the depths of my being I have never been one of them. I have just written what I 
experienced. (350) 
Yu’s own last words are in direct opposition to the Communist commissar’s final 
directive to his underlings to tell “our story.” He resists being folded into the collectivity 
of the rest of the repatriates, insisting on the singularity of the text he has penned with at 
once a kind of false modesty (what we have read “just” represents a first attempt at 
writing down his thoughts) and a grating self-importance (his story is too unique to be 
merely grouped in with all the others). His claim that he has “never been one of them” 
extends beyond his dissatisfaction with the Communist party in China. Rather, it speaks 
to a more fundamental aspect of his character: Yu Yuan is his own person, a self-
possessed individual acting in accordance with his own personal moral compass in a 
world of followers. And what could be more American than exercising your freedom to 
be an individual? 
 While in the camps, Yu learns to see individualism as a peculiarly American trait. 
When he is called upon to provide translations during the Communists’ kidnapping of the 
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American UN commander of the camp, fictionalized in the novel as General Bell, he 
overhears the captive Bell on the phone with another American general. He is “amazed” 
to find that they speak not of military matters, but about Bell’s wife and family, physical 
health, and mental well-being. “They treated each other as friends, not as comrades who 
shared the same ideal and fought for the same cause,” he writes; “They hadn’t mentioned 
any ideological stuff. What a contrast this was to Chinese officers, who, in a situation like 
this, would undoubtedly speak in the voice of revolutionaries, and one side would surely 
represent the Party” (181). Yu doubles down on this impression shortly thereafter, when 
an American Lieutenant berates him and his comrades for ruining the career of General 
Bell, who he claims is a good person. Yu finds that the Lieutenant “hadn’t thought of the 
incident in the way an officer should”: “He took it personally, thinking of General Bell as 
a specific individual…though he still regarded me as no more than a Red” (192). It is the 
latter “obliteration of human particularities” that Yu thinks of as the greatest “crime of 
war”: on both sides, war “reduces real human beings to abstract numbers” (193). It is for 
this reason that he frequently recalls with appreciation one Dr. Greene, a woman doctor 
from the U.S. who treated his potentially life-threatening wounds in a POW hospital in 
Pusan when he was first taken prisoner by the UN. Dr. Greene speaks Mandarin, and Yu 
speaks English; they strike up a friendship, trading gifts and language lessons. Later, as 
he healed from the surgery that saved his injured leg, Yu concluded that what made Dr. 
Greene “different from others” is that she “treated [him] with genuine kindness, which 
must have stemmed not just from her professional training but from real humanity” (66). 
With the others around him, including his Chinese Communist comrades, Yu confides, he 
could not feel safe, because “there was always some ulterior motive behind every activity 
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and every statement, and I had to take care not to be victimized” (66). In contrast, with 
Dr. Greene, he could sense the inherent “goodness” that “[flowed] out like water from a 
fountain, constant and effortless” (66). Amidst all the ideological violence in the prison 
camp, it just so happened to be the American doctor, radiating maternal energy and a 
genuine care for Yu’s individual health and happiness, who reminded Yu of his 
humanity. Long after their meeting, Yu sees Dr. Greene as a role model for himself and 
his children and grandchildren; he hopes his grandson will become a doctor so that he, 
too, can one day help people in need.  
  Yu’s abhorrence of the party mentality understandably amplifies his distress at 
both versions of the tattoo forced upon him – first “FUCK COMMUNISM” and later 
“FUCK …U…S.” Yet it is oddly fitting both that he is willing to once again play the 
maverick, choosing to enter the country in spite of the tattoo, and that he will finally be 
able to remove the tattoo in America, the land of personal liberty. He is inspired to finally 
look into having the tattoo removed through the most mundane of American activities: 
watching reruns of The Simpsons on television. “These days I often watch The Simpsons, 
which I like very much,” he writes (348). “Last week I saw Bart, the mischievous boy, 
get a tattoo removed from his arm. This gave me the idea of having mine erased” (348). 
Of course it is watching The Simpsons, the iconic American cartoon that lampoons both 
the nuclear age and the nuclear family in the post-Cold War era, that resolves his 
lingering and outdated Cold War anxieties.25  
                                                
25 For an analysis of the Simpsons’ satire of the nuclear age, see Mick Broderick’s “Releasing the Hounds: 
The Simpsons as Anti-Nuclear Satire.” For a study of how The Simpsons upholds and defends the nuclear 
family form even as it satirizes the family and flouts “family values,” see Paul Cantor’s “The Simpsons: 
Atomistic Politics and the Nuclear Family.” 
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The episode in question, “Simpsons Roasting on an Open Fire,” is in fact the 
series premiere, which first aired on December 17, 1989, just over a month after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, the event conventionally used to mark the end of the Cold War; as 
such, it may be said to be the first ever post-Cold War television show.26 In the episode, 
Bart Simpson, like Yu Yuan, must deal with a tattoo gone awry and a misdirected 
message. While doing Christmas shopping with his family at the mall, Bart sneaks into a 
tattoo parlor and asks for a tattoo of a red heart emblazoned with the word “MOTHER.” 
Hearing his cries of pain, Marge, his mother, barges into the parlor, interrupting the 
session before the tattoo is completed, and so instead of “MOTHER,” the tattoo now 
reads, “MOTH.” Marge decides to use all of the family’s Christmas money to have Bart’s 
tattoo removed at a clinic, not knowing that her husband Homer will not be receiving a 
Christmas bonus from his job at the nuclear plant this year. As a result, Homer is 
desperate to find a way to buy Christmas presents for the family. During a trip to the 
races where Homer tries, and fails, to win money by betting on racing greyhounds, Bart 
convinces him to adopt the losing dog, Santa’s Little Helper, which has been abandoned 
by its owner. The dog finds a home with the Simpsons and becomes a beloved addition to 
the family, and the episode thus ends on a happy note. 
 In the episode, Bart’s tattoo serves several functions: it’s a sign of Bart’s 
rebelliousness, a nod to the show’s countercultural milieu, and a linguistic and visual gag. 
But most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, it’s a tattoo that binds together the 
                                                
26 The conditions of the production of The Simpsons are also bound up in the history of U.S.-Asian 
relations since the Cold War: from the first episode through the present, the show has been animated in 
South Korea through overseas contractors. See the 2010 article in Time magazine, “South Korean 
Cartoonists Cry Foul Over The Simpsons,” for a brief discussion of the ongoing relationship between The 
Simpsons’ producers in the United States and its animators in South Korea. See the Simpsons wiki for 
credits and details on the production of different episodes: http://simpsons.wikia.com/wiki/Simpsons_Wiki. 
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nuclear family. Bart intends for the tattoo to express his love for his mother; the familial 
crisis that the tattoo and the cost of its removal sparks sets off a chain of events that 
ultimately brings the family closer together. And although the episode displays the 
anarchic, juvenile yet self-aware brand of humor that becomes the show’s trademark, its 
message is remarkably sincere: it’s an episode that affirms by satirizing the 
heteronormative nuclear American middle-class family. Together, the Simpsons learn to 
eschew materialism and value one another, and on top of this, they complete their family 
with the addition of the dog Santa’s Little Helper, a creature that was abandoned and left 
to fend for itself once it was no longer of use to its previous owner. Hence Yu’s passing 
reference to the episode yields more than just proof of his familiarity with American 
culture and humor. In one sense, he’s Bart, the mischievous boy, stuck with a problematic 
tattoo that doesn’t say what it should. In another, he’s Homer, just trying to provide a 
decent living for his family. At the same time, he’s Santa’s Little Helper, mistreated by 
his homeland and seeking a loving home and family. And like the Simpsons episode, the 
novel ends by affirming the American family and its future.  
In fact, I would argue that it is Yu Yuan’s Asian American family that cements 
the status of his memoir as an American story. As we know, Yu Yuan fondly addresses 
his entire memoir to his grandchildren, Bobby and Candie, whom he takes shopping for 
Chinese treats in the Asian strip mall in the Atlanta suburbs – “Asian Square on Buford 
Highway,” where they buy “a chunk of hawthorn jelly and a box of taro crackers” – in a 
ritual familiar to all readers of immigrant literatures. He mentions in the novel’s opening 
pages as well Karie, his “Cambodian-born daughter-in-law,” from whom he carefully 
hides the secret of his tattoo even though she “knows I fought in Korea and want to write 
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a memoir of that war while I am here” (4). Specifying his daughter-in-law’s ethnicity 
helps us to better picture his family as a multi-generational, multi-ethnic, multicultural 
immigrant family. At the same time, mentioning that she is Cambodian-born evokes other 
unspoken histories of war and trauma, reminding us of the other hot wars the U.S. has 
waged in Asia and of the way that the post-Cold War nation has been able to absorb 
many of those who survived them.  
 But where The Simpsons makes a joke out of the idea of “playing with the 
alphabet” through Bart’s unfinished tattoo – you can’t write MOTHER without MOTH! – 
the matter of Yu’s tattoo in War Trash is deadly serious. That you can’t write 
COMMUNISM without U.S. is no laughing matter for Ha Jin, who seems to find the 
group mentality that either version of Yu’s tattoo represents equally reprehensible. Both 
versions of the tattoo would seem to tell an “our story,” but Yu wants us to read in the 
journey from one version of the tattoo to the other a “my story” instead. In the end, Yu 
Yuan bears allegiance to no land. Whereas the anti-Communists and pro-Nationalists in 
the camp imagined becoming Americans by espousing pre-given beliefs and adhering to 
party lines, for Yu Yuan, it was choosing to return to China on his own terms that most 
clearly proved his Americanism. He was able to get here, the novel suggests, by valuing 
education, working hard, and listening to his own conscience—even when it meant 
standing up to authority. In this sense, the tattoo etched on his body for the past five 
decades serves as a fitting personal slogan for his journey from Communist soldier to 
American subject: fuck “us,” there’s only me.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
From the 38th Parallel to the Río Grande: 
 
Genealogies of U.S. Empire in Rolando Hinojosa’s Klail City Death Trip Series 
 
 
 
 
What is found at the historical beginning of things 
is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the 
dissension of other things. It is disparity. 
 
Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Early in Rolando Hinojosa’s Claros Varones de Belken, or Fair Gentlemen of 
Belken County, the narrator, Rafe Buenrostro, shares the following story in a vignette 
entitled “Where Another Life of Rafe Buenrostro is Seen”: 
Raul Serna, Lorenzo Castillo, and Armando Ledesma took no part during that 
business in Korea; in June of that year of 1950, the People’s Army of the 
Republic of North Korea crossed the dividing line of the now well-known 38th 
parallel; a month later when the Immun Gun armies were advancing toward the 
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Pusan Peninsula, those three took off across the border by way of Jonesville-on-
the-River. (16)27 
Here, Hinojosa collapses the physical space between two national borders, bringing the 
38th parallel dividing the newly constituted North and South Koreas and the Río Grande 
separating Mexico and Texas into the same narrative universe. The crossing of the 
“dividing line” at the 38th parallel by North Korean troops in June 1950 not only gives 
rise to this escape across the Río Grande, but – more to the point – it also takes our 
narrator and many other “Texas Mexicans” from the Río Grande Valley halfway around 
the world to fight in Korea.28 Rafe and his friends find themselves leaving one site of 
border conflict only to encounter, and to police, another. And while the abovementioned 
three men who crossed over to Mexico in 1950 “did very well” there, the narrator informs 
us, those “who did not do at all well in Korea were Charlie Villalón, Pepe Vielma, Tony 
Balderas, David the ‘uncle,’ and others who died some 10,000 miles away from Belken 
County,” the fictional home of Buenrostro’s recurring cast of characters throughout his 
fifteen-volume Klail City Death Trip Series (CV 16).  
Rolando Hinojosa, a pioneering author in Chicano literature since the 1970s, is 
best known for his wide-ranging portrayal of a fictionalized Mexican American 
community in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of South Texas in the Klail City Death Trip 
Series [KCDTS], a set of works written in Spanish and English that span multiple literary 
                                                
27 I cite Julia Cruz’s English translation of Claros Varones de Belken from the original bilingual edition of 
the book here. Hinojosa has published different versions of the same books in Spanish and English 
(Estampas del Valle y otras obras and The Valley; Klail City y su alrededores and Klail City; Mi querido 
Rafa and Dear Rafe, Becky and Her Friends and Los Amigos de Becky); however, these different editions 
are not English or Spanish translations of the original texts, but rather, in Hinojosa’s words, “recastings.”  
28 “Texas Mexican” is the term Hinojosa uses throughout the series for Mexican Americans from Texas; I 
use the same term in this chapter when discussing Hinojosa’s work. 
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genres and forms, including poetry, short stories, detective novels, and epistolary fiction. 
These works tell and retell stories in different voices, iterations, and languages, and in 
this chapter, I read them as a continuous archive. Of the fifteen works that comprise the 
KCDTS to date, two have been wholly devoted to recounting Rafe and his friends’ time 
served in Japan and Korea during the Korean War: Korean Love Songs (1978), a book of 
poetry, and The Useless Servants (1993), a novel composed of Rafe’s diary entries and 
letters written from Korea.  
Given that the Klail City Death Trip Series [KCDTS] is generally understood to 
be a chronicle of Mexican-American communal life in South Texas over the twentieth 
century, critics have been largely undecided about how to interpret the Korean War 
stories in relation to the larger narrative. Some have chosen to bracket this Korean War 
content entirely, while others have acknowledged the place of the Korean War as an “all-
informing event” in the narrative arc of the series (Calderón 166).29 Few critics, however, 
have offered substantive readings of Hinojosa’s Korean War stories. In this existing 
scholarship, it has been argued that the Korean War functions primarily as an allegory of 
or parallel to the historical-fictional world of the Río Grande Valley in Texas, as in a 
review of The Useless Servants that sees “parallels between war-torn Koreans and war-
riddled Texas Mexicans” as “inescapable” in the novel (Doyle 124). Cultural critic 
Ramón Saldívar reads the “theme of war” in Korean Love Songs as an allegory more 
                                                
29 In an example of the former, Helena Villacrés Stanton states in “Death in Rolando Hinojosa’s Belken 
County” (1986) that she omits Korean Love Songs from her analysis of the series “because, focusing on the 
Korean War scene, it introduces a different perspective” (Stanton 9). In examples of the latter, Rosaura 
Sanchez states that Korean Love Songs serves to crucially “connect” the works in the series (76), and Klaus 
Zilles observes that Korean Love Songs is the first book to feature the phrase “Klail City Death Trip Series” 
on its title page, thus officially inaugurating an understanding of Hinojosa’s work as an ongoing serial 
project (23). 
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broadly of Chicano struggle. In his reading, the characters’ American military units and 
bases in Korea and Japan, like their hometowns back in the Valley, become sites of 
Chicano struggle for “cultural integrity, communal identity, and social justice” in the face 
of racial prejudice and alienation (136). For this reason, Saldívar argues that even though 
the book takes place in Korea, Korean Love Songs is still ultimately “about South Texas 
and Mexican American life in a moment of crucial self-formation” (136).  
This chapter proceeds from a different premise. If the figure of a parallel evokes 
straight lines that run side by side, never intersecting, then, I contend, the Korean War 
does not parallel the wars and conflicts in Texas’ past and present. Rather, I argue that in 
the Klail City Death Trip Series, Rolando Hinojosa sketches a genealogy of U.S. imperial 
border wars whose crisscrossing lines of descent connect the Korean War to past and 
present wars and conflicts on the Texas-Mexico border. His work insists that we see the 
Korean War as a part of the history of Chicano life, and the history of Texas and Mexico 
as a part of the Cold War division and consolidation of the two Koreas. It reveals South 
Texas, Japan, and Korea to be ongoing and enmeshed U.S. imperial projects. Reading the 
Korean War in a genealogy of U.S. imperial border wars, I argue in this chapter that 
Korea and Japan become the sites of these characters’ recruitment into an American 
imperial apparatus. As I will show, the experience of fighting in the Korean War on the 
side of the colonizer irrevocably alters Rafe and his fellow Texas Mexican soldiers’ 
relationships to U.S. empire.  
I use the term genealogy advisedly here, with regard to both how we read 
Hinojosa’s work and how we narrate histories of the Cold War and U.S. empire. As Juan 
Bruce-Novoa has observed, genealogies, in the sense of naming and tracing family 
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lineages, lie at the heart of Hinojosa’s literary project (155).30 In a nonfiction piece, 
Hinojosa explains this genealogical sensibility by way of the following example: 
[A Texas Mexican] could look at a plaque commemorating the dead of World 
War I, II, Korea and so on, read the names listed there, and see something 
different from what an outsider would see … The outsider’s eyes would also see a 
flat surface with names, while we would see differing configurations with 
extending and extensive bloodlines… We would see lines crossing and 
crisscrossing across the years and across the wars that would cause the flat 
surfaces to show us another reality. (“Baroque” 109) 
In this example, genealogy gives rise to different modes of seeing and knowing: it crafts 
what appear to be given facts on a flat surface into differing configurations, or what 
Hinojosa describes later in the essay as “vistas not always clarified nor clearly seen” 
(114).31 Such an aesthetic guiding principle shares an affinity with what Wendy Brown, 
following Foucault, calls the “genealogical work of defamiliarizing” (95). Brown 
explains that a genealogical method aims to “denaturalize existing forces and 
formations…to take that which appears to be given and provide it not simply a history 
                                                
30 Bruce-Novoa argues that Hinojosa’s work “has evolved into a history of land claims closely interwoven 
with family relations,” making genealogy the key to what he calls the “recuperative venture” of the texts, 
that is, the recuperation of oral tradition as an object under the threat of erasure in contemporary society 
through the production of the Chicano literary text (156). José David Saldívar, too, argues that the KCDTS 
functions in part as a genealogy of South Texas (“Chicano Border Narratives” 178). 
31 The figure of the commemorative war plaque appears in Hinojosa’s fiction as well: in Klail City 
(published in Spanish 1976 as Klail City y su alrededores, 1977 as Generaciones y semblanzas, and 1994 
as El condado de Belken – three different editions of the same text – and in English in 1987 as Klail City, 
cited here), Hinojosa’s narrator tells the story of Ambrosio Mora, a young World War II veteran shot in the 
back and killed by the Anglo sheriff outside of a shopping center. Afterwards, Mora’s father smashes a 
plaque commemorating those who had died in World War II. After he is done “breaking the living hell and 
memory a-the damn thing,” he explains that Mexicans in Texas are “Greeks … Greeks whose homes have 
been taken over by the Romans” (38). This story is retold several times and referenced repeatedly 
throughout the KCDTS.  
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but one that reveals how contingently it came into being and remains in being, the degree 
to which it is neither foreordained nor fixed in meaning” (103).  
Taking on a genealogical approach, this chapter critically engages the histories of 
race, the Cold War, and U.S. empire contained in the Klail City Death Trip Series. 
Focusing on Hinojosa’s Korean War stories, I make the case that in these works, the 
Korean War serves to broker the inclusion of Mexican American soldiers into the 
American mainstream. In return for risking their lives and being willing to kill to serve in 
the U.S. military, these subjects are offered newfound access to institutions of power and 
the promise of upward mobility. José Davíd Saldívar has argued that Hinojosa’s series 
“subverts the lofty tradition of the Spanish chronicle by focusing not on the powerholders 
in south Texas, but on the powerless, not on the colonizers, but on the colonized men of 
Belken County” (“Limits” 257).32 In critical conversation with this reading, I contend on 
the contrary that in Hinojosa’s work, the Korean War fundamentally transforms these 
colonized subjects’ relationship to U.S. empire. After fighting in the U.S. military 
overseas, these soldiers must newly negotiate the terms of their American national 
belonging. The first part of this chapter discusses several key frameworks for 
understanding U.S. empire and the origins of the Korean War, and makes a case for the 
importance of theorizing empire comparatively across space and time. Then, turning to 
the Klail City Death Trip Series, I examine Hinojosa’s representation of the military 
                                                
32 José David Saldívar and other Hinojosa scholars including Rosaura Sánchez, and Héctor Calderón have 
discussed the way in which Hinojosa situates his work in a tradition of chronicle writing through his 
manipulation of form and the allusive titling of his works: for example, Saldívar points out that Claros 
Varones de Belken references Fernando del Pulgar’s medieval Spanish chronicle, Claros Varones de 
Castilla, and Sánchez discusses Estampas del Valle in relation to 18th century European “sketches of 
manners” and Generaciones y semblanzas in relation to a 15th century Spanish text of the same name by 
Fernán Pérez de Guzmán. 
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during the Korean War as an institution that facilitates the integration of Rafe and his 
fellow Texas Mexican soldiers into dominant structures of American citizenship. Then, 
following the disparate trajectories of Hinojosa’s core group of characters after the war, I 
trace the long-term impact of that institutionalization under the rubric of Cold War racial 
liberalism. In these readings, taken together, I aim to bring out the reciprocal effects of 
one imperial situation – the longstanding U.S. annexation of Texas – on another – the 
U.S. occupation of South Korea. In a coda to the chapter, I consider a third space that 
both illuminates and further complicates these readings: Japan after World War II, at 
once an imperial power recently dispossessed of its colonies, including South Korea, and 
a nation itself newly occupied by the U.S. military. This coda takes up the case of Sonny 
Ruiz, a character in Hinojosa’s novels who comes to reject his affiliation with the U.S. 
military while serving in the Korean War and flees to settle in Japan. Examining the 
colonial situation of occupied Japan, I argue that even in this act of refusal, Sonny cannot 
evade the gendered power dynamics of colonial and racial control under global capital. 
 
II. Empire(s) of the Cold War 
 
 Conventional readings of the Cold War locate its origins most immediately in 
geopolitical dynamics following the Second World War. For example, Robert McMahon 
explains in a recent historical overview of the Cold War that at the end of World War II, 
the prior Eurocentric world order had vanished and was replaced by a struggle for power 
between the United States and the Soviet Union; the Cold War resulted from this sudden, 
shattering overturning (5). In his influential two-volume The Origins of the Korean War, 
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historian Bruce Cumings offers a timeline of the Korean War that also begins in the ashes 
of World War II. His study locates the origins of the war in Korea’s liberation from 
Japanese colonial rule in 1945 and the ensuing civil and revolutionary conflict that 
overtook Korean society. As Cumings and other left scholars of the Korean War have 
argued, the process of decolonization in Korea was interrupted by U.S. and Soviet 
occupation at this time, and a number of “domestic and international contingencies” came 
to define the agenda for liberated Korea (xxi).33 These contingencies “remained 
unresolved in the period from 1945 to 1950 and gave the ostensible solutions forced upon 
Korea by the great powers (national division, alter regimes) a distinctly temporary quality 
in the minds of all Koreans” (xxi). Such a perspective opposes conventional 
understandings of the Korean War as a proxy war originating in superpower conflict. 
Whereas most American scholars saw the war as “a thunderclap that burst in the summer 
of 1950, a sudden hot war in a distant and unexpected place amid a Cold War focused in 
Europe” (xxix), Cumings explains in the second volume that his project is to show that 
June 25, 1950, the given starting date of the Korean War, is actually “a denouement 
mistaken for a beginning” (9). To understand the Korean War, he argues, we must first 
investigate the “unbroken chain of critical events linking August 1945 with June 1950” 
(xxii), that is, Korea’s liberation from Japan in 1945 and its subsequent division and 
occupation by the United States and Soviet Union. 
Revisionist historians such as William Appleman Williams and Thomas 
McCormick see the roots of U.S. Cold War policy far earlier in U.S. history. McCormick 
                                                
33 For example, see Chungmoo Choi’s “The Discourse of Decolonization and Popular Memory: South 
Korea” (1993), in which she argues that South Korea’s postcoloniality was deferred by these overlapping 
occupations. 
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traces the Truman Doctrine – the U.S. imperative to “support” the world’s peoples in 
their struggles against communist takeovers, announced in 1947 – back through 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points negotiating peace among the European powers after 
World War I, the Open Door Policy of 1899 securing Chinese markets for international 
trade, and the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 declaring U.S. hegemony over the western 
hemisphere (21). According to McCormick, the Truman Doctrine served essentially to 
globalize the Monroe Doctrine: it was a “declaration that America’s proper sphere was 
not just the New World but the whole world” (74). Williams similarly argues that the 
Open Door notes, which “became the history of American foreign relations from 1900 – 
1958,” came to shape U.S. Cold War foreign policy (52). He sees the Open Door policy 
as essentially a Monroe Doctrine for Asia (64), and the Monroe Doctrine as itself a 
logical extension of American Revolutionary thought. America “matured in an age of 
empires as part of an empire,” he writes, and Americans “thought of themselves as an 
empire at the outset of their national existence” (21). In this way, Williams and 
McCormick draw a through line from the Cold War era back through the earliest days of 
U.S. settler colonialism and westward expansion. 
According to historians Melvyn Leffler and David Painter, scholarly interest in 
the origins of the Cold War has been renewed since the “end of the Cold War,” usually 
understood to refer to the period encompassing the fall of the Berlin Wall and dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In their analysis, prior 
interpretations of the Cold War’s origins such as those discussed above were “grounded 
in deep, if unacknowledged, ideological and philosophical differences” that were 
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themselves shaped by the ongoing Cold War. Thus the ending of the Cold War has 
presented “an opportunity to reassess its beginnings” from a clearer perspective (1).  
As the anthropologist Heonik Kwon states, the only consensus about the 
beginning of the Cold War is that “there is no consensus about the question of beginning” 
(1). However, for Kwon and other recent scholars, the matter of “ending” the Cold War is 
just as untidy as that of its origins. As Kwon points out, the current story of the Cold War 
may be said to have “an open-ended beginning and a closed ending” (1), but the Cold 
War did not “end” everywhere in the same way or at the same time; indeed, he argues, 
this disparity in ending of the war shows that “there has never been a conflict called the 
cold war” (6). Kuan-Hsing Chen similarly points out that although the Cold War may 
appear to be over in Europe, its structures in Asia “have been weakened, but by no means 
dismantled” (119); because the “effects of the cold war have become embedded in local 
history” in East Asia, he argues, it is “not yet the post-cold-war era” (118). Jodi Kim also 
problematizes the question of endings, noting that “the Cold War is not only a historical 
period, but also an epistemology and production of knowledge, and as such it exceeds 
and outlives its historical eventness” (3). Her project reads this “protracted afterlife” of 
the Cold War in Asian American cultural productions, which she argues “[generate] a 
critical genealogy of the Cold War as a genealogy of American empire” (8). 
Each of these takes on the origins of the Cold War tells a certain kind of story 
about U.S. empire. A reading of the Cold War that places its origins in the Open Door 
policy, the Monroe Doctrine, and the founding of U.S. settler colonialism, for example, 
sees a continuous line of colonial conquest throughout U.S. history that moves further 
and further west. Placing the Cold War’s origins squarely at the end of World War II, in 
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contrast to this long view, marks the postwar period as the moment of U.S. global 
ascendancy, in which the United States takes the reins from the dying European and 
Japanese empires and becomes newly invested in far-flung locations such as Korea. 
Finally, insisting that the Cold War is not yet over, especially in Asia, points to the 
diffuse effects of U.S. empire in the present. Each of these timelines offers valuable 
insight into the historiography of the Cold War, and yet, in different ways, I think they 
each risk reproducing what Amy Kaplan terms a “teleological narrative that empire tells 
about itself, the inexorable westward march of empire” (18). Kaplan argues in The 
Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture that this teleological narrative revolves 
around “a central geographic bifurcation between continental expansion and overseas 
empire, and the related, yet not identical, division between territorial annexation and 
deterritorialized forms of global domination” (17). This “spatial splitting,” she further 
argues, often “takes the temporal form of a developmental narrative that moves from 
continental national expansion in the nineteenth century to formal colonial annexation at 
the turn of the century to the neo-imperial exercise of military and economic might in the 
twentieth” (17).  
Such a view of a spatial and temporal split between continental expansion and 
overseas empire as a progress narrative has also contributed to the misreading of the 
Korean War in Rolando Hinojosa’s work as a bounded event totally separate from the 
history of U.S. imperial border conflicts in Texas and Mexico. On the contrary, I show in 
this chapter that Hinojosa’s work helps us to apprehend the Korean War as a site of the 
articulation of multiple, co-present, ongoing formations of empire. One scholarly 
example of such an approach is Takashi Fujitani’s comparative analysis of U.S. and 
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Japanese empire during World War II, which takes the mobilization of Japanese 
American soldiers for the United States and colonized Korean soldiers for Japan as 
“optics through which to examine the larger operations and structures of the two 
changing empires, which were based on the nation-state form, as they struggled to 
manage racialized populations within the larger demands of conducting total war” (6). 
Reading across these two imperial sites and histories allows Fujitani to broadly theorize 
the military as an institution that facilitates the national inclusion of racialized and 
colonized populations at mid-century. In discussing the U.S. military’s simultaneous 
employment of and disavowal of racism during World War II, Fujitani looks specifically 
at Japanese American soldiers, but his insight about the integrative function of the 
military and his argument about the cross-pollination of different imperial systems over 
space and time hold for the “Texas Mexicans” that Hinojosa writes about as well. The 
Klail City Death Trip Series invokes multiple imperial sites and histories, most notably 
including the U.S. occupation of Japan, the U.S. occupation of Korea, Japan’s occupation 
of Korea, the U.S. annexation of Texas, and the Spanish colonization of Mexico. To 
consider the status of the Mexican American soldier in the Korean War is necessarily to 
critically engage the overlay of these disparate histories and think them together. In this 
sense, the readings that follow in this chapter represent an attempt to heed Lisa Lowe’s 
recent call for scholars to investigate the “forgotten intimacies…of four continents” in 
their studies of race, empire, and capital (207).  
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III. “After all, a lot of Mexicans live in Texas”: Racial Belonging in the Korean War 
 
 In the Klail City Death Trip Series, Hinojosa repeatedly compares the Korean 
War to other wars in U.S. history. These wars – especially but not exclusively wars 
fought in Texas and Mexico in the 19th and 20th centuries, including the War for Texas 
Independence, The Mexican-American War, and the Mexican Revolution –  appear as 
structuring reference points in the historical memory of the Valley across the works in the 
series. For example, in Rites and Witnesses (1989), a town elder named Abel Manzano 
narrates the family history of Esteban Echevarría as a history of various wartimes. He 
tells us that Echevarría was born “just a few years after the Americans fought between 
themselves; in their own war” (109), and that one of Echevarría’s uncles fought for the 
Confederates while another fought for the United States; that Echevarría’s family land is 
near the site where “the Texas Rangers shot the three Naranjo brothers in 1915” during 
the time of the Seditionists’ raids in the Mexican Revolution (109);34 and finally that the 
town sheriff, an ex-Texas Ranger suspected to be involved with that same shooting, has 
recently murdered a young Texas Mexican veteran of World War II. Such a compression 
of historical time through references to war is typical of Hinojosa’s narration throughout 
the series.  
 Hinojosa has explained that part of his motivation for making the Korean War so 
prominent in his work is to “show that that the military had been another experience (as 
                                                
34 The Seditionists, or the “Texas-Mexican Liberating Army,” as Hinojosa sometimes refers to them, 
appear several times in the KCDTS, perhaps most memorably in Claros Varones, in which we learn about 
Rafe’s family’s support of the Seditionists, and Dear Rafe, in which Jehú recounts an argument he has with 
an Anglo woman over dates and places of events of the Mexican Revolution. In The Valley, the narrator 
Jehú Malacara tells us that the Mexican Revolution of 1910 appears as a living event for those around him 
in such a way that a “conventional term when speaking of the Mexican Revolution” is “yesterday” (37). 
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had the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World 
War II, etc.) of [Mexican Americans in Texas]” (Jason 299). In Korea, the character-
narrator Rafe Buenrostro finds that his experiences there are constantly referred back to 
these and other wars, both recent and long past, by those around him. After one 
particularly grueling battle, he writes in his journal that “the Marine Old Guys must’ve 
thought they died and were being forced to fight the Pacific wars all over again” (US 47); 
after another, a wounded fellow soldier from Jonesboro, Arkansas tells him that the “fight 
with NK was like the French-and-Indian War…all guerrilla fighting by both sides” (US 
62); after he watches his own forces blow up a bridge that thousands of Korean refugees 
are attempting to cross, he records, with no small amount of horror, the response of one 
of the “Old Guys,” who comments nonchalantly that “it’s not the first bridge. The Union 
Army did it in the Civil War. Bound to be other examples” (90). In fact, Hinojosa has 
stated that his process of writing about the Korean War was essentially comparative from 
the start: it was literature on World War I – he names Paul Fussell’s The Great War and 
Modern Memory, Robert Graves’ Goodbye to All That, and the poetry of Siegried 
Sassoon, Isaac Rosenberg, David Jones, and Wilfred Owens – that inspired him to begin 
Korean Love Songs (Jason 298).35 
“The Eighth Army at the Chongchon,” a poem in the first section of Korean Love 
Songs, takes place in the fall in 1950, as the Eighth United States Army (the commanding 
                                                
35 In that interview and elsewhere, Hinojosa discusses his experimentation with form in composing Korean 
Love Songs. As he explains, he initially attempted to write the book in Spanish, but came to realize that, 
given that army life happened in English, he had “tried to write in the wrong language and wrong genre” 
(Jason 298). Working through a process he documents in his essay “Crossing the Line: The Construction of 
a Poem,” he comes to write the poems in the form of the arte mayor, a Spanish twelve-syllable form, in 
English. As such, he sees the poems in KLS as poems “written in English using Spanish syllable norms” 
(“Crossing” 65). 
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formation of U.S. troops in South Korea to this day), positioned in the Ch’ongch’on 
River Valley at the top of the Korean peninsula, is preparing to push the Chinese army 
out of the war. Instead, defeated by the Chinese in a surprise counteroffensive in what 
becomes the weeklong Battle of the Ch’ongch’on River in late November, U.S. troops are 
forced to retreat south. In Hinojosa’s account of this battle, the brutality of the fighting 
that Rafe observes haunts him for the rest of his time in Korea and beyond. But in this 
poem, Rafe has other things on his mind. I quote it in its entirety here: 
Creating history (their very words) 
by protecting the world from Communism. I suppose 
one needs a pep talk now and then, but what 
Gen. Walton H. (Johnny) Walker said 
Was something else. 
 
Those were darker days, of course, 
And the blinding march South 
Cannot be believed  
Unless you were there. But the point is 
That the Chinese 
Were stoppable, so Gen. Walker believed. 
 
And he was right; later on he was killed 
At one of the fronts, standing up 
On a jeep. We understood. 
 
This wasn’t Ketch Ridge or Rumbough Hill 
Or the Frisco-Rock Island RR Junction at Sill, 
But then, it wasn’t the Alamo either. 
 
And those who survived 
Remember what he said: 
     “We should not assume that (the) 
     Chinese Communists are committed in force. 
     After all, a lot of Mexicans live in Texas.” 
 
And that from Eighth Army Commanding 
Himself. It was touching. 
And yet, the 219th 
Creating history by protecting the world from Communism, 
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Brought up the rear, protected the guns, continued the mission, 
And many of us there 
Were again reminded who we were 
Thousands of miles from home. (24) 
 
“The Eighth Army at the Chongchon” offers a few unexpected reference points for the 
battle at hand. Ketch Ridge and Rumbough Hill are locations in southwest Oklahoma that 
have historically been used for artillery training. The nearby Fort Sill is the site of Rafe’s 
basic training (RW 15) and a U.S. Army post that, according to the Oklahoma Historical 
Society, has “played a significant role in every major American conflict since 1869” and 
was especially important in “policing Indian Territory and fighting against American 
Indians” during westward expansion.36 And as is well known, in the Battle of the Alamo 
in 1836, the Mexican army, attempting to retake land in Texas, attacked and defeated a 
garrison of Texan soldiers stationed at the Alamo Mission, leaving only a handful of 
survivors. It is memorialized in the United States as a rousing moment of patriotic 
sacrifice (“Remember the Alamo!”) that galvanized the Texans into eventual victory over 
Mexico.  
 These references in “The Eighth Army” to past outposts of U.S. empire in 
Oklahoma and Texas set the stage for General Walker’s analogy between Chinese 
Communists and Texas Mexicans, repeated several times in both Korean Love Songs and 
The Useless Servants and often quoted in Hinojosa scholarship: “We should not assume 
that (the)/Chinese Communists are committed in force./After all, a lot of Mexicans live in 
                                                
36 The history of Fort Sill is discussed by Lance Janda on the website of the Oklahoma Historical Society at 
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/F/FO038.html. References to Ketch Ridge and 
Rumbough Hill appear in a World War I-era text entitled Notes on Training Field Artillery Details: 
Practical Instruction for Field Artillery Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Members of Special 
Details. 
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Texas.” Just as Mexicans living in Texas are not always loyal to our government, Walker 
implies, Chinese troops impressed into military service by their Communist government 
may not be “committed in force” to the North Korean cause. That someone lives in a 
certain country – is risking his life for that country – doesn’t necessarily prove his loyalty 
thereto, a belief Walker stakes on the apparently paradigmatic example of Mexicans 
living in Texas.37 General Walker’s hypothesis about the disloyal Chinese is, of course, 
proven wrong at Ch’ongch’on: the Chinese troops are apparently quite committed to 
fighting this war, and the UN forces face a resounding defeat.38 Walker and thousands of 
the soldiers he leads pay for his wrong guess with their lives. 
The tension between Rafe and his fellow soldiers and U.S. military authority – the 
opposition of “us” and “them” – animates “The Eighth Army at the Chongchon.” When 
General Walker proclaims, “We should not assume that (the)/Chinese Communists are 
committed in force,” his first-person plural pronoun seems to refer to the entirety of the 
forces under his command, the U.S. soldiers fighting in Korea. And yet the next words 
out of his mouth – “After all, a lot of Mexicans live in Texas” – would appear to perform 
                                                
37 This inherent suspicion of Mexican Americans speaks to the entrenchment of the ideological apparatus 
that B.V. Olguín argues “prefigures Mexican Americans as potential enemies whose loyalty – and 
nationality – cannot be determined until they have made the ultimate sacrifice” (90). In “Sangre 
Mexicana/Corazón Americano: Identity, Ambiguity, and Critique in Mexican American War Narratives,” 
Olguín ties this characterization of Mexican American soldiers in the U.S. military to Juan Nepomuceno 
Seguín, who fought with Anglo and Mexican Texans against Mexico in the 1836 Texas War of 
Independence and for Mexico ten years later during the Mexican American War. He argues that Seguín 
becomes the paradigmatic Mexican American soldier, “repeatedly forced to take sides against family, 
friends, and the warring peoples to whom he feels equal amounts of filiation and antipathy” (88).  
38 In fact, in The Useless Servants, the racialized American troops who are characterized as not being 
“committed in force” are not Mexican Americans, but African Americans: in a journal entry dated 
December 5, 1950, Rafe records the story of the “Negro arty guys” who “ran away twice when their CO 
volunteered them as Inf to help truck convoy. Negroes kept separate from us; they have their own units. 
I’ve no idea how I’d behave if I were an Amer Negro in the service. Separate, but in combat just the same. 
Am told most of the Os are white in those units. Don’t know if this is true or if it makes a difference” (114). 
The Korean War was the first American war fought after Truman’s executive order to desegregate the 
military, but this order was unevenly implemented during the war; for a longer discussion of the 
participation of African American soldiers in the Korean War, see chapter three of this dissertation. 
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a fundamental exclusion of our narrator, Rafe Buenrostro, and the other Texas Mexican 
soldiers present for Walker’s speech, interpellating them as untrustworthy elements in 
“our” midst. In Hinojosa’s Korean War stories, Mexican American soldiers have been 
deployed by the U.S. government to protect its geopolitical interests with their bodies and 
lives, the same bodies and lives that have been systematically devalued by the white 
supremacist power structures back at home over a period of centuries. Even as they fight 
alongside other American soldiers in Korea, Rafe Buenrostro, Jehú Malacara, and other 
Texas Mexicans are marked again and again as racially, regionally, linguistically, and 
culturally alien, and their loyalties to the U.S. state are constantly cast under suspicion by 
their superiors as well as their fellow grunts. Thus, Rafe’s final lines in the poem tell the 
reader that “many of us there/Were again reminded who we were/Thousands of miles 
from home,” pointedly emphasizing the differential status of Mexican American soldiers 
within the U.S. military.39  
Rafe’s “we,” then, stands in for a racially marked and colonially inflected subject 
position that is separated from the larger collectivity of the U.S. army, and by extension, 
of U.S. society. If the (white) leadership of the U.S. army represents an opposing “they,” 
then the poem’s opening lines, “Creating history (their very words)/by protecting the 
world from Communism,” give the troops their mission in the guise of an order from 
above. The omission of this parenthetical statement when the lines repeat toward the end 
of the poem, “Creating history by protecting the world from Communism,” reinscribes 
                                                
39 As B.V. Olguín (see note 8 above) points out, Mexican American veterans have chosen to respond to this 
racialized suspicion in varying ways. He cites an anthology of writing by Mexican American veterans titled 
Among the Valiant: Mexican Americans in WWII and Korea whose mission is to “revise the lingering 
notion that Mexican American soldiers cannot be trusted” (89). Underwritten by a “patriotic Mexican 
American veterans organization” called the G.I. Forum, Among the Valiant, according to Olguín, offers a 
“racist and immanently masculinist prescription for Mexican American citizenship” (89).  
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Walker’s performative exclusion by underscoring how the (racial) majority of the troops 
have adopted the mission and its given rationale. Rafe’s “many of us,” then, maintain a 
necessary and bitter distance from “their” mission. Elsewhere in the Klail City Death Trip 
Series, Texas Mexicans back at home voice the same skepticism about “their” wars. An 
elderly character, reminiscing about past days in the Valley in Claros Varones, talks to 
Rafe about “the wars … Those in the Valley, your brother’s overseas, and your own, 
Rafe, and those other wars of theirs in which they always involve us” (208). Another 
character puts it more baldly in Becky and Her Friends: “In thirty years now, this country 
of theirs has been in half-a-dozen wars, hasn’t it? and what for? The Germans? Friends 
again. The Japanese? Same damn thing. And the dead? Dead” (51).  
 Hinojosa’s “The Eighth Army at the Chongchon” thus tells a story about racial 
exclusion and the long memory of colonial war, as Rafe carries the histories of conquest 
at the Alamo and the Río Grande with him to the Ch’ongch’on and the 38th parallel. But 
I’d like to return to the omission of the parenthetical, “(their very words),” in the 
repetition of the slogan, “Creating history by protecting the world from Communism,” at 
the end of the poem. As I have stated above, one way to read this poem is to see an 
irreparable breach between the “many of us” who were “reminded who we 
were/Thousands of miles from home” and the “we” who would liken Chinese 
Communists to Texas Mexicans. But I’d like to suggest that the poem also effects a 
suturing of those two collectivities through the repetition-with-omission of those opening 
lines. That is, if the repetition of “Creating history by protecting the world from 
Communism” without the parenthetical demonstrates the extent to which Rafe and other 
Texas Mexican soldiers have also adopted “their very words,” then we must also read the 
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poem’s last three lines differently. What if General Walker’s words interpellate Rafe and 
his friends not just as Mexican outsiders, but also as American soldiers abroad? What if 
his “we” is at once exclusionary and performatively inclusive? In this sense, the Texas 
Mexican soldier in the poem is just like the Chinese Communist in Korea: a member of a 
foreign occupying army, committed in force only because he is under orders to be so.40 
The poem’s final lines – “And many of us there/Were again reminded who we were” – 
thus speak not just to a minoritarian Texas Mexican “us,” reminded of collective 
subjugation in and by U.S. imperial history, but also to a universalized and imperial 
American “we,” creating U.S. (imperial) history by protecting the world from 
Communism.  
 
IV. “A new life?”: Racial Liberalism after the Korean War 
 
 I have argued thus far that the combat experiences of Rafe and his fellow Texas 
Mexicans fighting in the Korean War serves to underscore their exclusion from the white 
American mainstream at the same time that it compels their identification with that 
mainstream. This tense dynamic of conditional liberal inclusion has been described by 
historians and scholars of postwar and Cold War U.S. culture as part of the ascendancy of 
a newfound attitude of domestic liberal pluralism with regard to race in the postwar 
United States. Mary Dudziak argues in Cold War Civil Rights that from 1946 through the 
                                                
40 Indeed, in The Useless Servants, Rafe Buenrostro’s last journal entry before being sent back home to 
Texas is dedicated in part to “all the other useless servants, the CCF, who also fought for their masters in a 
foreign land” (184). Such a characterization puts the Chinese and American troops on the same side, that of 
the foreign invader. In the same entry, we learn that the phrase “the useless servants” comes from Luke 
17:10 in the Bible: “Well, will we then be like the useless servants who did nothing more than that which 
was commanded of us?” (184). 
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mid-1960s, the federal government “engaged in a sustained effort to tell a particular story 
about race and American democracy: a story of progress, a story of the triumph of good 
over evil, a story of U.S. moral superiority”—even if American race relations did “not 
always stay neatly in this frame” (13). And as Mae Ngai argues in Impossible Subjects: 
Illegal Aliens and the Making of America, this story necessarily enlisted pluralism as an 
assimilationist strategy that “recognized difference in order to efface it within the 
universality of liberal democratic politics” (234).  
Dudziak, Ngai, and other scholars also show that this progress narrative of race 
relations became important in the unfolding global Cold War, as the U.S. state attempted 
to prove the superiority of liberal capitalist democracy over Soviet Communism by 
pointing to its gradual accommodation of civil rights reforms, ostensibly achieved 
through civic participation as a hallmark of democratic process, at home (13). In this 
way, as Jodi Melamed argues, racial liberalism and U.S. global ascendancy were 
mutually constitutive in this period (4). In Melamed’s analysis, the postwar liberal racial 
formation “sutured an official antiracism” – that is, an official state antiracism – “to a 
U.S. nationalism itself bearing the agency for transnational capitalism” (5). This “official 
antiracism” in the context of the Cold War also curtailed the conversation about different 
visions for change. As Dudziak notes, the postwar racial formation limited the purview of 
civil rights reform “to formal equality, to opening the doors of opportunity, and away 
from a broader critique of the American economic and political system” (252). The 
dominant fiction of postwar race relations was one of the ethnic subject assimilating into 
an ever more accepting U.S. society, helped along by the democratic state. 
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In Hinojosa’s depiction of his characters’ return home to Texas after the Korean 
War, this dynamic of gradual racial assimilation and class attainment is facilitated by 
their affiliation with the military. The time that Rafe and his friends have served in the 
war yields material benefits that were previously beyond their reach because of staunchly 
enforced class and racial barriers. For Rafe and Jehú, these benefits come about largely 
through their access to the Veterans’ Adjustment Acts of 1944 and 1952, popularly 
known as the GI Bill. The GI Bill promoted what has been called a “bridging process” for 
many Mexican-American veterans in the postwar period, providing a new avenue for 
gaining access to education, improved health care, and higher income—even if the 
distribution and implementation of these benefits was still decisively marred by racial 
discrimination.41 In Hinojosa’s work, this process comes to bear clear rewards for both 
Rafe and Jehú. Before the war, Rafe is a farmhand on his family ranch, but after returning 
from the war and earning a degree at the University of Texas in Austin, he finds a job as a 
teacher at his old high school, earns a law degree, and eventually becomes a lieutenant in 
the Belken County Police Department. Jehú similarly goes from working odd jobs before 
the war – assistant to a Bible salesman, stagehand in a traveling carnival, migrant farm 
worker – to holding a position at the Klail City First National Bank as a successful banker 
and loan officer after receiving a college diploma.  
                                                
41 In his article “Fighting the Peace at Home: Mexican American Veterans and the 1944 GI Bill of Rights,” 
Steven Rosales refers to “the many potential opportunities that have benefited veterans as compared to their 
non-veteran counterparts, such as preferential hiring practices, military training, and exposure to 
mainstream bureaucratic organizations, as well as the GI Bill” as a part of the “bridging environment” that 
aided Mexican American veterans after World War II and the Korean War. He further argues that “veteran 
status for socially marginalized and other working-class groups seemed to enhance this bridging process 
even more because of their previously disadvantaged position in U.S. society” (599). 
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The Korean War in this way becomes integral to Hinojosa’s depiction of Rafe and 
Jehú’s upward mobility in the Valley.42 But an anecdote Rafe shares in The Valley 
illustrates how racist assumptions continue to pervade the implementation of the 
technically color-blind GI Bill. After returning home from Korea, Rafe goes to see a 
Veterans Affairs adviser for advice about the potential benefits and uses of the GI Bill. 
The adviser, an Anglo, suggests that Rafe use his GI Bill to sign up for a “two-year 
course in boat-building,” and perhaps after that, another in “cabinet making” (53). 
Remembering the same story years afterward in Claros Varones de Belken, Rafe adds 
that the VA adviser “told me that if I had any ambition I could well attend high school 
with the same GI Bill” (24). It is not lost on the reader that Rafe ends up teaching, not 
attending, high school later in the same volume. In the version of the story told in The 
Valley, Rafe merely comments to the reader, “Some adviser; some advice,” and 
announces that he is leaving the Valley for Austin, where he has registered at the 
University of Texas. Wondering about his prospects there, he writes, “It’ll be a new town 
for me. Will it be a new life? We’ll see” (53).  
Rafe’s university education does indeed offer him a new life, one that maps onto 
the emergent progress narrative of racial liberalism. The anecdote about the “rowboat 
gringo,” as Jehú calls him, reveals how race and class continue to circumscribe Rafe’s 
                                                
42 Hinojosa has also commented on this phenomenon in relation to his own career. In his opinion, “what 
happened in the Seventies [when he began to publish] is that the Veterans’ Entitlement Acts of World War 
II and Korea had produced a sizable and critical mass of educated U.S. Hispanics by the Fifties and Sixties” 
(Ibarrola-Armendariz 219). He adds that he feels “privileged to have witnessed and to have participated in 
the changes in the US academy” (Ibarrola-Armendariz 224). His novel We Happy Few (2006), the most 
recent book in the KCDTS, is set on a fictional state college campus in the Rio Grande Valley and 
dramatizes some of these changes, particularly with regard to the inclusion of people of color in the 
academy since the 1950s. Hinojosa earned his Ph.D at the University of Illinois in 1969 and is currently a 
Professor of English at the University of Texas at Austin.  
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life choices even as new opportunities are systematically being made available to him. 
But his service for the state in the U.S. military fuels his ability to transcend residual 
racial barriers. That is, the “official antiracism” of the U.S. state places him alongside 
Anglo American soldiers in Korea and funds his education, allowing him to break out of 
a racialized and classed trajectory that, in the new postwar liberal racial formation, is no 
longer his sole option. Over time, he and Jehú do manage to penetrate some of the most 
cherished centers of power in Belken County (and U.S.) society – the bank and the police 
– but that is not to say that they find unmitigated acceptance among the white Anglo 
elites of Belken County. Jehú in particular finds that even with the institutional 
imprimatur of the Klail City First National Bank, his leapfrogging into a higher 
socioeconomic status is met with resistance by the still-racist Anglos around him who can 
only barely disguise their distaste at his attempt to join their ranks. At the same time, he 
encounters disbelief verging on resentment from some of the Texas Mexicans whom he 
has “left behind,” so to speak. In Dear Rafe, for example, an old acquaintance of Jehú’s, 
Emilio Tamez, complains, “And Jehu? Well? Well? When has he ever faced anybody 
down in this cantina? In any cantina? College has ruined that guy; got himself educated, 
and then he couldn’t measure up in the street or in the Bank!” (117).   
 While Rafe and Jehú’s careers after Korea and the GI Bill appear to make good 
on the promises of racial liberalism, other characters’ trajectories in the KCDTS challenge 
and disrupt the operative terms of that progress narrative. Unlike Rafe and Jehú, for 
example, Charlie Villalón does not get to access the GI Bill as a reward for his military 
service in Korea, because he is killed in combat. In his case, the military’s liberal 
inclusion is fatal. In Klail City, Rafe tells a story about his junior year in high school 
  77 
 
when “Charlie Villalón was awarded a letter and a football jacket to go with it: K C in 
purple inside a white map of Texas” (72). Rafe is given a letter, but no jacket: he is told 
he “hadn’t played enough quarters as per University Interscholastic League 
requirements” (72). But that was “bullshit,” he continues: “The Texas Anglo kids all got 
sweaters or jackets. Oh yes.” The following year, he and the other overlooked Texas 
Mexican football players collectively refuse to participate in practice. When the coach 
asks them why they “ain’t out there running wind sprints and getting your licks like the 
rest of ‘em,” they explain the situation. He gets the point, and soon after, “the school-
board, somehow, came up with enough money for sweaters for all the eligibles” (72).  
So far, this story reads as a parable of racial progress through a collective struggle 
for civil rights: the Texas Mexican students discover a clear-cut case of racial 
discrimination, fashion a collective plan to fight it, and successfully manage to claim full 
and equal status on the team. But it turns out that the story’s ending is far from 
celebratory in nature. Rafe concludes the story by commenting that their victory “didn’t 
mean much, really. In fact, it didn’t mean a thing: Charlie Villalón and a couple of the 
other guys on the team died in Korea in 1951 at the Chongchon River crossing” (72). We 
find that the narrative of upward mobility for Charlie ends before it can really begin. He 
never gets to access the promised benefits of the GI Bill because the one precondition for 
those benefits, fighting for the U.S. military in the Korean War, leaves him dead. In 
Charlie’s case, the actual Cold War interrupts the Cold War racial formation that would 
allow him to fulfill his youthful quest for full and equal citizenship.  
If a model of racial liberalism aspires to efface racial difference within the 
universality of liberal democracy, to repeat Mae Ngai’s words, then the poem 
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commemorating Charlie Villalón’s death in Korean Love Songs also presents an 
interesting rebuttal of that model. When Rafe and his friend Joey Vielma finally find out 
a few months after the Battle of the Ch’ongch’on River that Charlie, whose whereabouts 
had been unknown since that battle, died in that battle, they decide to visit his presumed 
burial site during their time off to pay their final respects. To their chagrin, they are also 
joined by an army chaplain named John McCreedy who drinks with them at the gravesite. 
In “Boston John McCreedy Drinks with Certain Lewd Men of the Baser Sort” from 
Korean Love Songs, Rafe depicts their evening in part as follows: 
He’s from New England, Charlie; 
A true descendant of our Founding Fathers 
Who settled on a cape 
Not ten thousand miles from this very spot. 
Lately, Boston John’s been wondering 
What he is doing hee-ah. 
 
The question is simple and direct, 
But it doesn’t compare to ours: 
Chaplain Mac (and we point we do to this Korean soil) 
What the hell’s Charlie Villalón 
Doing hee-ah? 
And he cries, does Boston John 
In his GI issue bee-ah. (56) 
 
For Rafe, Boston John’s “why am I here?” is so “simple and direct” a question that he 
and Joey can only deign to answer it with one of their own: why is Charlie here? What is 
a simple and direct question about Boston John McCreedy apparently becomes more 
complicated when it’s about Charlie Villalón from Belken County, Texas. In what sense 
is it that these two men, to use the language of the poem, don’t “compare”?  
 Chaplain John McCreedy is figured in this poem as incontestably American, a 
“true descendant of our Founding Fathers” from New England. Later described more 
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humbly in the poem as a “descendant of whalers and traders,” he can apparently 
nonetheless trace his lineage back to a proud and classically American tradition. Charlie 
Villalón’s lineage reveals him to be the virtual opposite of Boston John McCreedy in this 
regard. In Claros Varones de Belken, we learn that the Villalóns run a goat ranch on an 
estate that is “among the largest and also the poorest in the Valley,” which the narrator P. 
Galindo informs us has been “goat land” since before “Escandón brought the first 
settlers” (114). According to the Texas State Historical Association, José de Escandón, a 
Spanish colonizer of Mexico born in 1700, is “sometimes called the ‘father’ of the lower 
Rio Grande valley” in Texas (García). Where John is a “true descendant of the Founding 
Fathers,” then, Charlie is the descendant of Mexican settlers led by a foundational Texas 
Mexican – not American – colonial figure. Where John is the “descendant of whalers and 
traders,” Charlie is the descendant of Mexican goatherds.43  
John McCreedy’s conspicuous Boston accent as rendered in the poem – hee-ah, 
bee-ah, and so on – reveals that he comes from a distinctive American culture. It marks 
him as more, not less, American. Charlie, Rafe, and Joey, on the other hand, find that 
their regional dialect at turns interests, annoys, and threatens their fellow soldiers. Rafe 
notes such occurrences throughout his journals in The Useless Servants. For example, his 
entry for August 6 notes that “Skinner and Stang [two members of his unit] are forever 
after Joey, Charlie and me about speaking Spanish… The three of us will prob have it 
out…with Skinner and Stang and whoever else wants some after this is over” (41). On 
                                                
43 It is noteworthy that this discussion of the Villalón family roots is one of the few moments in the KCDTS 
that directly discusses Spanish settler colonialism in Mexico, a history that largely goes unspoken in the 
series’ characterizations of Mexico. Hinojosa’s elision of settler colonialism in his depictions of U.S. 
empire on the Texas/Mexico border is a topic in need of of further critique and investigation in scholarship 
on his work. 
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September 15, he notes that the three of them “got to speaking Spanish and then went 
into English and then mixed both as we always do,” driving a nearby member of their 
unit “crazy” (72). 44 In perhaps the most pointed example, on October 21, he writes that 
one Lieutenant Brodkey “asked if we spoke Spanish and we said, ‘Sure, Lt. All the time.’ 
Said our English was very good, and we told him we were Americans, just like him” 
(79). (He continues, “We call ourselves Mexicans, we said, and our fellow Texans call us 
that too. Wanted to know if that bothered us. At this, Charlie said it depended on how it 
was said.”) In this exchange, Brodkey’s naïve compliment about their “good English” 
and his confusion about what to call them show to what extent Charlie, Joey, and Rafe 
are viewed as something other than American even as they are serving in the U.S. army.   
 To return to the scene at Charlie’s burial site in Korea, then, the poem’s question 
about what John and Charlie are each doing “hee-ah” in Korea brings out a bitter irony: 
the question of why John is in Korea has apparently only occurred to him lately, while 
Rafe, Joey, and Charlie have had that question foisted upon them by other soldiers in 
Korea – recall General Walker’s comments in “The Eighth Army at the Chongchon” – 
ever since they arrived there. Indeed, they have asked and been asked why they are where 
they are back in Texas for their entire lives. Now, in this poem, they pose that same 
question to Boston John: “Chaplain Mac (and we point we do to this Korean soil)/What 
the hell’s Charlie Villalón/Doing hee-ah?” The universal, existential question here – why 
is our friend dead? – goes unanswered, as does the more basic question of what exactly 
                                                
44 These entries recall similar conflicts over the use of Spanish in the stories in the KCDTS set in Texas as 
well. In Rites and Witnesses, for example, an older Anglo woman named Rebecca Ruth Verser complains 
to the narrator, “If they like Spanish so much, why don’t they go to Mexico? It’s right there. It’s right there, 
right on top of us, for crying out loud” (97). 
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the U.S. army is doing in Korea and why. But the question Rafe dwells on is both blunter 
and more pointed: what is Charlie Villalón doing here, in Korea? And did he ever really 
belong here?   
 Rafe addresses these questions, among others, with a psychiatrist whom he is 
assigned to see before being discharged in May 1951. By this point, Joey, like Charlie, 
has been killed in action, and his friend Sonny Ruiz has gone AWOL. But, he writes 
grimly, “I’m still here.” When Dr. Perlman asks if he feels guilty for surviving, he replies 
that it’s not guilt but a sense of loss that he feels. He writes in his journal, 
Dr. Perlman has always listened attentively and (I guess) sympathetically, but 
even he doesn’t know about us, about home, Texas. I explained that we were 
different; that that part of Texas is home, our home. We’re not like the rest of the 
guys in our outfit; they can go live anywhere in the United States, and many of 
them talk about moving to California, wherever. We can’t, and don’t want to, 
either. That some of us leave for a while, but that we have to come back. Home. 
And so on. (Useless 167) 
Just as Charlie Villalón is different from Boston John McCreedy in the poem above, in 
this passage, “we” are “not like the rest of the guys in our outfit.” Rafe insists that unlike 
other Americans, who can choose where in the country they’d like to settle, he and his 
people have one place, “that part of Texas,” that constitutes home—and he despairs over 
the fact that Charlie, Joey, and Sonny will not be returning there with him. In effect, he 
repeats the same bitter question about Charlie Villalón’s death that we encountered in 
Korean Love Songs (“what the hell’s Charlie Villalón/doing hee-ah?”) in the form of a 
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now-impossible injunction: “some of us leave for awhile, but we have to come back.” For 
Rafe, Charlie did not belong in Korea, or at least not forever. 
Rafe claims that Texas Mexicans “can’t, and don’t want to” live in different parts 
of the United States in the same way that other Americans can and do, the formal equality 
of postwar racial liberalism be damned. Recall that in “The Eighth Army at the 
Chongchon,” he also discloses the distrust that “many of us” felt about “their very 
words,” a we/they formulation that I argued must be read as ambiguous. In this passage, 
more than the pairing of “we” and “they,” which represent clearly articulated groups, I 
am interested in the conceptual gap that Hinojosa opens up between “can’t” and “don’t 
want to.” We encounter this rhetorical slippage elsewhere in Hinojosa’s work as well. 
Earlier in The Useless Servants, for example, Rafe and his friends go to Mass at a Roman 
Catholic cathedral in Tokyo while there on “R&R,” rest and recuperation, and they notice 
“some people sitting in two marked-off sections” (80). When they ask about “the people 
in the boxed-in benches,” they find out that they are Korean Catholics living in Japan 
who “couldn’t and didn’t sit with the rest of the faithful” (80, my emphasis). (When the 
white American soldier with them is shocked, Charlie responds, “Hell, Lt, I don’t even 
know where the Klail Anglos go to Mass or if they even have a church.”) Similarly, in 
Rites and Witnesses, an Anglo woman shopkeeper, recalling when the first Mexican-
owned business opened up in town, voices her suspicion about where the Mexican-
American owner acquired the startup funds for his business: “Vicente was a hard worker, 
don’t you know. It was just that it was a lot of money in those days, see…? And since he 
couldn’t, I mean, he didn’t-a, didn’t have a bank account, at the First … Know what I 
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mean?” (78, my emphasis).45 Each of these three stories concerns the nature of a 
particular instance of racial segregation: a country that is not equally welcoming to all, a 
boxed-in section among the pews in a church, a bank that is not open to everyone. What 
inheres in the space between “can’t” and “don’t want to,” between “couldn’t” and 
“didn’t” in these stories?  
In the latter two examples, “didn’t” presents a softer, friendlier, more 
happenstance version of the proscriptive, ugly “couldn’t.” After all, the Korean Catholics 
“couldn’t and didn’t” sit with the Japanese because they were prevented from doing so, 
just as Vicente Vizcarra, Jr. “couldn’t, I mean, he didn’t-a, didn’t” open a bank account at 
the Klail City First National Bank because he wasn’t allowed to. In both of these cases, 
the hopeful “didn’t” provides a kind of cover for the coercive reality of “couldn’t.” The 
rhetorical slide from “couldn’t” to “didn’t” thus marks an understanding that the logic of 
segregation is, however slowly, becoming unacceptably antiquated in the postwar 
moment of racial liberalism. That is, it maps onto a historical transition in understandings 
of race and racism.  
Rafe’s version of these words – “we can’t, and don’t want to” move anywhere 
else – name a different relation. In the other two cases, we imagine that both parties did, 
in fact, want the option to do what they were barred from doing. That is, they didn’t 
because they couldn’t: they didn’t have a choice. Here, in contrast, Rafe essentially 
argues the opposite: he and the others can’t move away from Texas, but more 
importantly, they don’t want to. He desires the same proscription that he instates: he 
                                                
45 The First, or the Klail City First National Bank, is the same bank that hires Jehú some years later, a fact 
that demonstrates the extent of the racial “progress” that the bank achieves in a short amount of time. 
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clings to the “can’t” and refuses to want otherwise. Refusing to abide by the lie that 
smoothly replaces “couldn’t” with “didn’t” over time, he articulates an inversion of the 
formula that follows a progress narrative of racial liberalism.  
Rafe believes that Texas is the place for Texas Mexicans to live, then, now, and in 
the future. But ironically, at the end of the Korean War, he is one of the only Texas 
Mexicans from the Valley who gets to return home. While most of his friends from home 
are killed in Korea, making a return to Texas impossible, one of them makes a choice that 
goes against his strict formulation in this passage: Sonny Ruiz can and does choose to 
remain in Japan after the war. To conclude this chapter, I’d like to turn to his story as it 
appears in Korean Love Songs. In this chapter, I have argued that the U.S. military served 
as an institutional access point for the Texas Mexican characters of Hinojosa’s narrative 
universe in the period of Cold War civil rights, allowing these characters opportunities to 
enter spaces of power and privilege that previously excluded them. I have argued that this 
transformation brings together two histories of U.S. empire often viewed as completely 
separate: U.S. empire in Texas and Mexico and U.S. empire in South Korea, and in doing 
so, I have made the case for a comparative mode of reading colonial and imperial texts. 
The coda that follows attempts to take such a reading practice further, examining 
Hinojosa’s ambivalent engagement with the subsumed history of Japanese colonialism, 
which prefigures the U.S. occupation of South Korea and predates the U.S. occupation of 
Japan. In doing so, I aim to highlight the value of not just reading across different 
instances of U.S. empire over time and space, but contending with the multiply layered 
histories of race and empire in the spaces we study—in this case, in occupied postwar 
Japan. 
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V. Coda: “To Americans he looks Japanese”: Competing Racism(s) in Occupied 
Japan  
 
In the KCDTS, Sonny Ruiz is the one character serving in the Korean War who 
comes to actively refuse to participate in a system that would trade in his willingness to 
risk his life for the promise of future benefits. After being wounded twice, Sonny picks 
up and leaves Korea, literally walking away from the military after filling out his own 
missing-in-action card. According to Rafe’s journals in The Useless Servants, Sonny 
“was wounded lightly both times, but he said the third time could be a charm, and he sure 
as hell wasn’t going to take a chance” (158). In the third and final section of Korean Love 
Songs, which begins in September 1951 during Rafe’s second “R&R” in Japan, Rafe 
goes to see his old friend: 
 
Not long after, cards started to arrive from Nagoya and signed 
By Mr. Kazuo Fusaro who, in another life, 
Had lived as David Ruiz in Klail City, 
And who, in this new life, 
Was now a hundred and ten per cent Japanese. 
 
There he is, punctual as death: Business suit, hat, arms at his side, 
And as I approach, he fills the air with konnichi wahs, 
As he bends lower and lower, arms still at his side, smiling the while. 
  
He and I are the only ones left: 
     Charlie Villalón, Joey Vielma, Cayo Díaz 
     And a kid named Balderas 
Have all been erased from the Oriental scene. (98) 
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When Rafe confronts Sonny with the question of home, he responds, “‘This is home, 
Rafe, Why should I go back?’” (100). When the army’s “Board of Inquiry” finally gets 
around to investigating his disappearance, Sonny calls on Rafe to “swear/That, to the 
very best of my knowledge,/Cpl. Ruiz is dead” (114). Rafe acquiesces, and with that, the 
case is closed. Sonny settles down with a Japanese schoolteacher named Tsuruko – news 
that Rafe responds to with the line, “And didn’t we/As Cayo said,/Make out better with 
Japanese girls because we were Chicanos?” (100) – and plans to live the rest of his life in 
Japan. Sonny’s mother back at home will receive “something to eat and live on” from the 
army, and Rafe swears to never reveal to her, the rest of his family, or anyone else back 
in Texas that Sonny did not die in Korea.  
Rafe doesn’t think the army will ever find Sonny, for “to begin with/To 
Americans he looks Japanese” (98). In the poem “Brief Encounter,” the ineptness of the 
U.S. army’s racial perception is on full display. As two military police officers stop Rafe 
to check his papers on the street, 
Just then, Sonny Ruiz passes by and tips his hat, showing, 
As he carries, the biggest, the loudest, the most glorious bouquet  
In the whole of Honshu. 
 
One of them grunts and says: 
          “Pipe the gook and them flowers, there. 
     Damndest place I’ve ever seen.” (102) 
 
Without his uniform, it seems, Sonny is just another “gook” in a foreign land. As 
someone who grew up under the shadow of U.S. empire, Rafe, our narrator, is sensitive 
to the peculiar capaciousness of the term “gook.” Early in his war journals in The Useless 
Servants, he learns that “K’s call their homeland Hanguk (Han-Guk?),” and at the same 
time that he wonders whether “gook come[s] from that,” he notes that a fellow American 
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soldier who was once married to a Puerto Rican told him that “Puerto Ricans were called 
gooks by GIs stationed in the Caribbean” (39).46 Under this occupation, then, Sonny is 
one kind of “gook” disguised as another. The lazy racism of the U.S. military allows him 
to pass undetected, even to flaunt his freedom after his criminal act of desertion, under 
the very eyes of its occupying guards. After all, in this scene, it is Rafe in his U.S. 
military uniform, not Sonny in his racial drag, whose papers are being checked by the 
police.  
As Ramón Saldívar argues in “Chicano Border Narratives as Cultural Critique,” 
these scenes of Sonny’s new life as Kazuo Fusaro in Nagoya, Japan “seem to project a 
utopian fantasy about cultural synthesis” (145). Sonny chooses to see a “cultural affinity 
between Japanese and Mexican American life” that offers him a “turn away from an 
oppressed, self-negating home in South Texas” (143). For him and Rafe, Saldívar argues, 
this “alien world seems rich…in contrast to the one to which they must return” (145). 
Although Sonny and Rafe are both susceptible to a romanticized view of Japan, it is 
Sonny whose certainty that he will “find in Japan what he cannot possess at home” leads 
him to the radical decision to settle there (145). As Saldívar points out, this decision 
entails his repudiating not just the U.S. military and its exploitation of his person, but his 
former home and the Chicano community along with it. Rafe, in contrast, “chooses not to 
turn against his American home,” a decision that Saldívar reads as an affirmation of the 
“community and collectivity which has been the historical heritage of the border 
                                                
46 In Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War, Jodi Kim outlines the “enduring, varied, 
and infamous etymology of ‘gook’” as a marker of “America’s long-standing history of military 
intervention and war not only in Asia, but in other parts of the world” (2-3). Citing Paul Kramer and David 
Roediger, she notes that “gook” has been recorded as a pejorative term against Filipinos, Asians, Haitians, 
Arabs, and other people of color since at least the Philippine-American War, which began in 1899. 
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communities of South Texas” (147). Indeed, Saldívar concludes that Sonny and Rafe 
represent two different “solution[s] to the confusion of serving one’s own oppressor”: 
“assimilation to another world” for the former and “the determination to return to the 
contradictory but familiar one” – and a renewed sense of commitment to the Chicano 
community – for the latter (146).  
Hinojosa depicts Sonny’s choice to settle in Japan as extreme but understandable, 
given the duress he faced as a soldier and the oppression he lived under back at home. 
Saldívar critiques Sonny’s escapism as both a romanticization of Japan and a rejection of 
Chicano culture. But I want to point out here that Saldívar’s characterizations of the 
Korean and Japanese settings that these characters encounter – the “masking quality” of 
their cultures, the “ritualized Japanese way of life” (141) – also draw upon a familiar set 
of tropes about the Far East as an alluring yet alien place for drifting Westerners. “It is no 
wonder,” he writes, “that [Rafe and Sonny] are charmed by the allure of Japanese self-
sufficiency, integrity, and family solidarity in the face of an occupying American army” 
(145). But such a rendering of postwar Japan flattens the complexities of race and empire 
that persist in that space. It also elides the peculiar status of these characters, colonized at 
home in Texas but part of the colonizing force in Japan. As I will show below, far from 
an idealized site of escape from racism and colonialism, Japan in the Cold War era was 
deeply bound up in both residual and newly emerging racial and colonial systems. Sonny 
Ruiz’ unique status as an outsider in Japan – and as a persona non grata in the eyes of the 
U.S. military following his desertion – would not exempt him from participating in these 
systems. The white American soldiers that Sonny encounters mistake him as just another 
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“gook”: “to Americans he looks Japanese.” But what does Sonny Ruiz look like to the 
Japanese? 
At the time of the Korean War, Japan was simultaneously a nation under 
occupation and a decolonizing power. In the early twentieth century, Japan had promoted 
the “master ideology” of the so-called “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,” 
another name for the Japanese empire which, in historian John Lie’s words, “promised 
Asian unity and liberation from Western rule” (102). Under these auspices, it colonized 
East and Southeast Asian and Pacific territories including Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria 
in the first half of the twentieth century. After its defeat in World War II, Japan was 
occupied by the U.S. military from 1946 to 1952, a period in which, according to John 
Dower, Japan “had no sovereignty,” as “no major political, administrative, or economic 
decisions were possible without the [U.S.] conquerors’ approval” (23). At the same time, 
Japan was rebuilding as a capitalist regional power under the protection of the United 
States in the context of the emerging Cold War. Put otherwise, as historian Bruce 
Cumings has argued, Japan in the twentieth century functioned as “‘core’ vis-à-vis Korea 
and China” but “semi-peripheral vis-à-vis the United States” (86).47 Takashi Fujitani 
similarly argues that the United States made Japan into a “puppet” or “client state” 
through occupation after World War II in the same manner that Japan had set up client 
states across Asia in the first half of the twentieth century (103). The terms of Japan’s 
surrender in World War II called for its immediate withdrawal from its colonial 
                                                
47 Cumings outlines the following timeline for Japan in the 20th century world system: 1900-22: Japan in 
British-American hegemony; 1922-41: Japan in American-British hegemony; 1941-45: Japan as regional 
hegemon in East Asia; 1945-70: Japan in American hegemony; 1970-1990s: Japan in American-European 
hegemony (103). 
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territories. But Japan’s conquest of Asia had already resulted in an influx of Taiwanese, 
Koreans, and other colonized peoples to Japan. These colonized subjects had either been 
conscripted as forced laborers or migrated to Japan in search of work, and like Japan’s 
indigenous ethnic minorities, they faced widespread discrimination and conditions of 
poverty (Lie 110). No longer considered Japanese nationals after Japan’s surrender, they 
were also stripped of citizenship and referred to as daisankokujin, or “third-country 
people,” rather than gaijin, the conventional term for “foreigner” which “was reserved for 
Caucasians” (Dower 578). Given these conditions, many ethnic minorities in Japan 
adopted Japanese names and attempted to “pass as ‘ordinary’ Japanese and hide their 
ethnic background” for fear of discrimination (Lie 5).48 
The Japan that Rafe, Sonny, and their fellow soldiers encountered, then, would 
have been a space rife with racial and colonial tensions. As members of the U.S. 
occupying forces, they are partly shielded from these dynamics, but in his journals in The 
Useless Servants, Rafe registers his recognition of Japan’s erstwhile colonial relationship 
to Korea. At one point, as his unit heads northwest toward the border between North 
Korea and Manchuria, he learns from an officer that “both Korea and Manchuria were 
under Jap domination for years. Korea was called Chosun or Chosen by the Js and 
Manchukuo was their name for Manchuria” (77). Rafe goes on to wonder “who named it 
Korea,” but concludes that “One thing is sure: the Old Guys all agree that Koreans don’t 
like the Japs one damned bit” (77). In a conversation soon after that, he recounts an 
                                                
48 Fujitani argues that the ideology of the “supremacy of the pure Yamato race” was fading in the last years 
of the war, in large part because of the Japanese empire’s need to mobilize ethnic minority soldiers to fight 
for Japan in World War II. As such, he considers the World War II period a moment of a shift to what he 
calls “inclusionary racism,” in which ethnic minorities in Japan were newly being interpellated into the 
Japanese nation (77).  
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instance of having attending Mass at a Catholic cathedral in Tokyo during which he “saw 
some people sitting in two marked-off sections” (80). He learned that the “people in the 
boxed-in benches” were “Korean Caths” who “couldn’t and didn’t sit with the rest of the 
faithful” (80). He reports that his white lieutenant was surprised at the story “until Charlie 
said, ‘Hell, Lt, I don’t even know where the Klail Anglos go to Mass or if they even have 
a church’” (77). Here, Charlie draws an immediate structural comparison between the 
segregation of the dominant Japanese and colonized Koreans in Tokyo and the 
segregation of the dominant Anglos and colonized Mexicans back at home in Klail City. 
Significantly, it seems that the Mexican-American soldiers’ experience of colonial and 
ethnic oppression at home gives them a framework for understanding the colonial and 
ethnic oppression they have witnessed in Japan.  
At the same time, however, as soldiers in an occupying military, they have come 
to see Japan as their “home.” As Rafe narrates in his journals, after being dispatched from 
Japan to Korea at the start of hostilities, he and his fellow troops almost immediately 
begin “dreaming about ‘home’ in Japan” (US 81). After deserting the army, Sonny finds, 
as Rafe puts it, “increasingly good reasons” to call Japan “home” (KLS 100). In his 
postcards to his friends, Rafe remembers, he “dribbled bits and pieces of how he made it 
back to Yamato; Sonny always uses the poetic name for Japan, and he says he’s at home 
here” (US 158). Tellingly, what Sonny thinks of as the “poetic” name for Japan, 
“Yamato,” is the name of the dominant and ruling ethnic group in Japan. An outsider in 
Japan, Sonny remains unfamiliar with structures of racism and histories of colonialism in 
his new home. Rather, Japan is a place that American soldiers associate with modern 
comforts, leisure, and safety. Particularly in a city such as Nagoya, host to a U.S. military 
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base, U.S. soldiers out on “rest and relaxation” would have been a common part of the 
landscape of occupation. His act of desertion has severed his ties to the military, but 
Sonny still occupies a position of privilege as an American man making his home in 
postwar Japan.   
Sonny’s relationship with his Japanese girlfriend constitutes perhaps his biggest 
reason to call Japan home. Hinojosa’s depiction of that relationship, and of the sexual 
relationships between Rafe and various Japanese women, illustrates the gendered nature 
of the power that American servicemen maintain in occupied Japan. Sonny’s girlfriend, 
Tsuruko, is a Japanese schoolteacher; when Rafe describes his visit to their home in “At 
Sonny’s and Tsuruko’s” in Korean Love Songs, he paints a domestic scene in which 
“Sonny, kimono-wrapped, pours the tea” while Tsuruko shows Rafe the gifts that Sonny 
has given her (104). She is not the first Japanese woman to make an appearance in 
Korean Love Songs. In fact, just before and after going to see Sonny and Tsuruko in 
Nagoya, Rafe visits his favorite brothels as a part of his “R&R.” He makes a stop in 
Honshu to visit “Shirley’s Temple of Pleasure Emporium,” and see a “good 
acquaintance” – that is, a prostitute for whom he has been a regular client – whose “love 
duties” for Rafe include massages and tea service in addition to the “usual bath and mat 
and bath” (92). Just after leaving Sonny’s, he travels to the “Pages of Wisdom geisha” 
and goes on to “call on” another prostitute, who also bathes, massages, and serves him 
(112). Rafe’s periods of “R&R” in Japan seem to be synonymous with his ability to 
access the sexual labor of women in Japan. 
Such encounters were, of course, widespread during the U.S. occupation of Japan. 
According to historian Naoko Shibusawa, “As was typical of soldiers in conquering 
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armies, American GIs who wanted to procure sexual services could count on the 
desperation of women, including young war widows, in the defeated nation” (38).49 Sex 
between women in Japan and U.S. servicemen took place under a range of auspices, from 
the government-endorsed “Recreation and Amusement Association” (composed of 
Japanese women “volunteers” who vowed to “defend and nurture the purity of our race” 
by acting as a “breakwater to hold back the raging waves” of U.S. troops’ sexual 
voracity) to the independently run “emporia” that Rafe visits to the frequent sexual 
assault of women on and near military bases (Dower 126). According to John Dower, 
many U.S. servicemen held a “characteristic colonial attitude” toward women in Japan, 
regarding them as “little more than available sexual objects” (138). But at the same time, 
as Shibusawa puts it, women who had sex with U.S. troops “helped, with their 
ministrations and their bodies, to mediate, attenuate, and manage the hostility the U.S. 
servicemen felt toward Japan” (39). That Rafe repeatedly (and euphemistically) describes 
the women he visits as “old friends” (92), for example, shows how the intimacy he 
experiences with these women colors his remembrances of Japan.  
Does it matter that these particular GIs are Chicanos, as in Rafe’s recollection of 
his friend Cayo Díaz’s words—“And didn’t we make out better with Japanese girls 
because we were Chicanos?” Indeed, race did mediate American servicemen’s access to 
sex in Japan. In the early stages of the occupation, prostitutes in Japan were segregated 
                                                
49 Hinojosa mentions this very phenomenon in the context of Texas and Mexico in an interview with Aitor 
Ibarrola-Armendariz. Discussing the many mixed-race Mexicans with hyphenated Anglo surnames living 
in Texas, he notes that “most of these [came from] marriages between World War I soldiers and Texas 
Mexican women from Mercedes” (216). During World War I, U.S. troops were stationed in south Texas 
due to perceived threats from Germany regarding the so-called “Zimmerman Letter,” a secret telegram in 
which the German state offered to help Mexico regain its ceded territories in Texas, Arizona, and New 
Mexico if Mexico joined the German effort in the war. 
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into hierarchical “districts” reserved for U.S. officers, white enlisted men, and black 
enlisted men; later, as the sex industry developed over the course of the occupation, the 
“panpan girls” were lauded as “transcend[ing] racial and international prejudice” because 
many of them “consorted openly and comfortably with both white and black GIs” 
(Dower 133). Even the systematic sexual exploitation of women in Japan can thus be 
mapped onto a narrative of the racial liberalism of the U.S. military in the postwar period: 
American soldiers of all races could equally “make out” with Japanese girls, a dubious 
achievement in the annals of desegregation. However, Japan’s own racial others did not 
enjoy the same egalitarianism with regard to matters of sex and marriage. As John Lie 
points out, historically, ethnic minorities in Japan have faced extreme discrimination in 
the realm of marriage (5). At the same time, sex work has long been the principal 
occupation of women migrant workers, who are among Japan’s most vulnerable 
populations (Lie 11); many of the estimated fifty-five to seventy thousand women who 
worked as prostitutes in the immediate postwar era were women “of third-country 
origin,” that is, migrant women from Japan’s former colonial territories or Japanese 
ethnic minorities (Dower 132). Sonny’s Japanese sweetheart is eager to marry him, then, 
but her willingness to date and marry Sonny is less a marker of racial solidarity than a 
measure of Sonny’s status as an American in postwar Japan. Despite his apparent 
repudiation of his Americanness, his relationship to Japan is mediated by sex and power 
over women’s bodies. 
Rafe’s relationships with the prostitutes he patronizes and Sonny’s relationship 
with his girlfriend fall on different ends of the spectrum of intimacy between American 
soldiers and Japanese women, but they each take place as a well-established part of the 
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postwar social order. Relationships between American soldiers and Japanese women 
were structured by the exploitation, power, and control that marked the U.S. military 
occupation of Japan. The fact that sex between GIs and Japanese women in general was 
marked by the gross power imbalance and domination of occupation may not have 
determined the content of any given individual relationship between a GI and a Japanese 
woman, but it did circumscribe the range of options available for such relationships.  
If we are able to conceptualize different sites of empire together, as I have made a 
case for in this chapter, then we can see that Sonny Ruiz is neither simply rejecting a 
Texan brand of American racism by settling in Japan nor simply acting as an agent of 
U.S. empire in occupied Japan. Rather, he is engaged in a struggle between these two 
apparently contradictory roles, a struggle that reflects the overlapping histories of empire 
in the global Cold War. The decision by Rafe, Jehú, Charlie, and Sonny to join the U.S. 
army is one inflected by the colonial legacy of the Texas Mexican border, but as I have 
argued, that is not the only colonial legacy at issue in our readings of Hinojosa’s work. 
Reading Sonny Ruiz as a neoimperial presence in Japan does not negate his own past as a 
colonized subject, nor does viewing Japan as an occupied nation after World War II 
discount its own legacy of colonial occupation across Asia in the half-century before that 
moment. Rather, I have argued in this chapter that the Korean War operates as a point of 
articulation, allowing us to contend with the multiplicity and heterogeneity of these 
discrete yet connected histories of colonialism and empire. Understanding these 
connections necessarily complicates our narratives of the racial legacies of U.S. settler 
colonialism and of the ongoing histories of U.S. empire in the Cold War era into the 
present. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
Going Color-Blind: 
 
The Black Soldier in Toni Morrison’s Home 
 
 
 
 
What I am determined to do is to take what 
is articulated as an elusive race-free paradise 
and domesticate it. 
  
  Toni Morrison, “Home” 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In an essay entitled “Home,” drawn from a talk she gave in 1994 at a conference 
on race, Toni Morrison writes, “I have never lived, nor has any of us, in a world in which 
race did not matter…[but] I prefer to think of a-world-in-which-race-does-not-matter 
as…home” (3). For Morrison, using the term home “domesticates the racial project” (3). 
She explains that her writing has always been driven by the question of “how to convert a 
racist house” – the racist house to which we are all consigned – “into a race-specific yet 
nonracist home” (5). In a talk entitled “Color Blindness, History, and the Law,” given at 
the same conference and anthologized in the same volume, the legal scholar Kimberlé 
Williams Crenshaw discusses the ideology of color-blindness and the principle of formal 
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equality that underpins it. She argues that in the forty years since Brown v. Board of 
Education, the legal doctrine of color-blindness, usually celebrated as a hallmark of racial 
equality, has been deployed to legitimate rather than dismantle racial hierarchy. Arguing 
that “formal equality in conditions of social inequality becomes a tool of domination, 
reinforcing that system and insulating it from attack” (285), Crenshaw concludes her talk 
by urging her listeners to “understand the distributive consequences of legal ideology” 
(287). 
Nearly twenty years later, Morrison published a novel that shares its title with her 
earlier essay: Home. Set in the early 1950s, the novel centers on Frank Money, a recent 
veteran of the Korean War, and his sister Ycidra, or Cee, a pair of siblings forced to 
navigate the racial architecture of the postwar United States as they separately leave their 
home in the fictional town of Lotus, Georgia and then make their way back together. 
Alternating chapters of third-person narration that follows different characters through 
the events of the novel are punctuated by short chapters of italicized first-person 
commentary in the voice of Frank Money, addressing and often challenging the narrator 
(“Write about that, why don’t you,” for example, or “You can’t imagine it, because you 
weren’t there”). Throughout the novel, these two narrative voices supplement each other 
in telling the story, and by the end, they are colluding to unlock the novel’s secrets. Home 
details Frank’s journey across the country to find and rescue his sister, who is on the 
verge of death, and their shared difficulty in reconciling with the home they left behind. 
Along the way, Frank must face his own struggles with the traumatic aftereffects of his 
experience fighting in Korea—effects that are expressed in disorienting episodes of 
color-blindness. 
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Early in the novel, for example, the narrator recalls the first time that the recently 
returned veteran Frank Money experienced a “break” after returning home from Korea. 
After returning to the U.S. from Korea, Frank has drifted for a year without a steady job 
or a permanent home. Fixated on memories of his best friends from home dying beside 
him on the battlefield, and on one particular image of a hungry Korean child shot point-
blank by a U.S. soldier, he has alienated the people around him with his erratic and 
occasionally violent behavior. Boarding a bus near Fort Lawton in Seattle, his discharge 
papers in hand, Frank sits next to a brightly dressed woman: 
Her flowered skirt was a world’s worth of color, her blouse a loud red. Frank 
watched the flowers at the hem of her skirt blackening and her red blouse draining 
of color until it was white as milk. Then everybody, everything. Outside the 
window—trees, sky, a boy on a scooter, grass, hedges. All color disappeared and 
the world became a black-and-white movie screen. He didn’t yell then because he 
thought something bad was happening to his eyes. Bad, but fixable. He wondered 
if this was how dogs or cats or wolves saw the world. Or was he becoming color-
blind? (23). 
In this incident, as in many more to come, color-blindness emerges as the somatic 
expression of Frank’s trauma. As the world around him transforms into a black-and-white 
projection, he speculates first that he is losing his vision, then that he is losing his 
humanity; the question that lingers, however, is whether he is “becoming color-blind.”  
It is clear that Frank’s combat experience in Korea has left him grappling with the 
question of color. His direct memories of combat are also rendered in terms of red, white, 
and black: in private moments, he cannot help but see “a boy pushing his entrails back 
  99 
 
in” on the battlefield and remember “stepping over [him]…to keep his own face from 
dissolving, his own colorful guts under that oh-so-thin sheet of flesh. Against the black 
and white of that winter landscape, blood red took center stage” (20). In this memory, 
too, a world of color stands out against a black and white screen, and the unforgettable 
scenes of “blood red” that Frank remembers from the battlefield here give us an 
unmistakable referent for the red that drains out of the black-and-white world around him 
on the bus back in Seattle. Moreover, if red is the color associated with communism, then 
Frank’s visually draining the world of red recapitulates the very logic that placed him in 
Korea: after all, the given rationale of the U.S. military presence and intervention in 
Korea in these years was to rid the world of communism. It also evokes the domestic 
environment of redbaiting to which he has returned. 
That Frank’s memories of combat in Korea are ruled by the language of color also 
marks the particular place of the Korean War in the history of desegregation in the United 
States.50 In July 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order 9981, declaring it to be 
“the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for 
all persons in the armed series without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin,” 
to be implemented “as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to 
                                                
50 In a 2011 article on Beloved, Florian Bast contends that the significance of color has been overlooked in 
Morrison scholarship. He proposes that Beloved “negotiates issues of trauma using the color red,” and 
argues that red “constitutes a text in and of itself” in the novel (1070). He goes on to examine the use of red 
as a “highlighter” in the text, used to mark and amplify the trauma of slavery, and tracks the characters’ 
interactions with the color red throughout the text. Finally, he argues, by turning to the use of the color red 
to mark instances of trauma, Morrison “performs the inability to use everyday language to portray a 
traumatic event” (1082). This chapter similarly tracks the appearance of color in the novel, and I have 
found that in Home as in Beloved, the color red is associated with trauma and its resolution. A 2014 article 
by Melissa Schindler also briefly discusses Morrison’s use of color in relation to tropes of migration and 
homecoming in Home. She notes that red is a color associated with the Korean War and scenes of travel in 
the novel. However, my chapter departs from both Bast’s and Schindler’s work in linking color in the novel 
and its absence with issues of race and racism.  
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effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale” (Mershon 183). 
As the first war fought under the sign of Executive Order 9981, the Korean War helped to 
initiate the institutional desegregation of the military on a wide scale. 
 Color-blindness in Home is both the name of the postwar racial regime that sends 
Frank Money to Korea as part of the army and the primary symptom of the trauma he 
experiences while serving as a part of that army. Reading this novel against the history of 
the desegregation of the U.S. armed forces during the Korean War, I argue in this chapter 
that Morrison stages an encounter between pre- and post-45 racial regimes. She shows 
how these regimes haunt each other in the form of two ghosts: the zoot suited man, a 
ghost of past racial terror, and the child, a ghost of the contemporary regime of color-
blindness. Moreover, I argue, this opposition between the pre-war and the post-45 racial 
orders becomes essential to the novel’s resolution. Ultimately, Morrison’s novel shows 
that the codes of color-blindness cannot heal past trauma: rather, it is recognizing the 
value of color that gives Frank and Cee resolution. Going to Korea to fight alongside 
white soldiers in an integrated army does not allow Frank to reckon with the past and lay 
it to rest; rather, it is coming back home and being immersed in color that does that. In 
this sense, I read Home in the tradition of Beloved: as Linda Krumholz argues, Beloved 
“challenge[s] the notion that the end of institutional slavery brings about freedom by 
depicting the emotional and psychological scars of slavery as well as the persistence of 
racism” (396). Similarly, I argue, Home shows us that the paradigm of color-blindness 
does not and cannot redress racism, but rather functions as a new and different system of 
racial harm that brings about new forms of trauma. It is Frank and Cee’s return home to a 
black community in Georgia—a “race-specific” home—that brings to light multiple 
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layers of trauma. With the restoration of color to the surrounding comes the attempted 
resolution of that trauma and the beginning of a process of shared reparation. 
 
II. Color-blindness as a Racial Ideology 
 
 Scholars of race in the United States agree that the post-World War II era marks a 
sea change in conceptions of race, which led to an official disavowal of racism by the 
state and the endorsement of color-blindness as a doctrine and policy, with desegregation 
as its centerpiece. Color-blindness names the legal doctrine that has governed post-1945 
racialization in the United States, but the use of the concept of color-blindness as a 
metaphor for racial tolerance extends well before 1945. As is well known, in 1896, the 
Supreme Court ruled in Plessy v. Ferguson that racial segregation was constitutional, so 
long as segregated facilities were “separate but equal”; in his dissent, Supreme Court 
Justice John Marshall Harlan famously argued against the notion that one race or class 
was superior to any other, stating that “our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows 
nor tolerates classes among citizens.” When the Supreme Court overturned separate-but-
equal in the 1954 case Brown v. Board of Education, then, a “color-blind” interpretation 
of the Constitution prevailed, setting the new standard for the Court’s future rulings 
regarding racial discrimination. According to legal scholar Neil Gotanda in his article “A 
Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind,’” the concept of color-blindness, which 
holds that the state does not and should not “see” race when making legal decisions, thus 
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“developed after the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 
and matured in 1955 in Brown v. Board of Education” (2). 
While the stated goal of color-blind racial ideology is to create “a racially 
assimilated society in which race is irrelevant” (53), Gotanda argues that in fact a color-
blind interpretation of the Constitution “legitimates, and therefore maintains, the social, 
economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other Americans” (2). Under a 
color-blind constitutional model, “the prescription for racial problems in American 
society is for the government to adopt a position of ‘never’ considering race” (7). But by 
reducing race to its formal definition, treating racial distinctions such as ‘Black’ and 
‘white’ as merely formal categories (“neutral, apolitical descriptions, reflecting merely 
‘skin color’ or country of ancestral origin”) and evacuating race of its historical, cultural, 
and social meanings, the “nonrecognition” of race has the effect of entrenching rather 
than redressing racial disparities (18). As such, Gotanda argues that color-blindness 
“ultimately supports the supremacy of white interests” (18) and ends up furthering the 
subordination of people of color. He cautions that the concept of color-blindness is 
“inadequate to deal with today’s racially stratified, culturally diverse, and economically 
divided nation” (68).  
 In “Color Blindness, History, and the Law,” Kimberlé Crenshaw also shows how 
color-blindness “has been deployed to do the ideological work of legitimating racial 
hierarchy” (281). Crenshaw argues that by the time of her writing in 1994, exactly forty 
years since Brown v. Board of Education, the law has come to endorse the narrative that 
Brown constitutes a fundamental break with white supremacy, a “celebratory narrative” 
about how Brown “marks the historical moment when African Americans were finally 
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granted full citizenship status” in America (280). But although Brown is popularly 
regarded as having overturned Plessy, she argues, “it would be a mistake to focus solely 
on the rejection of the formal doctrine [of separate-but-equal] while failing to uncover the 
continuity of Plessy’s social vision and its analytic,” which are in fact “reincarnated in 
color-blind jurisprudence” (284). In Plessy, the Court authorized segregation as the 
“symmetrical” treatment of black and white passengers on a train, and the fact of the 
inequality between the two kinds of cars was relegated to the private sphere, reflecting a 
vision of a “racial marketplace” in which “the state [could not] interfere to redistribute 
racial value” (283). The contemporary doctrine of color-blindness, she argues, endorses 
this notion of a “free market of race” (287). For Crenshaw, the heart of Plessy was “its 
admonition that the law could not be looked to in order to bring about social equality” 
(283); a lesson to be drawn from both Plessy and Brown, then, is that “formal equality in 
conditions of social inequality becomes a tool of domination, reinforcing that system and 
insulating it from attack” (285).  
 As Crenshaw, Gotanda, and other critical race theorists have demonstrated, the 
legal doctrine of color-blindness purports to legislate the public sphere of government 
action, in which race is not be considered, rather than the private sphere of individual 
freedom, in which race may be considered (Gotanda 8). But the concept of color-
blindness has also taken hold in wider social understandings of race: as the sociologist 
Howard Winant writes, in recent decades, “the ironic view has emerged that we are now 
in a post-racial, color-blind world” (1). Winant attributes this view to what he calls the 
“racial break” of the post-World War II period. He argues that the “upsurge of anti-racist 
activity since World War II constitutes a fundamental and historical shift, a global rupture 
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or ‘break,’ in the continuity of worldwide white supremacy” (2). As evidence of this 
racial break, he points to: the racial dimensions of World War II and the anti-genocide 
position it generated; the social movements and revolutionary uprisings that followed the 
war, including the civil rights movement in the United States and anti-apartheid 
movement in South Africa; the scrutiny that the Cold War conflict placed upon the racial 
policies of superpower nations; and the mass migration of formerly colonized peoples 
from the global rural South to the metropolitan North (7). In this framework, color-
blindness emerges as one symptom of the post-World War II racial break, which Winant 
argues was “at best a partial shift away from formally avowed white supremacy,” a shift 
that has now left us in a “racial interregnum … between the discredited but undead racial 
past and the much anticipated but far from realized racial future” (6).  
 In a recent critique of Winant’s theory of the post-World War II racial break, 
literary critic Jodi Melamed argues that rather than simply a “partial shift” away from 
white supremacy, the “break” of the World War II moment “instantiated a new 
worldwide racial project that…supplemented and displaced its predecessor: a formally 
antiracist, liberal-capitalist modernity articulated under conditions of U.S. global 
ascendancy” (4). For Melamed, the advance of this new racial project signaled a decisive 
move away from white supremacy, as the U.S. state newly came to embrace “official 
antiracisms” in its administrative workings. The result of this process of racial reordering, 
she argues, “was a new and old role for race as a unifying discourse,” as the narratives of 
liberal antiracism – “of reform, of color blindness, of diversity in a postracial world” – 
took precedence over prior narratives of the white man’s burden (8). Like Winant, 
Melamed takes World War II to be a breaking point for U.S. and global racial orders, but 
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she views the present racial order, which she dubs “neoliberal multiculturalism,” as less 
an interregnum than a new mode that must be assessed on its own terms. 
 The sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva offers a slightly different periodization of 
color blindness in his analysis of contemporary racism, proposing that the new racial 
ideology he terms “color-blind racism” gained dominance in the late 1960s. “Whereas 
Jim Crow racism explained blacks’ social standing as the result of their biological and 
moral inferiority,” he argues, color-blind racism “rationalize[s] minorities’ contemporary 
status as the product of market dynamics, naturally occurring phenomena, and blacks’ 
imputed cultural limitations” (2). He contends that in the post-Civil Rights era, the 
“normative climate…has made illegitimate the public expression of racially based 
feelings and viewpoints” (11), resulting in a framework in which “most whites assert they 
‘don’t see any color, just people’” (1). As he points out, this professed color-blindness is 
at great odds with the “color-coded inequality” that persists in the United States (2). For 
Bonilla-Silva, this inequality is “reproduced through ‘New Racism’ practices that are 
subtle, institutional, and apparently nonracial” (3). He points to the “slippery, apparently 
contradictory” language of color blindness as evidence of the dramatic changes in the 
“normative climate” between Jim Crow and the post-Civil Rights era (53).  
 These scholars of race thus point to different moments as the breaking point of the 
post-World War II racial break—World War II itself, the onset of the Cold War, Brown v. 
Board, the Civil Rights movement. The Korean War, which falls between World War II 
and Brown v. Board, does not factor into any of these analyses. The Korean War may not 
mark the arrival of desegregation on a national scale; indeed, as I will discuss below, 
desegregation was not evenly implemented throughout all of the units fighting in Korea, 
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much less throughout all levels of the U.S. military. Moreover, because the battlegrounds 
of the Korean War seem to be so far from home, the utility of Korea for assessing the 
transformation of the postwar racial order on a wider scale may appear limited. But as I 
argue in this chapter, the Korean War, the first war fought after Truman’s desegregation 
of the military by executive order, is central to the development of color-blindness as a 
state and popular discourse. As I will show in the following section of this chapter, it was 
in the transnational, racially unfamiliar space of Korea, in the controlled environment of 
the military amidst the uncontrollable circumstances of war, that color-blindness was 
developed as a technique of racial management.  
 
III. Desegregation and the Korean War 
 
As Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman point out in their study of racial 
desegregation in the U.S. military, the incorporation of blacks into the armed forces on 
terms of formal, legal equality in the period between World War II and the Vietnam War 
was one of the most sweeping – and contentious – changes in its history (xi). Such a “vast 
reordering of their internal race relations between 1940 and 1965,” they argue, was 
undertaken and achieved only “reluctantly and unevenly” by the leadership of the armed 
forces (xiii).51 In fact, they claim that while it was black activism that brought 
desegregation to the fore as a necessary and plausible change, Truman’s decision to end 
the formal segregation of the armed forces resulted less from a magnanimous desire to 
                                                
51 Mershon and Schlossman, writing in 1998, note in a preface to the book that they wrote it as a study of 
the struggle to incorporate of gays into military in the 1990s, a framing of their work that speaks to the 
abiding importance of the military as an institutional benchmark for American policies on integration. 
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redress racism than from a need to “improve military efficiency” in order to better “serve 
the national interest” (xiii).52 During World War II, they argue, military leadership came 
to realize that racial segregation was “inherently costly in terms of money, space, and 
time” (74) and “caused substantial waste of human talent through inappropriate personnel 
placement and the rejection of qualified people on racial grounds” (75). By the time 
President Truman assembled his “President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and 
Opportunity in the Armed Services” in 1949 to make recommendations on how to best 
implement Executive Order 9981, his advisers recognized that the Army could no longer 
“perpetuate inefficiency by failing to make full use of the talents and skills of its 
personnel,” a situation that could change “only if [the army] permitted the assignment of 
blacks to any unit—thereby initiating the dissolution of segregation” (209). 
 Despite Executive Order 9981’s proclamation of the principle of “equality of 
treatment and opportunity” for people of all races, the military was still very much 
segregated in practice when the Korean War began in June 1950. Given that the Army 
maintained “almost exactly the same racially segregated organizational structure that had 
existed in World War II,” the same “problems of inefficiency and morale” that derived 
from racial segregation promptly resurfaced during the first year of the war (Mershon and 
Schlossman 218). Because General MacArthur, commander of U.S. and UN troops in 
Korea, was against desegregation, the Far East Command was not formally desegregated 
until July 1951, a year into the war, when General Ridgway replaced MacArthur. 
                                                
52 Of course, Truman’s decision did not emerge out of a vacuum; by 1948, the idea of desegregation had 
entered the public imagination. Mershon and Schlossman also point to a number of Supreme Court cases 
that “eroded the legal foundations of racial segregation” throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
including a 1944 ruling against racial discrimination in primary elections, a 1946 ruling against segregation 
on interstate railroad and bus routes, a 1948 ruling against racial restrictions on private real estate sales, and 
a 1950 ruling against segregation in graduate education at state universities (146).  
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Ridgway ordered “race-neutral policies” and abolished the all-black 24th Regiment when 
he assumed command.53 However, even before this official change, some field 
commanders had begun combining black and white soldiers into the same units without 
waiting for orders from above, “impromptu innovations [that] were reactions to military 
necessity” (Mershon 223).54 
 The process of desegregating U.S. troops in Korea was thus neither rapid nor 
complete: the active desegregation of troops during the war did not end racial 
discrimination in the military or in society at large.55 But scholars agree that the Korean 
War jumpstarted the active implementation of desegregation throughout the military in 
the ensuing years. Mershon and Schlossman argue that the apparent success of large-
scale desegregation in Korea, “which began as a response to particular emergency 
conditions in the Far East,” showed officers in other Army commands in the United 
States and around the world that “implementing the Army’s nondiscrimination policies 
was not only feasible but also desirable” (219). In July 1953, fighting ceased in the 
Korean War; by 1954, according to Mershon and Schlossman, “the tradition of racial 
segregation had collapsed throughout the armed forces” around the world (219).  
                                                
53 Before its dissolution, the all-black 24th Regiment had been viewed unfavorably as a unit whose soldiers 
were especially prone to desertion, or “bugging out.” For a detailed history of the 24th Regiment and its 
dissolution during the Korean War, see Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea by 
William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle, who show that institutional 
racism limited the “effectiveness” of the unit in Korea. 
54 Spontaneous decisions to desegregate combat units due to shortages during battle had happened before; 
for example, there were partially integrated infantry companies in Europe during 1944 and 45. This time, 
however, because of the change in larger policies, “the first racially mixed units in Korea generated 
widespread interest and affirmation and became models for subsequent change. They provided hard 
evidence that helped to convince skeptical officers of the viability and desirability of desegregation” 
(Mershon 224). 
55 After the Korean War, black soldiers continued to be systematically funneled into less desirable positions 
within the military and were largely kept out of leadership roles. See Mershon and Schlossman, chapters 
ten and eleven. 
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Discussing the desegregation of troops in the postwar period, historian Michael 
Cullen Green similarly argues that “a war was required to effect this revolution in 
military affairs” (140). He agrees that mass casualties of U.S. troops in Korea 
necessitated the rapid implementation of desegregation, but argues in addition that the 
military leadership “recognized that their orders to desegregate would be less difficult to 
carry out in Asia – where there were no off-base Jim Crow laws and few opportunities for 
black-white heterosexual intimacy – than in the United States or Europe” (140). 
According to his analysis, then, the desegregation of the U.S. military and U.S. military 
occupation and war in Asia were not merely contemporaneous, but were rather co-
constitutive: war and occupation in Asia both forced and allowed for a more rapid 
desegregation of troops. Citing the large-scale recruitment of black soldiers in the 
postwar period, Green argues that “[the Korean War] and its enduring consequences 
sustained African Americans’ socioeconomic dependence on militarization, an empire of 
bases … and foreign interventions” (137). In this way, desegregation helped to invest 
African Americans in the aims of the state and its military power: “Black military service 
abroad encouraged African Americans to…think of themselves first and foremost as 
Americans … and to identify with their government’s foreign policy objectives in Asia” 
(2). As the military became an early adopter of desegregation, African Americans 
“increasingly viewed their nation’s armed forces a model for civilian society,” and thus, 
“by the time the Supreme Court declared de jure segregation unconstitutional in its 
landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, African American investment in 
the state’s overseas military expansion was largely secured” (2).  
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What the above scholarship shows us is that in desegregating the troops during 
the Korean War, the state officially took up the rhetoric of color-blindness at a strategic 
moment in its military expansion. It has been well documented that publicly disavowing 
racism was a strategic move for the United States in the early years of the global Cold 
War, and desegregating the military likewise served to project an image of the United 
States as a forward-moving democracy. But as we have seen, desegregating the troops 
did not serve to redistribute resources among racial groups in the interest of social justice, 
nor did it primarily aim to do so. Rather, desegregation was a method of more efficiently 
managing the human resources that constituted the armed forces during a period of rapid 
military growth. In other words, the U.S. military needed to desegregate in order to 
expand across the Asia Pacific and the globe. At the same time, the emerging rhetoric of 
color-blindness needed the Korean War in order to learn how to put desegregation into 
practice. Attempting to implement desegregation in the geographically and racially 
foreign space of Korea allowed for the limited application of the policy of “equal 
treatment and opportunity for all persons…without regard to race,” in the words of 
Executive Order 9981, in a contained geographical and institutional space, and as such, 
Korea became the temporary grounds on which the workings of a U.S. domestic policy to 
come – that is, the policy of color-blindness – could be tested and improved.  
 
IV. Navigating Color-Blindness in Home 
 
 
 In his critique of color-blindness, Gotanda briefly notes the difference between 
“color-blindness” and what he refers to as “literal” or “medical” color-blindness. For 
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example, he writes, using the technique of “nonrecognition,” which the legal doctrine of 
color-blindness advocates, is in fact “impossible”: “One cannot literally follow a color-
blind standard of conduct in ordinary social life,” since one cannot not perceive race (18). 
Whereas the “medically color-blind individual” is someone who “never perceives color 
in the first place,” the “racially color-blind individual” perceives race and then attempts 
to ignore it (19). Here, Gotanda acknowledges the literal referent for the term “color-
blindness” in order to point out the deficiency of the metaphor when it comes to racial 
matters.56 In Home, Morrison presents an unexpected connection between these two 
definitions of color-blindness: the medical condition of color-blindness which afflicts 
Frank Money derives from the trauma he experienced as a soldier in the Korean War, a 
formative event for the state’s development and implementation of color-blind policies 
regarding race. One form of color-blindness begets another. This literalization of the 
metaphor of color-blindness allows us to examine the effects of the move to implement 
desegregation in the post-45 United States. 
 The narrator of Home recounts Frank’s initial episode of color-blindness as both 
confusing and frightening: as a “world’s worth of color” drains out before his eyes and 
the world becomes a “black-and-white movie screen,” the narrator asks the question, 
“was he becoming color-blind?” (23). Only when these episodes recur does he learn to 
associate the visual loss of color with other uncontrollable expressions of psychic 
                                                
56 In fact, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, color-blindness in the medical sense “has been 
considered by many scientists to be a misleading name,” since it refers only rarely to the complete absence 
of color vision. The OED also defines color-blindness as not only the “disregard of differences in race,” but 
also the “inability to perceive, experience, or distinguish between certain perspectives, moral choices, 
emotions, etc,” a definition that is also applicable to the shell-shocked Frank Money in Home.   
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distress. As the narrator puts it after this initial instance, once he steps off the bus and 
watches the “grass [turn] green” again with relief,  
he knew he wouldn’t shout, smash anything, or accost strangers. That came later 
when, whatever the world’s palette, his shame and its fury exploded. Now, if the 
signs of draining color gave notice, he would have time to hurry up and hide. 
Thus, whenever a smattering of color returned, he was pleased to know he wasn’t 
going color-blind and the horrible pictures might fade. (24) 
Frank greets the return of color to his field of vision as a reassuring “no” to the question 
the narrator earlier posits. But in Home, Toni Morrison takes great care to show the 
extent to which life in the United States, far from going color-blind itself, continues to be 
dominated by color in the 1950s. As the novel unfolds and Frank continues his journey 
south to find his sister, he is forced to navigate the unabated color-consciousness of the 
postwar United States. In this way, Home stages the contradiction between the rhetoric of 
color-blindness and the realities of life reduced to black-and-white.  
In fact, in Home, color emerges as a category paramount in shaping Frank’s 
experience of the world, circumscribing the possible range of his movements and choices. 
It becomes clear from the outset of the novel that race, far from receding from 
importance, has structured Frank Money’s life circumstances from the moment of his 
return back to the United States as a veteran of the Korean War. His time served in a 
desegregating army overseas has left him experiencing disorienting bouts of literal color-
blindness at the same time that he is faced with racism in all of his encounters with white 
people and institutions. His experiences traveling across the country reveal to him a 
United States whose racisms differ in important ways from those he grew up with in rural 
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Georgia before the war. Frank’s journey to find Cee becomes a journey of discovering 
the breaks and continuities of the post-45 U.S. racial order.  
At the novel’s opening, Frank is planning his escape from the psychiatric ward of 
the hospital in the Pacific Northwest where he’s been involuntarily confined, less to 
receive care than to be sedated and incarcerated—or as another character wryly 
comments, “They must have thought you was dangerous. If you was just sick they’d 
never let you in” (10). When he escapes, penniless and shoeless in the middle of the 
night, he seeks shelter at a nearby black church whose pastor, Reverend Locke, plots out 
an itinerary of black churches along his route to help him reach his destination safely. 
Calling Frank “another one,” Reverend Locke laments the unhappy state of the many 
black veterans he has encountered, declaring that “An integrated army is integrated 
misery. You all go fight, come back, they treat you like dogs. Change that. They treat 
dogs better” (17). Locke also advises him not to sit down at just any lunch counter along 
the way: “Listen here, you from Georgia and you been in a desegregated army and maybe 
you think up North is way different from down South. Don’t believe it and don’t count on 
it. Custom is just as real as law and can be just as dangerous” (19). It is just after this bald 
enunciation of the dissonance between formal policies of desegregation (“law”) and the 
continuing material reality of racial violence (“custom”) that the narrator recalls Frank’s 
episode of color-blindness on the bus after he has been discharged from the army base.57  
                                                
57 After the Korean War, like World War II before it, black veterans, particularly in the South, were 
frequently harassed, attacked, and subjected to mob violence by racist whites. These attacks, and the outcry 
over these attacks by the NAACP and civil rights organizations, led to Truman’s initial investigations of 
race relations and the military, which in turn led to Executive Order 9981. See Mershon and Schlossman, 
161-167. 
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 Even before this explicit articulation of the gap between custom and law by the 
reverend, however, the novel sets up both contrasts and continuities between past forms 
of racial terror and their present incarnations. In the novel’s opening scene, for example, 
as Frank plots his escape from the mental hospital, he worries about being arrested for 
vagrancy once he has made it outside. “Better than most,” the narrator informs us, “he 
knew that being outside wasn’t necessary for legal or illegal disruption. You could be 
inside, living in your own house for years, and still, men with or without badges but 
always with guns could force you, your family, your neighbors to pack up and move—
with or without shoes” (9). We learn that when Frank was four, his family and fifteen 
others were threatened by white men, “both hooded and not,” and “ordered to leave their 
little neighborhood on the edge of town” in Texas (9). While most of the families, 
including his own, left town that night, one elderly man who refused to leave his property 
was beaten to death. It is this incident that makes the Money family refugees, forced to 
leave Texas on foot (Frank’s sister Cee is born on the road), and brings them to resettle in 
Lotus, Georgia; it is this incident that gives Frank an intimate knowledge of the vagaries 
of racist police violence, whether “legal or illegal,” “with or without badges,” that he 
carries with him through adulthood. The novel thus stages a complex temporal and spatial 
continuity between post-45 and pre-war regimes of racial violence: although the racial 
terror and dispossession that the Money family survived in the South in the 1920s and 
‘30s might seem far removed from Frank’s life in the Pacific Northwest in the 1950s, 
Frank’s formative childhood experience of racist vigilante violence gives him a special 
awareness of the policing of the geography of racial belonging that he must navigate and 
manage as an adult. At the same time, the power of the police – with or without badges – 
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to control the movements of communities and populations was being felt globally in this 
same moment: after all, Truman famously referred to the Korean War as itself a “police 
action.” The notion that “men…with guns could force you, your family, your neighbors 
to pack up and move—with or without shoes” (9) must have resonated with Frank during 
his time in the Korean War, when he was part of an army subjecting millions of Korean 
civilians to precisely this situation.  
Both the explicit connection that Frank draws between his present detention and 
his past eviction and the connection left unspoken between his own refugee past and the 
refugees he left behind in Korea demonstrate how racial logics and racist practices travel 
across time and space in Home. Morrison more directly stages the encounter between past 
and present forms and consequences of racist violence through the figure of a zoot-suited 
man whose apparition confronts Frank and his sister several times over the course of the 
novel. Frank first spots him on his train out of Seattle, when the small man wearing a 
“wide-brimmed hat,” a “pale blue suit [that] sported a long jacket and balloon trousers,” 
and white shoes with “unnaturally pointed toes” takes the empty seat next to him (27). 
The man quickly and eerily disappears, leaving no indentation in the seat, but he 
reappears in Frank’s bedroom during his overnight stop in Chicago. Frank regards the 
man as an unwelcome “dream ghost,” and wonders whether his repeat appearance is “a 
sign trying to tell him something,” perhaps about his sister (34). The narrator notes that 
he “had heard about those suits, but never saw anybody wearing one” (33), but it is left to 
the narrator to add that the zoot-suitors’ chosen costume “had been enough of a fashion 
statement to interest riot cops on each coast” (34). Here, Morrison relies on the reader to 
supplement this observation with its historical context: the zoot suit, popularly associated 
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with urban African American and Chicano youth subcultures of the 1930s and 1940s, 
became well known as a racialized symbol of rebellion and criminality.58 The weight 
behind this historical referent is left unstated in the novel, in which the zoot suit, that 
symbol of minority youth rebellion, race riots, and oppositional masculinity, is simply 
glossed as outdated, even “comic,” through Frank’s eyes (34).  
The only other appearance of the zoot-suited man, Frank’s “living ghost” (33), 
comes at the end of the novel, when Cee briefly spots what “looked to her like a small 
man in a funny suit swinging a watch chain. And grinning” (144). Frank has brought Cee 
out to a field at the edge of town to locate and re-bury the skeleton of a man whose death 
they had witnessed together years ago as children, a foundational trauma alluded to in the 
novel’s opening pages (“we saw them pull a body from a wheelbarrow and throw it into a 
hole already waiting”) (4). It is only after he has returned to Lotus with Cee that Frank is 
able to access the repressed memory of that burial scene. Once he remembers, he goes to 
his grandfather and other town elders to investigate what happened: he asks about the 
“dogfights” that used to happen at a local horse farm, and one of them replies, “More like 
men-treated-like-dog fights” (138). The men proceed to tell Frank a story about a boy and 
his father who were forcibly brought there from Alabama and made to fight to the death 
in front of a (presumably white) crowd who took bets on the outcome of the fight; the 
corpse in the wheelbarrow that Frank and Cee saw from their hiding place – the remains 
                                                
58 The historian Kathy Peiss notes that while the zoot suit was a key element of Mexican American and 
African American subcultures, it also “appeared across the main fault lines of social difference in the 
United States—among Filipinos, Japanese Americans, men of Jewish and Italian descent, jitterbug-crazy 
middle-class boys, and even Mexican American women and working-class lesbians” (13). While the zoot 
suit has been viewed as a “symbol of disloyalty and disaffection of minority youth,” in contrast to the 
“soldier’s uniform, which stands for a militarized white American culture,” Peiss views this interpretation 
as a flattening of the multiple meanings of this “extreme fashion” (11).  
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that Frank and Cee have come to lay to rest decades later – was the boy’s father. 
Significantly, Frank’s grandfather Salem comments about these fights, “I don’t believe 
they stopped that mess till Pearl Harbor” (139). The specific relationship of the zoot-
suited ghost to the man Frank and Cee bury is left ambiguous in the novel: as Colleen 
Lye writes in an essay on Home, the ghost is “unlikely to be a representation of the actual 
man” who was killed on that farm, but a clear connection between the two is that “they 
both signify a pre-World War II racial order.” That both the zoot-suited man and the man 
buried in Lotus haunt the narrative of the present suggests, however, that in Home, past 
racial forms do not stay cleanly in the past.  
Home thus offers several clear-cut examples of what racism looked like in 
decades past: white mob violence, lynching, terror. But how do these examples frame 
race as it operates in a post-45 United States newly embracing the rhetoric of color-
blindness? For one, Frank’s experiences and observations during his travels underscore 
the material realities of continuing color-consciousness in the postwar United States. He 
watches as a black couple on the train is kicked out of a department store and injured by a 
white mob throwing bricks; he befriends a black man whose son was maimed at the age 
of eight by a white policeman who faced no consequences for his actions; he finds that he 
must consult the black porter on the train to find a place where he can safely eat dinner 
and rest between train stops without being ejected or attacked for his race. Each of these 
examples of racial terror is described as routine, even humdrum, and each incident belies 
the notion that the present has progressed beyond a more-racist recent past. 
If anything, it is Frank’s status as a veteran of the Korean War that occasionally 
affords him improved or exceptional treatment by the police. For example, in Chicago, 
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Frank goes shopping at the Goodwill store with a new acquaintance named Billy, and 
afterwards, in his new clothes, Frank feels “proud enough to take his medal from his 
army pants and pin it to his breast pocket” (36). Outside of a shoe store, though, Frank, 
Billy, and two other black men are subjected to a “random search” by the police, who 
stop and frisk them. 
Of the two other men facing the wall, one had his switchblade confiscated, the 
other a dollar bill. All four lay their hands on the hood of the patrol car parked at 
the curb. The younger officer noticed Frank's medal.  
“Korea?”  
“Yes, sir.”  
“Hey, Dick. They’re vets.”  
“Yeah?”  
“Yeah. Look.” The officer pointed to Frank's service medal.  
“Go on. Get lost, pal.”  
The police incident was not worth comment so Frank and Billy walked off in 
silence. (36-37) 
Frank and Billy are released just as unilaterally as they are detained. Being black men 
makes them automatic targets for everyday police harassment, but being visible as a 
veteran removes Frank from the category of the criminal in the eyes of these policemen, 
placing him in a different relationship to the state. His race is the reason why he is being 
harassed, but his association with the military – and the pride he takes in that association, 
which is what motivates him to display his medal – mitigates his perceived criminality 
and provides the police with another vector against which to assess him. Earlier in the 
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novel, Reverend Locke warned Frank not to expect the world around him to reflect his 
experience in the “integrated misery” of a desegregated army, and Frank and Billy’s 
unceremonious detainment, so ordinary it is “not worth comment,” is just one example of 
the customary color-consciousness Frank must navigate on his travels after returning 
from war. But the policemen’s recognition of Frank’s status as a veteran, and the special 
treatment it affords him and his friend, marks one way that Frank’s association with the 
military has affected his place in the postwar domestic order. Joining the military did not 
rescue Frank from racism: he finds no systemic benefit from having participated in the 
military’s experiment with desegregation. Even still, in this encounter, he is able to 
garner a material benefit – however meager or ignominious – of his visible status as a 
veteran. 
Frank’s combat experience overseas thus materially affects his status back at 
home. But the effects of the war extended to those who stayed at home as well, 
particularly the novel’s female characters. Lily, for example, the woman romantically 
linked with Frank at the start of the novel, finds that racialized Cold War conflict 
infiltrates her everyday life in Chicago. When Frank meets her, she has temporarily taken 
a new job at a Chinese-owned dry cleaner’s, a line of work that alludes to an earlier 
historical formation of migration and labor between the United States and Asia.59 We 
learn that she recently lost her previous job as a makeup artist because her employer, a 
                                                
59 As Colleen Lye observes, “The story does contain hints of amicable black-Asian encounters; for 
example, Frank’s African-American girlfriend Lily receives a raise from her employer at Wang’s Heavenly 
Palace dry cleaners, but even this only underscores the structural divergence between black wage-workers 
and Asian American middleman minorities.” 
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local theater, was closed down due to anticommunist paranoia.60 But it is in her attempt 
to purchase a home that she encounters the coldest racism: after she makes an offer on a 
house, the real estate agent turns her down and shows her an underlined passage that 
reads, “No part of said property hereby conveyed shall ever be used or occupied by any 
Hebrew or by any person of the Ethiopian, Malay, or Asiatic race excepting only 
employees in domestic service” (72-73). In a novel that so obviously stages the moment 
of transition to a post-45 racial order of color-blindness, the anachronism of this clause is 
striking. And yet at the same time that its outdated racial categories place the passage 
firmly in the past, the language of the passage also enunciates a finality and timelessness 
– no part of the property shall “ever” be used or occupied – that belies its anachronistic 
rootedness in the past. On the one hand, Lily’s frustrated attempt at buying a home marks 
another soon-to-be-surpassed relic of race relations before Civil Rights. On the other, 
though, Morrison deftly demonstrates in this brief encounter the inadequacy of the 
doctrine of formal equality to address entrenched practices of racism: after all, as the 
half-century since this moment has shown the contemporary reader, segregation in 
property ownership has persisted well past the lifting of clauses like the one Lily 
encounters.  
Lily’s frustrated attempt to purchase a home also speaks to the gap between the 
relatively progressive treatment black soldiers received on military bases in Asia and the 
continued racism black civilians – by definition, disproportionately women – faced at 
home in the same time period. As the U.S. military occupation of Japan after World War 
                                                
60 The play that shuts the theater down is an obscure work by the American writer Albert Maltz, who was 
blacklisted and jailed under McCarthyism. The work is titled The Morrison Case. 
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II took on a more permanent nature in the late 1940s, for example, soldiers who 
volunteered for longer stays were allowed to request the transfer of their wives and 
children to their bases.61 Soldiers and their dependents were housed in suburb-style 
developments, complete with single-family homes, playgrounds, shopping centers, and 
the like, and provided with free education and medical care – amenities and privileges 
which were, of course, unavailable to the majority of black families in the United States. 
In this way, Michael Cullen Green notes, “young black men of modest or impoverished 
backgrounds…found themselves privileged occupiers” of Japan (54). In Home, Lily’s 
real estate agent tells her that she can only live in the home she desires to own as an 
“employee in domestic service” of a white resident; in contrast, black soldiers and their 
wives on U.S. bases in Japan at the same moment were hiring Japanese maids, servants, 
and domestic workers for their own homes.62 In other words, the dream of home 
ownership denied to Lily in Chicago – one of many potential references for the “home” 
of the novel’s title – potentially resided in the growing network of U.S. military bases in 
Asia. But although she has been dating a veteran recently returned from Asia, Lily is no 
mere housewife: when Frank leaves to find his sister, she greets his departure as a 
welcome chance to redouble her focus on professional advancement. Along with her plan 
to purchase a home, she aims to open a dressmaking shop and become a professional 
costume designer for the stage, and with Frank gone, “[u]nobstructed and undistracted, 
she could get serious and develop a plan to match her ambition and succeed” (80). 
                                                
61 See Green 50-52. 
62 According to Green, at the height of the occupation, “some 15,000 U.S. military families employed more 
than 25,000 servants” (49).  
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 In fact, it is a crisis of gendered domestic work that sets the entire narrative of 
Home in motion: Frank is summoned to Georgia to rescue his younger sister Cee after 
receiving a letter from an unknown person that reads, “Come fast. She be dead if you 
tarry” (8). Over the chapters that follow, the narrator reveals to the reader that Cee has 
been hurt, perhaps mortally, by a white doctor for whom she was a live-in domestic 
worker in the suburbs of Atlanta. Cee had been living in Atlanta alone – she had moved 
there with a man who left her just after their hasty marriage – and was seeking work 
when she heard about a job working as a “maid-type person,” a “helper,” for a doctor and 
his wife – “nice people” – outside the city (57). The racial geography of city and suburb 
is clearly delineated: buses to the suburbs were “filled with silent dayworkers, 
housekeepers, maids, and grown lawn boys” who, once outside the city, “dropped off the 
bus one by one like reluctant divers into inviting blue water high above the pollution 
below” (109). At their employers’ homes, they would “clean, cook, serve, mind, launder, 
weed, and mow” (109). Unlike these transient laborers, however, Cee lived at her 
employer’s home, a requirement that she regarded as a benefit allowing her to live in a 
home “more beautiful than a movie theater,” with its cool air, velvet furniture, and silk 
sheets (61). But, as Lily’s attempt to buy a house shows, Cee’s residence in such a home 
hinges on her labor, rendering her vulnerable to the whims and demands of her employer. 
There are immediate warning signs that Cee’s duties might fall outside of the 
purview of those of a typical domestic worker. At her job interview, Dr. Scott’s wife tells 
Cee that her husband “is more than a doctor; he is a scientist and conducts very important 
experiments,” which “help people” (60). When Cee meets the doctor, he asks her about 
her sexual history, and is “pleased” to hear that she was briefly married but never became 
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pregnant (64). The Scotts’ other domestic worker, an older black woman named Sarah, 
tells Cee about another “helper” who had been fired for arguing about with the doctor 
about his practices; she explains that the doctor said he “wouldn’t have fellow travelers in 
his house,” to which Cee innocently responds, in a moment of foreshadowing, “What’s a 
fallow traveler?” (62).63 In her first days with the Scotts, Cee notices, and admires, that 
the doctor’s primary clientele is poor people, “women and girls, especially,” rather than 
the well-to-do white people from the surrounding neighborhood (64). She notices books 
in his office, the titles of which include The Passing of the Great Race and Heredity, 
Race, and Society, and “promise[s] herself that she would find time to read about and 
understand ‘eugenics’” so that she can come to feel more at home in this “good, safe 
place” (65). Finally, after all of these warning signals, we learn that Dr. Scott has been 
experimenting on Cee and other women – working to develop and improve the speculum 
and other gynecological instruments, testing medicines, researching women’s 
reproductive systems, performing abortions – and that Cee has become extremely ill as a 
result. It is Sarah who notices “Cee’s loss of weight, her fatigue, and how long her 
periods were lasting” and sends off the “scary note” that brings Frank to Atlanta to take 
Cee away (112).64  
                                                
63 In the era of redbaiting and McCarthyism, a “fellow traveler” was someone suspected of sympathizing 
with Communist beliefs and objectives, even if he or she was not a card-carrying or professed member of 
the Communist party.  
64 This representation of Cee’s forced sterilization is in accordance with other representations of “disrupted 
girlhood” in Morrison novels including A Mercy and The Bluest Eye, which, according to Susmita Roye in 
a 2012 article, “present a number of ways in which girlhoods are aborted” (214). In the article, Roye argues 
that “The disturbed girlhoods of Toni Morrison’s disrupted girls most powerfully register her angry protest 
against a gender system that designates a woman a secondary rank and against a social system that 
effortlessly overlooks what befalls a poor (black) female child” (212-213). 
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Cee’s vulnerability as an unmarried woman and her youthful ignorance of the 
meaning of terms like “fellow traveler” and “eugenics” eventually render her a “fallow 
traveler” under the doctor’s predations. Her storyline in Home presents a companion 
narrative of race and the Cold War to Frank’s story of returning from desegregated 
military service in Korea. Frank’s employer during the Korean War is a state institution 
that has strategically adopted an ideology of formal equality in its policies regarding race, 
and thus, in the transnational militarized zone of Korea, black soldiers are integrated into 
white units in a limited practice of desegregation that would be replicated with fanfare 
and trepidation in historically white American institutions over the next decade. Cee’s 
employer subscribes to no such theory of change. Rather, the ideology that drives his 
life’s work is white supremacist on its face and, ultimately, genocidal. At the same time 
that Frank is serving as the subject of a national experiment with color-blind racial 
liberalism by serving in a newly desegregated army, Cee is the literal test subject of a 
doctor conducting his own unauthorized racial experiments. Where the desegregation of 
the military trumpets the arrival of a new, more enlightened moment after the postwar 
“racial break,” the continuing practice of forced sterilization under the banner of eugenics 
provides a disquieting corrective to this narrative, reminding us of the continuities of 
racism amidst the arrival of a new era. Frank’s time served in the military nearly kills him 
and leaves him with debilitating, traumatic flashbacks; Cee’s victimization by Dr. Scott 
nearly kills her and leaves her weak, traumatized, and unable to have children. In their 
travels away from Lotus, Cee and Frank thus encounter two versions of what Morrison 
calls in this chapter’s epigraph from her essay “Home” a “race-free paradise”—one 
apparently progressive, the other deeply sinister. That is, desegregation is one way to “get 
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rid of” race, and eugenics is another. But the exploitation of Frank’s and Cee’s bodies 
and labor by both of these systems brings about bodily and psychic trauma for these 
characters. The next section of this chapter examines how Home imagines the resolution 
of trauma for Frank and Cee through the language of color. 
 
V. Restoring Color, Repairing Trauma 
 
 Finally reunited, Frank and Cee complete the last leg of their journey back home 
together: he carries her, barely conscious, on the bus back to town and finds a cab willing 
to drive them twenty miles to Lotus. Earlier in the novel, Frank had described Lotus as 
“the worst place in the world, worse than any battlefield” (83), but now, returning there 
for the first time since Korea, and leaving Cee in the capable hands of Miss Ethel 
Fordham, an old family friend, he finds himself basking in a “feeling of safety and 
goodwill” (118). Describing Frank’s return to Lotus, the narrator writes, “Color, silence, 
and music enveloped him.” Indeed, Morrison’s description of life in Lotus at this moment 
of the Moneys’ return is rich with color: “every front yard and backyard sported 
flowers…marigolds, nasturtiums, dahlias. Crimson, purple, pink, and China blue. Had 
these trees always been this deep, deep green?” (117). The sun, which “sucked away the 
blue from the sky,” “could not scorch the yellow butterflies away from scarlet 
rosebushes” (118). In the cotton fields, Frank watches “acres of pink blossoms…turn 
red,” precisely the color that he had previously been horrified to find draining from his 
field of vision (118); in a matchbox stored away over the years in a hole in the kitchen of 
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their old house, he finds Cee’s baby teeth along with “his winning marbles: a bright blue 
one, an ebony one, and his favorite, a rainbow mix” (120).  
 Color envelops Frank in Lotus, too, in that his and his sister’s return there is a 
return to a predominantly black community. Each of them had left Lotus to work in white 
institutions; each of them barely escaped with their lives. Back in Lotus, though, Frank 
finds that nothing could “ruin the pleasure of being among those who do not want to 
degrade or destroy you” (118).65 Being back in her home community literally saves Cee’s 
life: she spends two months confined to Miss Ethel’s house, “surrounded by country 
women who loved mean” and “handled sickness as though it were an affront” (121). 
When she tells them that her sickness resulted from a white doctor’s machinations, their 
“eye rolling and tooth sucking was enough to make clear their scorn” for the medical 
industry (121). But it becomes clear that these women “knew how to repair what an 
educated bandit doctor had plundered” (128). To combat the damage done by the “devil 
doctor,” they put Cee under constant, watchful care and administer a variety of herbs and 
medicines to rid her of fever and infection. The final stage of Cee’s healing requires her 
to be “sun-smacked, which meant spending at least one hour a day with her legs spread 
open to the blazing sun” to rid her of her “womb sickness” (124). This ordeal, along with 
the “demanding love” she has received from Miss Ethel, gives her a newfound strength: 
“Sun-smacked or not, she wanted to be the one who rescued her own self” (129). Cee, 
like Frank, had left Lotus at the first available opportunity, but once she is well enough to 
                                                
65 In this sense, the novel insists on the importance of precisely the historical and cultural components of 
race that the framework of color-blindness refuses to acknowledge. Put differently, as Barbara Christian, 
discussing narratives of migration and shifts in geography in Morrison’s first three novels, writes, 
“Segregation, enforced by law or custom, had restricted African Americans in material ways but it had also 
placed them in contexts where they could create and retain their own languages, stories, and music” (415). 
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leave Miss Ethel’s home, she proclaims, “I ain’t going nowhere … This is where I 
belong” (126). Her newfound self-sufficiency and resolve are apparent to Frank when she 
returns to live with him: she puts herself to work learning to quilt, intending to eventually 
make quilts to sell to visitors and tourists to help support their household.  
 Cee thus emerges from her sickness with her health restored and self-confidence 
strengthened through communal healing, but even Miss Ethel’s expert care cannot 
reverse the permanent damage done by Dr. Beau’s operations: Cee is infertile. When 
Miss Ethel tells her this news, she needs time to process the implications. Initially upset 
with herself for having been “so stupid, so eager to please” (128), she comes to realize 
that she must now become “person who would never again need rescue” (129). She 
accepts that she will never have children and that she may never marry; she accepts that 
she will “have to invent a way to earn a living” (130). But when she first tells Frank the 
news, her grief overwhelms her. She tells him while sobbing, “I didn’t feel anything at 
first when Miss Ethel told me but now I think about it all the time. It’s like there’s a baby 
girl down here waiting to be born. She’s somewhere close by in the air, in this house, and 
she picked me to be born to. And now she has to find some other mother” (131). She 
continues:  
“You know that toothless smile babies have? … I keep seeing it. I saw it in a 
green pepper once. Another time a cloud curved in such a way it looked like…” 
Cee didn’t finish the list. She simply went to the sofa, sat and began sorting and 
re-sorting quilt pieces. (132) 
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As Cee heals, she is able to mourn the loss of her unborn child, or children: thanks to her 
newfound strength, she could “know the truth, accept it, and keep on quilting” (132).66 
But her description of the “toothless smile” she sees in the world around her triggers an 
unexpected reaction in her brother.  
 In fact, it is Cee’s haunting visions of the baby girl that bring together the novel’s 
disparate threads and ultimately bring about the resolution of the Money siblings’ tale in 
Home. Throughout the novel, Frank has returned to a disturbing memory of his time in 
Korea: one day, while guarding his post, he notices a Korean child scavenging for trash. 
He smiles as he watches her hand grabbing for food, and she returns to the site for days in 
a row. But one day, according to Frank’s initial account of the incident, recounted in first-
person narration in the longest of the italicized chapter interludes, when a “relief guard” 
approaches her, she reaches out and touches his crotch in “what looks like a hurried, even 
automatic, gesture” (95). Frank reads the gesture as the handiwork of a corrupt adult who 
was “not content with the usual girls for sale and took to marketing children,” a 
disturbing consequence of war (96). The relief guard responds by immediately 
“blow[ing] her away” (95).67  
                                                
66 Cee’s vision of her unborn child marks yet another way that Home recalls Morrison’s Beloved, which, as 
Marianna Hirsch writes, is “a ghost story about a child who returns to reestablish connection” – about “the 
murdered/abandoned child, here a daughter, returning from the other side to question the mother” (97). 
Hirsch argues that Beloved “is not only about the child’s longing for a lost maternal object but about the 
immense loss experienced by a mother who is unable to keep her children alive and rear them: It is about 
maternal fantasies of reparation and recovery” (97). While the transmission of “unspeakable memories” in 
Beloved is, as Hirsch argues, “a peculiarly maternal one” (109), Home addresses the question of reparation 
and recovery through the representation of Cee’s unwillingly foreclosed maternity. 
67 In a 2014 article, Melissa Schindler points out that the Korean girl is associated with a “rotting orange” 
that she picks out of the trash, a poignant image “in a canvas largely devoid of adjectives of color” (86). 
Later, she notes, the narrator asks the reader, “What type of man thinks he can ever in life pay the price of 
that orange” (133).  
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 Before this full description of this incident, the novel makes several weighty, 
oblique references to a Korean girl lurking in Frank’s memories of the war. Early in the 
novel, before he departs on his trip to find Cee, he struggles with pictures in his mind of 
the victims of his anguish and hatred after his friends had died on the battlefield: he 
replays in his mind shooting women and children, an old one-legged man, and most of 
all, “the girl. What did she ever do to deserve what happened to her?” (22). Later in the 
novel, when he recalls meeting Lily for the first time at the dry cleaner’s where she 
worked, he explains that he went to get his clothing cleaned because he had had a 
breakdown when he saw “a little girl vomiting water”: “Blood ran from her nose. A 
sadness hit me like a pile-driver” (69). Seeing the girl triggers an episode similar to the 
one that left him institutionalized at the novel’s opening: he rushes off feeling shaky and 
spends three nights sleeping on park benches, a “haunted, half-crazy drunk” (69). After 
he and Lily become an item, he attends a church picnic with her and is again triggered by 
the sight of a young girl, this time a “little girl with slanty eyes” who reaches for a 
cupcake at his table (76). Frank pushes the plate closer to her, and when she smiles up at 
him, he “dropped his food and ran through the crowd” (77). He stays out until dawn, and 
when he returns to Lily, she asks, “Was it something to do with your time in Korea that 
spooked you?” (77). He does not respond and simply tells her it won’t happen again. 
Finally, in the chapter following Frank’s description of the girl’s death, as he thinks 
through the deaths of his friends in gory detail yet again, the narrator writes, “But before 
that, before the deaths of his homeys, he had witnessed the other one. The scavenging 
child clutching an orange, smiling, then saying, ‘Yum-yum,’ before the guard blew her 
head off” (99).  
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 In each of these cases of remembrance, Frank links the Korean girl’s death to his 
own suffering. When he actively thinks of her, he cannot help but think of his friends 
dying on the battlefield, and when he remembers his friends’ deaths, his mind turns to the 
girl: he relives the horror of witnessing his friends dying on the battlefield, then 
remembers channeling his anger into the sanctioned retaliatory killing of his enemies 
(“There were not enough dead gooks or Chinks in the world to satisfy him”), and then 
finally fixates on the girl as one of these dead. But because her death predated the loss of 
his friends, this logic of compensation is disrupted (“What did she ever do to deserve 
what happened to her?”). She becomes the ultimate figure of the senseless violence of 
war, and thus, in both of the narrated instances in which he happens to encounter a visual 
cue that resembles her in some way, he loses control of himself: being reminded of the 
Korean girl’s pain (the blood and vomit of the girl on the sidewalk) and innocence (the 
smile of the girl with “slanty eyes”) sets him off, forcing him to take leave of civilian 
society as he relives the atrocities of a faraway war in his mind.  
As Mary Dudziak notes in a short essay on Home, Frank’s “nightmares and rage” 
reflect his utter isolation in a society in which “the experience of war itself is far away 
and largely inaccessible” for the non-veteran. She reads the novel as a tale of the 
“profound limits of empathy,” in which “society’s inability to fully empathize with the 
soldier” presents a parable, and perhaps a warning, about “the commonality of this 
profound human condition.” Frank’s memories of war entail that he cannot function 
normally in society, and even his loved ones cannot fully access or comprehend what has 
happened to him. But when it comes to the Korean child, the limits of empathy fold back 
onto the soldier himself. Indeed, Frank’s narration of the girl’s death is filled with 
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empathy for the child: he notes that she is “left-handed, like me,” and likens her to 
himself and Cee as children “trying to steal peaches off the ground under Miss 
Robinson’s tree” (95). He smiles when he sees her hand pawing for food among the 
garbage, and the relief guard also returns the girl’s smile—just before shooting and 
killing her. Frank’s tone of warmth and indulgence toward the child belies the brutality 
and senselessness of her sudden death. In this way, even as Frank is isolated in his 
torment, unable to respond to the outward reach of those around him, he struggles 
inwardly with the question: to what extent can he empathize with this victim? 
Frank’s description of the relief guard, in contrast to that of his victim, is cold, 
distant, and uncertain: “Thinking back on it now, I think the guard felt more than disgust. 
I think he felt tempted and that is what he had to kill” (97). In these two sentences, the 
distancing mechanism – “I think” – is paired with the curious intimacy of “he felt.” The 
reason for this inconsistency is finally revealed when Cee mentions seeing the visage of 
her never-to-be-born child, a smiling baby girl, and in doing so unearths the truth for 
Frank: 
Then Cee told me about seeing a baby girl smile all through the house, in the air, 
the clouds. It hit me. Maybe that little girl wasn’t waiting around to be born to 
her. Maybe it was already dead, waiting for me to step up and say how.  
I shot the Korean girl in her face. 
I am the one she touched. 
I am the one who saw her smile. 
I am the one she said ‘Yum-yum’ to. 
I am the one she aroused. (133) 
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Here, Cee’s baby ghost converges with the ghost of the dead Korean girl, revealing Frank 
to have been the “relief guard” that killed her. In this confession, the “I think” of Frank’s 
earlier assessment of the guard has changed into an incantatory “I am”: the one who saw 
her smile, yes, but also the one she aroused, and the one who killed her for it. Frank’s 
reaction when Cee tells him that the doctor had rendered her infertile is a “fluttering in 
his chest” that accompanies the questions, “Who would do that to a young girl? … What 
the hell for?” (132). That he immediately afterwards confesses to his own act of sexual 
violence against a young girl – “I have something to say to you right now” (133) – reveals 
the fluttering in his chest to be not just a sign of his anger or grief over what Cee has had 
to endure, but also a telltale response to the horrors he has inflicted on others. What is at 
stake for Frank at this point in the novel, then, is not just whether society can empathize 
with him, or he can empathize with his victims, but the extent to which he can empathize 
with, or forgive, himself. 68  
                                                
68 Dudziak writes, “Frank’s nightmares and rages would now have a name: post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Tying his violent outbursts to a medical diagnosis might earn a contemporary Frank our sympathy. But 
even if broken soldiers received better care and resources, they would still confront the same emptiness – 
the profound limits of empathy.” Here, she speaks to the necessary point that soldiers who return from war 
face a lack of care, support, and understanding. But as Mimi Thi Nguyen points out, the diagnosis of post-
traumatic stress disorder – a phenomenon peculiarly tied to wars of American empire – “underscores the 
ways in which historical events of imperial violation, especially those brutal acts continually committed 
against racial, colonial others, are transfigured into unimaginable pain for their perpetrators” (116). She 
reminds us that PTSD emerged from psychiatrists’ conjecture that soldiers, themselves “war victims,” 
“might present disturbances identical with those of their victims” (114), and argues that “the genealogy of 
[PTSD] and, concomitantly, the sidelining of the dead that evinces this disorder buttress an imperial project 
that declares its own innocence” (115). Nguyen shows that the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder 
for the “self-traumatized perpetrator” underscores the humanity of the soldier, even the soldier who 
commits heinous acts, against the dehumanization of the soldier’s victims, whose pain and suffering are not 
considered. Her discussion of the post-traumatic stress disorder paradigm suggests that Dudziak’s concept 
of the “limits of empathy” for the soldier with regard to Frank’s predicament in Home is ultimately one-
sided. In fact, the novel reveals Frank’s “nightmares and rages” to be a response to the atrocities he himself 
has committed. Moreover, I argue that Morrison is just as concerned with the breakdown in empathy 
between Frank and the Korean girl – indeed, between the many perpetrators of violence in the novel and 
their victims – as she is with that between Frank and the society around him after the war. 
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Frank’s revelation moves him from the position of a witness to that of a 
perpetrator, forcing him to contend with not just his sorrow at having lost his best friends, 
but also his guilt at having taken an innocent life. “I hid it from you because I hid it from 
me,” Frank claims before sharing his realization. “My mourning was so thick it 
completely covered my shame” (133). At the start of the next chapter, the narrator writes 
that Frank spent that night “churning and entangled in thoughts relentless and troubling. 
How he had covered his guilt and shame with mourning for his dead buddies. Day and 
night he had held on to that suffering because it let him off the hook, kept the Korean 
child hidden” (135). Here, the narrator takes up Frank’s own language to explain his 
prolonged forgetting and sudden remembering: mourning what he witnessed in Korea 
(the death of his beloved friends) was more psychically manageable than facing up to 
what he did there (killed a child point-blank). 
 By this point, just pages from the novel’s conclusion, the Korean girl has already 
become an extraordinarily capacious symbol, standing in for his sister’s now-impossible 
child as well as Frank’s and Cee’s own childhoods. Once the brutal truth of the 
circumstances of her death revealed, she also becomes imbued with vast explanatory 
powers for the narrative that has preceded this moment: we know now why Frank 
struggled so mightily upon his return, and why he was so spooked by the sight of young 
children during his initial months back, and why he was so reluctant to talk to Lily or 
anyone else about his time in Korea, and why he was so evasive in expressing grief over 
his friends’ deaths in Korea. For Frank, learning the extent of the trauma that Cee 
suffered at the hands of the doctor unlocks this repressed memory of the suffering he 
inflicted on the Korean girl. Articulating his culpability in turn unlocks for him the 
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memory of another unspoken and unresolved, if apparently unconnected, trauma: his and 
Cee’s childhood witnessing of the burial of the anonymous man at the horse farm, the 
victim of the “men-treated-like-dog fights.” Immediately after Frank admits that he was 
the one who shot the Korean girl, he springs to action to investigate the particulars of his 
fuzzy memory of that night. And so it is at this moment, just after learning that Cee is 
infertile and confessing his killing of the Korean child, that he talks to his grandfather and 
learns about the makeshift burial of the man who died at the hands of his son in a forced 
fight to the death. Frank’s psychic linking of these two apparently unconnected traumas 
brings the novel full circle: it closes by returning to the site where it began, now plainly 
depicting what was presented as a jumble of confusing images in the scene that framed 
the novel in its opening chapter. 
After finding out where the man was buried and why, Frank asks Cee to come 
with him to the site of the old horse farm, which has since burned down, and he requests 
that she bring the multicolored quilt she has just finished making. Cee sewed the quilt 
while convalescing under the watch of the neighborhood women, who make quilts to sell 
to tourists; it thus represents not just her healing, but her newfound community as well as 
her potential future financial autonomy in Lotus.69 It represents her first attempt at 
quilting, and is thus relatively crude; at the same time, “Sloppy as the quilt was, she 
treasured its unimpressive pattern and haphazard palette,” which the women chose 
together (142). They bring the quilt to the site where Frank remembers seeing the man 
                                                
69 As Janice Barnes Daniel describes in “Function or Frill: The Quilt as Storyteller in Toni Morrison’s 
Beloved,” the patchwork quilt, along with other metaphors related to sewing and weaving, is a frequent 
trope in feminist literary criticism. See her article for an analysis of Morrison’s use of the quilt as narrative 
device in Beloved.  
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being buried and perform a ritual of reburial.70 When they unearth his skeleton, Frank 
arranges the bones on the quilt, which becomes “a shroud of lilac, crimson, yellow, and 
dark navy blue” (143).71 Together, they wrap his bones in this “crayon-colored coffin” 
and place it into a grave that Frank digs underneath an old sweet bay tree (144). The tree 
itself is damaged, split down the middle, but as Frank testifies in his last words to the 
reader, it, like he and his sister, is “Hurt right down the middle / But alive and well” 
(145). The natural world around them mirrors the vibrancy of the quilt’s colors: Frank 
puts up a grave marker underneath the tree that reads, “Here Stands a Man,” and “he 
could have sworn the sweet bay was pleased to agree. Its olive-green leaves went wild in 
the glow of a fat cherry-red sun” (145).  
Echoing the scene of Frank and Cee’s homecoming to Lotus, the narration in 
these final pages explodes with color. In particular, the combination of military green and 
cherry-red reappears here as an unlikely testament to Frank’s psychic wellness: where the 
color red appeared throughout the first two-thirds of the novel as a visual marker of 
violence, death, and trauma – recall that Frank’s first episode of color-blindness 
announced itself with the draining away of red – it here marks, for the first time, a happy 
                                                
70 Morrison has depicted ritual healing elsewhere in her work, most notably in Beloved. Linda Krumholz 
writes that in Beloved, “ritual processes also imply particular notions of pedagogy and epistemology in 
which—by way of contrast with dominant Western traditions—knowledge is multiple, context-dependent, 
collectively asserted, and spiritually derived. Through her assertion of the transformative power of ritual 
and the incorporation of rituals of healing into her narrative, Morrison invests the novel with the potential 
to construct and transform individual consciousness as well as social relations” (396). Similarly, Lynda 
Koolish argues that in Beloved, the characters’ “struggle for individual wholeness becomes a struggle for 
ancestral healing” (173), and that in order to achieve psychic wholeness, the characters must “come to 
accept [their] memories” (174).  
71 The image of wrapping the bones in a cloth (“Together they folded the fabric and knotted its ends”) also 
evokes the Korean pojagi, a traditional Korean wrapping cloth made of fabric scraps used to carry and 
transport items. Like the quilt, the pojagi has been used as a metaphor for storytelling and women’s work; 
for example, Elaine H. Kim and Eui-young Yu employ the metaphor of the pojagi and emphasize its 
importance as an art form made by ordinary women to introduce their collection of Korean American oral 
histories, East to America: Korean American Life Stories (xviii). 
 
  136 
 
moment for Frank. If Frank’s trauma was most dramatically allegorized in his episodes of 
color-blindness, the warmth and saturation of color in this scene demonstrates his, and 
Cee’s, hard-fought wellness. He and Cee have buried a skeleton, but they are also 
symbolically laying to rest the several ghosts that have haunted this novel: it was Cee’s 
vision of her unborn baby that triggered this pilgrimage and ritual, along with Frank’s 
reinterpretation of that vision as the child he killed in Korea. In this midst of the burial 
ceremony, too, Cee sees the zoot-suited ghost who had dogged Frank on his journey 
across the country. I argued earlier that the zoot-suited man and the man buried outside of 
Lotus represent a pre-World War II mode of racism and racialization: white mob 
violence, legal and extralegal police terror. The siblings’ visions of the baby girl, in 
contrast, invoke a post-45 genealogy of racial violence: atrocities committed by 
desegregated troops against racialized foreign populations in imperial wars, the 
systematic sterilization of women of color and the exploitation of their labor. These 
ghosts of the pre-45 and post-45 converge in Frank and Cee’s ritual. For Frank, the 
temporary debilitation of color-blindness has ended; for the United States in the early 
1950s, the career of color-blindness as policy and doctrine is just beginning. But in 
Home, Morrison suggests that if color-blindness is a denial of the social, historical, and 
cultural realities of race, then it cannot repair the damage done by past racisms. Literally 
burying the skeleton of the past in color, Home refuses the terms of color-blindness. In its 
stead, the novel makes the case for revaluing race-specific histories, communities, and 
experience—or as Kimberlé Crenshaw might put it, for redistributing racial value. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
 
“June, from the war”: 
 
Rescuing the Refugee in Chang-Rae Lee’s The Surrendered 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
About halfway through Chang-Rae Lee’s The Surrendered, the main character 
June, now an older woman living alone in New York, thinks back on the years when she 
was still getting settled in the city. She had emigrated there from Korea as a war bride, 
but soon found herself raising her son Nicholas as a single mother. She recalls a time in 
his youth when, because he “kept asking about where she was from and what other 
Korean people were like,” she would take him to eat at Korean restaurants in the ethnic 
enclave of Palisades Park, a town in northern New Jersey near Fort Lee (238). They 
would take a taxi there from Manhattan, and on the ride back home, “Nicholas would fall 
asleep while half-holding his nose because of the sewer-smelling radish kimchee and 
dried cuttlefish beside him” (238). These trips were not sentimental opportunities for 
cultural connection or ethnic affirmation. Rather, at these dinners, June found that “her 
own spirit would dampen and sour” and her son “would hardly say anything and would 
pick at his quarter-eaten bowl of bibim bap,” and the groceries they brought home would 
“mostly rot before [she got] around to preparing” them (238). On what would prove to be 
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their final trip out to Palisades Park, Nicholas “asked if he could stay in the taxi while she 
shopped and even ate”; when she asked him why, he replied, “Because you get so angry 
when we’re there” (238). At this, June “instructed the [taxi] driver to take them back to 
Morningside Heights,” where she made them peanut butter sandwiches for dinner instead 
(238). Accepting the failure of these field trips, June decided that “whatever nostalgia she 
was hoping to conjure for [Nicholas] had long been obliterated,” and that “there was 
nothing she wished to latch on to” in these excursions (238). 
June’s attempts to forge a connection to the Korean immigrant community are 
unsuccessful, but this alienation from other Korean immigrants does not result from an 
easy embrace of American assimilation. Rather, June, who was orphaned when her entire 
family was killed in the Korean War, seems to want to connect with others who share her 
background of violence and survival. She seems to value, for example, her relationship 
with the young superintendent of her Manhattan apartment building, Habi, a survivor of 
“tribal conflict” in the Congo (34). June gets to know Habi after her husband passes 
away; he helps her carry groceries to her apartment and she sometimes invites him in for 
tea. She asks him about old scars on his face and hands, and in response he “simply said 
he was orphaned when he was young” and tells her it was a “very difficult period” (34). 
He asks her in turn about the scars on her own hands – scars that she usually conceals 
from others – and she tells him simply that they were burned in an accident, choosing not 
to disclose the details of the “difficult period” in her own childhood. He “nodded 
somberly, but without the cloying concern that others might proffer, and said nothing 
more” (34). These exchanges seem to elicit a feeling of unspoken understanding, private 
yet open, far removed from the pain and rage that mar June’s visits to Koreatown.  
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Both the distance June feels from the larger Korean immigrant community and 
her affinity with a refugee whom she perceives as sharing her background reflect the 
unorthodox nature of June’s immigration story in The Surrendered. As a child, after her 
entire immediate family is brutally killed during the Korean War, June grows up in an 
orphanage run by American missionaries and is made available for adoption, 
unsuccessfully, to families in the United States; some years later, she immigrates to the 
United States as the wife of an American GI, Hector, in order to gain citizenship. June’s 
hidden refugee past thus intimately ties her to two practices directly tied to the aftermath 
of the war that hold exceptional status in U.S. immigration history: transnational adoption 
and marriage between U.S. soldiers and foreign women.  
It was not until the passage of the landmark Immigration Act of 1965 that racially 
restrictive quotas on immigration from Asia were lifted, allowing for the first time for the 
mass immigration that would lead to the settlement of immigrant enclaves like the one in 
Palisades Park, New Jersey. The shape and character of these immigrant communities 
were determined in part by the preferences named in both the 1965 Act and the 1952 
McCarran-Walter Act that preceded it – preferences for immigrants with specialized 
occupational skills and for those with familial ties to existing U.S. citizens. Together, the 
McCarran-Walter Act and the Immigration Act of 1965 defined postwar American 
immigration policy. In historian Mae Ngai’s assessment, they “ended the policy of 
admitting immigrants according to a hierarchy of racial desirability and established the 
principle of formal equality in immigration” (227). But in the decades before the 1965 
Immigration Act made the heteronormative family the cornerstone of Asian American 
immigration, special provisions were created for the “nonquota” immigration of Asian 
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war brides of American soldiers and of Asian orphans adopted by American families. It 
was thus the privileging of the family, in conjunction with the violence of war and 
military occupation, that also expedited the immigration of women and children from 
Asia throughout the 1950s and beyond, through the practices of transnational adoption 
and GI marriages. But the adoptee and the war bride have been largely left out of 
traditional accounts of Korean immigration. Indeed, as sociologist Grace Cho observes, 
the war bride has been viewed as a “subject with a hidden or shameful history” (36).  
In The Surrendered, June and her son Nicholas represent just one of the many 
family units that cohere around the figures of the war bride and the war orphan. There is 
June’s original family in Korea, torn apart by the war and killed off before her eyes one 
by one until she is left utterly alone. There is the makeshift family that she comes to rely 
on at the orphanage in the 1950s, with the American Reverend Tanner and his wife 
Sylvie standing in as idealized parental figures for June and the other orphans; then, there 
is the reality of the Tanners’ own marital discord, complete with cheating, lying, and drug 
abuse hidden from the children. There are the Stolzes, the American couple – Lee’s 
fictional version of the real-life Holts, the white couple from rural Oregon who laid the 
foundation for transnational adoption from Korea in the 1950s – that wants to adopt an 
entire brood of Korean children, including June, who shockingly refuses their offer. And 
finally there is June own brief marriage to the GI, Hector, and the son that it produces, all 
three estranged by the novel’s current moment of the 1980s. These unconventional 
families define the contours of the novel’s fictional world and, together, trace a trajectory 
for the Korean American war orphan and war bride over the second half of the twentieth 
century. 
  141 
 
This chapter argues that The Surrendered’s depiction of the family formations 
created by the adoptee and the war bride disrupts the standard narrative of Korean 
American immigration. It examines how the newly transnational reach of both the 
institution of marriage and the practice of adoption in the 1950s enabled the first wave of 
postwar Korean immigrants, beginning a decade before the immigration reforms of 1965 
that would place the heteronormative family at the idealized center of Asian American 
immigration. At the same time, I show that the privileging of the heteronormative family 
has facilitated the disappearance of the war orphan and the war bride, producing these 
figures as unstable and illegible within our dominant understandings of both the 
immigrant and the refugee. My aim in this chapter is thus to consider, following David 
Eng, how the war bride and the transnational adoptee might be considered “proper 
subject[s] of Asian America” (107). What kinds of different conclusions might we draw 
about Asian American racialization and citizenship if we place these figures at the 
forefront of our analyses? How do Lee’s representations of the practices surrounding 
transnational adoption and GI marriages in The Surrendered intervene in the stories we 
tell about immigration, the family, and post-1965 multiculturalism?  
I begin the chapter with an overview of the crucial, and under-studied, place of 
Korean war brides and adoptees in Asian American histories of immigration and 
citizenship. In this opening section, I show that the family histories of war brides and 
adoptees prefigure the privileging of the heteronormative family as the foundation of 
Asian American immigration after 1965. Next, I turn to the novel’s depiction of June’s 
childhood at an orphanage in Korea after the war, reading a series of scenes that show 
how emerging institutions and codes of transnational adoption work together to produce 
  142 
 
the war orphan as a subject of U.S. intervention. In this way, I show, the novel disrupts 
the given liberal story about adoption as a humanitarian practice, overturning the power 
dynamic of need and rescue that characterizes humanitarian intervention. Finally, the 
chapter turns to June’s attempt late in the novel to reunite her only extant family – 
herself, Hector, and their son Nicholas – at the site of the birthplace of humanitarian 
discourse itself, a chapel in Solferino, Italy. This rendering of the afterlife of the war 
orphan/war bride and her fractured family in the United States across the decades 
following the war marks the novel’s recognition of violence of the Korean War as the 
condition of possibility for past and present modes of Asian American citizenship. 
 
II. Producing the War Orphan and the War Bride 
 
 Between 1875, when the Page Law forbade the entry of Chinese women to the 
United States, and 1945, when the War Brides Act permitted GIs stationed in Asia to 
marry and bring their wives back to the United States, immigration from Asia was 
dominated by single male workers. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, 
Asian American immigration patterns underwent a decisive transformation. In the 
postwar era, for the first time, immigration law was changed in such a way as to give 
preference to women and children under the rubric of familial reunification. As 
sociologist Yen Le Espiritu argues, prior to World War II, “America’s capitalist economy 
wanted Asian male workers but not their families” (17), and thus immigration policies 
“treated Asian male workers primarily as temporary, individual units of labor” (9). After 
the initial repeal of Chinese exclusion in 1943, however, a 1946 act permitted Asian 
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spouses and children of U.S. citizens to enter the country as nonquota immigrants, and 
the War Brides Act of 1945 allowed GIs to marry and bring Asian wives, otherwise 
racially ineligible for admission, to the United States. As these measures brought an 
unprecedented number of Asian women and girls to the United States, Asian immigration 
in the postwar period became “overwhelmingly female” (54).72 Historian Mae Ngai 
views these reforms as particularly significant in that they “laid the basis for Asian family 
immigration, which had been a near-impossibility under the exclusion laws” (233).  
An additional piece of legislation that neither Espiritu nor Ngai addresses is the 
1953 Refugee Relief Act, which issued orphan visas to Asian children, primarily girls, 
being adopted by American families. As Catherine Ceniza Choy argues, these early 
adoptees’ racialized integration into American families is also “part of the diversity of 
family formations in Asian-American history: bachelor communities, picture brides, 
military brides, transnational households, and post-1965 family reunification” (164). The 
preference given to Korean orphans, who were newly being viewed by middle-class 
white Americans as “potential family members,” as historian Arissa Oh puts it, allowed 
adoptees to circumvent the racial and national origins quotas that would have otherwise 
kept them from entering the United States: as Oh shows, 4,190 children from Korea 
immigrated to the U.S. between 1955 and 1961, a number far greater than the annual 
quota of 100 allotted to Koreans in the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. Indeed, Oh argues 
that American’s “acceptance of [adopted Korean children] as legitimate citizens (and 
                                                
72 Espiritu notes that the War Brides Act of 1945 was amended in 1947 to include veterans of Asian 
ancestry, a change that allowed 6,000 Chinese American soldiers and veterans to marry women in China – 
or reunite with their wives who had previously been barred from immigration – and bring them back to the 
U.S. before the act expired at the end of 1949. Most Japanese, Korean, and Filipino brides, in contrast, 
married non-Asian men. See Espiritu 54-55. 
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potential citizens) helped to erode some of the anti-Asian racial thought behind the 
national origins quota system” which would be dismantled in the 1965 Immigration Act 
(37). She concludes that adopted Korean children “were instrumental to the larger 
refiguring of Asianness that occurred in the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s” (46).73   
The development of institutions of transnational adoption in Korea rested upon 
the figure of the “orphan” on the one hand and the ideal of the normative American 
nuclear family on the other. As Eleana Kim argues, “legal norms, social conventions, and 
cultural representations in the Euro-American West reinforce the idea that children who 
are adopted are orphans in need of immediate rescue,” and orphans are often construed as 
the “ultimate figure of global humanitarianism” (263). She explains that in adoption 
procedures, “much bureaucratic and emotional labor is directed toward the severing of 
networks and connections in order to produce an ‘eligible orphan,’ who is then free to be 
exchanged and transformed through Euro-American models of kinship into someone’s 
as-if genealogical child” (11). This severing of prior familial and social relations – often 
characterized as the “clean break” needed to facilitate a “smooth” adoption – constitutes 
the “[prerequisite] to rendering a child adoptable” both symbolically and legally (11). In 
other words, before the adopted child could be transferred from the legal status of 
“eligible orphan” to the more privileged category of “immediate relative,” as mandated in 
                                                
73 See Oh 36-41 for a detailed overview of the legislative changes that allowed Korean adoptees to enter the 
United States in the postwar period, including the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which made 5,000 visas 
available to children from Europe affected by World War II; the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, which she notes 
was also originally intended to address problems in Europe; the Act of September 11, 1957, also known as 
the Refugee-Escapee Act, which allowed entry for an unlimited number of “alien orphans” adopted by U.S. 
citizens for two years; and the Act of September 26, 1961, which made nonquota visas permanently 
available for foreign-born adopted children. 
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1961 legislation governing the entry of adoptees, came the necessary process of making 
the child into an orphan (Oh 41). 
That nearly all children placed for inter-country adoption have had existing 
parents and relatives in Korea, however, has not suspended widespread credence in the 
narrative that adoption is a humanitarian practice that rescues “orphans.” During the 
postwar period, the idea of placing needy Asian children under the care of white middle-
class American families took hold in the developing Cold War rhetoric of U.S. global 
dominance.74 Arissa Oh calls the ideology that supported these new feelings about Asian 
orphans “Christian Americanism,” or “a fusion of Cold War patriotism and vaguely 
Christian values” (35). According to Oh, the “constant narration and re-narration of the 
journey from wretched Korean waif to beloved American son or daughter” positioned 
adoption as a practice that “resonate[d] with Christian Americanist Cold War 
imperatives” (36). Similarly, Eleana Kim suggests that during and just after the war, 
Korean children functioned as what she calls “tranquilizing conventions,” helping 
Americans to understand the war and “converting what might have been viewed as 
postwar occupation into a humanitarian intervention” (76). Laura Briggs characterizes 
this enduring narrative as the story of “children who will die without ‘us’ – middle-class 
                                                
74 The notion that Americans could adopt Korean war orphans as an act of humanitarian rescue had entered 
popular consciousness before the Korean War. As Christina Klein discusses in Cold War Orientalism, the 
symbolic adoption of needy war orphans became a popular practice, trope, and fundraising tool for 
American missionaries working in Asia starting in the late 1930s. She argues that the rhetoric of “moral 
adoption” represented the Cold War as a “sentimental project of family formation” that would allow 
everyday Americans to feel connected to global politics (159). In this way, as she points out, transnational 
adoption became a “story that Americans in the 1950s liked to tell themselves” in addition to a lived social 
practice (174). Laura Briggs similarly argues that beginning in the 1930s, Americans “learned a way to feel 
about foreign children” (158), mediated by images of suffering women and children. In her analysis, the 
iconic image of the “Madonna and waif” became “part of the architecture of Cold War liberalism, which 
constructed an overseas role for the United States that was at once compassionate and interventionist” 
(135).  
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white families in the United States – who need the home and emotional investment that 
only ‘we’ can provide” (130).75 And as David Eng argues, in return for this care, the 
adopted child must then “[help] to consolidate the affective boundaries of the white, 
heteronormative middle-class nuclear family” (108). 
Whereas the “orphan in need of rescue” provides an idealized figure for the 
practice of transnational adoption, the figure of the “war bride” evokes a different set of 
associations.76 As sociologist Grace Cho argues, the “yanggongju [Western princess],” 
                                                
75 Such a narrative of rescue ignores that the practice of transnational adoption was largely brought about 
due the lack of social welfare and legal protocols in a chaotic post-war South Korea. As Eleana Kim notes, 
“Between 1951 and 1964, the number of abandoned children at orphanages increased from 715 to 11,319—
a remarkable figure that suggests, as Richard Weil notes, that the ‘presence of efficient foreign adoption 
facilities encouraged the abandonment of children’ (1984: 282). It could well be argued that orphanages 
(which were largely funded by Western relief organizations), and, later, state-subsidized adoption agencies, 
functioned as a surrogate welfare system and a conduit for foreign exchange” (32). As Kim points out, 
there were no laws or policies governing domestic, much less international, adoption in postwar Korea. 
U.S. and European aid organizations thus moved into Korea in the midst of not just a humanitarian crisis 
but a “legal and social policy vacuum”; for example, Holt International Children’s Services, founded in 
1955, quickly developed a “vertically integrated system of orphanages, baby homes, medical services, and 
adoption administration” that operated independently of Korea’s virtually nonexistent welfare system (74). 
For this reason, one might argue that transnational adoption has harmed women and children in Korea as 
much as it has “aided” them: as Kim puts it, the institutionalization of transnational adoption “not only 
retarded the development of domestic adoption and child welfare policies, but also provided a quick-fix 
solution that has been complicit in the social disenfranchisement of Korean women” (25). According to 
Kim, social welfare in Korea today is in fact “largely based on the models provided by Western 
humanitarian organizations after the war, and it was profoundly influenced by American social work 
consultants who designed programs and trained women in the field” (56). Many scholars and activists 
working on issues regarding transnational adoption in Korea have linked the ethical failures of the adoption 
industry to the systemic lack of social and financial support for Korean unwed mothers and linked the 
struggle for justice for adoptees to advocacy for unwed mothers and alternative family structures in Korea. 
See for example the work of TRACK [Truth and Reconciliation for the Adoption Community of Korea], an 
advocacy group for adoptees and unwed mothers in South Korea.  
76 Of course, the figures of the war bride and the orphan are not unconnected: transnational adoption in 
Korea began as a way to manage the problem of mixed-race children resulting from sexual encounters 
between Korean women and American soldiers. These children, often abandoned by their families due to 
the dual stigmas of illegitimacy and miscegenation, were among the first sent from China, Japan, and Korea 
to the United States for adoption (Kim 51). Their adoptions were promoted by organizations such as the 
Welcome House, founded by the writer Pearl S. Buck, who “[could not] bear to see Americans, or even 
half-Americans, growing up ignorant and at the lowest level of Asian society … Do we, their fathers’ 
people, not owe them something?” (Briggs 152). Chang-Rae Lee’s 1999 novel A Gesture Life tells the story 
in part of an older Asian American man who adopts a mixed-race Korean child. For a discussion of that 
novel’s treatment of transnational adoption as well as a broader analysis of transracial adoption in the U.S., 
see Mark Jerng’s Claiming Others: Transracial Adoption and National Belonging. For discussions of 
mixed-race adoptees, see essays by Choy and Oh (2005). 
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the “woman who provides sexual labor for the U.S. military,” is “a figure built out of 
layers of collective trauma” dating back to the earliest days of the U.S. military 
occupation of Korea (4). The Korean War created the conditions for sexual encounters 
between American soldiers and Korean women, encounters that Cho shows “were not 
motivated simply by personal desire and romance,” but rather were “thoroughly 
implicated in the power dynamics of U.S. military dominance, the material destruction of 
war, and the whitewashing of violence through the narrativization of the United States’ 
role in Korea as benevolent” (13). Because the Korean war bride could be embraced as a 
beloved “GI bride” only to the extent that her past as a “Yankee whore” was erased, she 
argues, the story of the arrival and assimilation of the GI bride “makes sense only through 
a willful forgetting of the everyday life of the [U.S. military] camptown and of the violent 
and intimate history shared by Korea and the United States” (130). Indeed, immigration 
to the United States through the institution of marriage has “[represented] an opportunity 
for the Korean woman who is associated with military sex work to shed the stigmas of 
the past by legitimizing her sexual labor” (14). Consequently, despite the fact that war 
brides and the family members they later sponsored for immigration constitute “about 
half” of all Koreans in the United States, Cho contends that their stories are often omitted 
from accounts of Korean immigration and discourses about Korean Americans due to 
unresolved wartime traumas as well as shame and secrecy surrounding sex work (23).  
Like the adoptee, then, the war bride is a “pioneer of Korean migration” to the 
United States (Cho 14). Yet each of their stories has been obscure within larger histories 
and understandings of Korean American immigration, a lacuna reflected in the scholarly 
discord over the very status of these figures. For example, Arissa Oh points out that 
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Korean adoptees are absent in histories of refugee orphans as well as in histories of 
refugee law and policy, a “historiographical disappearance” that she argues “reveals how 
these Korean refugee orphans have been reimagined as little immigrants. Indeed, the fact 
that Korean orphans are typically described—if they appear at all—as an early group of 
immigrants in Asian American and immigration histories shows how thoroughly their 
refugee roots have been erased from our historical imaginations” (35). But the adoptee 
garners only rare mentions in canonical accounts of Asian American and immigration 
history. David Eng observes that “the figure of the transnational adoptee has until very 
recently been noticeably absent in diaspora and immigration studies, in Asian and area 
studies, and in ethnic and queer studies” (94), and Catherine Ceniza Choy agrees that 
Asian American historiography “has not incorporated the history of Asian international 
adoption in the documentation and analysis of the Asian-American experience” (164). 
The adoptee is thus paradoxically claimed as neither a refugee nor an immigrant. 
Meanwhile, Grace Cho shows that the war bride does not appear in the sociological 
literature on immigration, which generally classifies Koreans as part of the ethnically 
diverse post-1965 wave of immigration, overlooking that the “main impetus” for 
Koreans’ arrival came before 1965, namely in the war that “set migration in motion” 
(12). For Cho, understanding the genealogy of the war bride must lead us to reconsider 
the boundary between forced and voluntary migration: she urges us to view the war bride 
as not just another immigrant, but a “displaced subject” of war (14). The war bride, too, 
sits between the poles of immigrant and refugee. 
How can we account for the multiple and overlapping erasures and silences that 
have surrounded adoptees and war brides? In order to understand and address these 
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archival erasures, I argue, we must critically examine the very structure into which these 
figures and their contested histories have disappeared: the normative family. Of the 
adoptee, David Eng writes, “The movement of the transnational adoptee from ‘over 
there’ to ‘over here,’ and from public charge to private family, individuates her while 
simultaneously working to encrypt colonial histories in the domestic space of intimate 
family and kinship relations” (103). The war bride, Grace Cho writes, “operates as a 
figure for the disappearance of geopolitical violence into the realm of the domestic” (14). 
Whereas the immigrant family has been hyper-visible as the primary framework for 
understanding post-1965 Asian America, the Asian diasporic family formations that 
preceded and indeed prefigured this model, including marriages between American 
soldiers and their Asian wives and adoptive American families and their Asian daughters 
and sons, have been both invisible and incomprehensible according to our dominant 
narratives of the immigrant and the refugee. As Cho insists, the happy story of the 
immigrant – of “the Korean war bride who shows gratitude toward her hospitable new 
family and country, who later brings the rest of her Korean family to the United States so 
that they, too, can enjoy America’s gifts” – “can make sense only through exclusions” 
(14, my emphasis). By dwelling in these exclusions, we can begin to apprehend a fuller 
picture of Asian American immigration, racialization, and citizenship in the postwar 
period. 
As a novel whose protagonist is a Korean War orphan who eventually immigrates 
to the United States as the war bride of a GI and ends up raising a mixed-race child as a 
single mother, The Surrendered is clearly invested in bringing to light the subjugated 
histories of war brides and adoptees within the larger story of U.S. participation in the 
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Korean War. That June, who partially grows up in an orphanage, grows up to be a 
Korean woman raising a child fathered by an absentee GI also marks a peculiar way in 
which the novel’s plot comes full circle, given that transnational adoption is a practice 
that has capitalized on the stigma attached to unwed mothers and interracial children. 
Over the course of the novel, we see June travel from being an orphan, the supposed 
beneficiary of the system of transnational adoption, to being a single mother, the category 
most often dispossessed by that same system. In other words, over time, she cycles 
through the various positions historically associated with Korean transnational adoptees 
and war brides. In this way, The Surrendered unambiguously writes the adoptee and the 
war bride into our narratives of Korean immigration. At the same time, in my reading, the 
novel problematizes that simple gesture of inclusion, delineating the distance between 
figures of war like the adoptee or the war bride and the conventionally understood figure 
of the immigrant associated with post-1965 multiculturalism. If, as I stated above, the war 
bride sits between the poles of refugee and immigrant, then how can we read June’s 
disidentification with the category of immigrant and her later turn toward what could be 
thought of as a refugee genealogy? This chapter turns next to this character’s trajectory in 
The Surrendered. 
 
III. Rescuing the Orphan in The Surrendered  
 
 From the beginning of The Surrendered, June presents herself as an 
unconventional orphan. For example, several months after their arrival at the orphanage, 
the American missionary Reverend Tanner and his wife Sylvie decide to have new 
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photographs taken of all of the orphans to include in their adoption files. The existing 
photos, in Tanner’s estimation, are “lugubrious, stern portraits, joyless and hard, and 
didn’t show off a single one of the children well,” and he is confident that new, happier 
photographs “would get them all placed” (156-157). Reverend Tanner and Sylvie find 
that they need to coax the children into smiling for the photographs, with Tanner eliciting 
their laughter by making funny faces and playing tricks behind the camera. But June, the 
last child to be photographed, refuses to smile for her picture, “not even offering the 
slightest smile, any break of the lips” (158). Despite the Tanners’ attempts to convince 
her to “look happy and friendly for her file,” they “ended up taking the image of June that 
any of them who cared to remember her might someday see in his mind, that iron gaze 
that was hers alone” (158). June’s refusal to smile for the camera puts her at odds with 
the logic that makes the humanitarian enterprise of the orphanage function smoothly. As 
we have seen, her insistent singularity – “that iron gaze that was hers alone” – grates 
against the logic of exchangeability that the open market of the orphanage demands. 
Unwilling or unable to act the ideal orphan, June is marked as an unadoptable child. 
As June’s story unfolds, however, we find that she does not think of herself as 
unadoptable as such; she wants to be adopted, but only by Sylvie, to whom she cathects 
almost immediately after arriving at the orphanage. She is not alone in this wish. It is 
known to everyone at the orphanage that Reverend Tanner and Sylvie are planning to 
eventually bring an unspecified number of children back to Seattle with them, and all of 
the children want to be among those chosen. Hector, the former GI working as a 
handyman at the orphanage, thinks he knows what draws the orphans to the kind and 
charismatic Sylvie; in fact, he finds that even he is susceptible to the fantasy of a future 
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with Sylvie, to the feeling that he “might like to be adopted away, too” (151). But what 
June wants from Sylvie is not what “any orphan” wants. After secretly reading Sylvie’s 
diary and learning that Sylvie herself is an orphan who lost her family in a war, June 
comes to view her relationship with Sylvie as “not just [a bond] of mother and daughter 
but that of comrades who by the curse of war had been sentenced to be alone” (326). She 
imagines herself in the future – in their “resumed lives” once they leave the orphanage – 
as “Sylvie’s secretary and housekeeper, her girl-in-waiting, her handmaiden, someone 
she could use and count on at any moment of the day or night” (327).  
In fact, the narrator explains, June has always been ill-equipped to act as a 
properly needy orphan: rather than grooming herself to be chosen by a family that will 
take care of her, she finds herself angling to figure out how take care of Sylvie and thus 
to be needed in a different way. That is, she imagines not a mother-daughter relationship 
of unconditional love between Sylvie and herself, but a relationship in which she 
becomes indispensable to the Tanners by figuring out how to provide what they need. 
After June reads Sylvie’s diary and finds out that she has been unable to bear children of 
her own, she feels that she can 
begin to understand what [the Tanners] were doing in Korea, certain there must be 
reasons besides goodness and charity for them to have come to a place as awful as 
this. They could not possibly be there only to give of themselves. They were 
hoping for something, too, and in the tireless device of her mind she was figuring 
how she could give them what they wished. It was finally within her power. (326) 
Here, June perceives that the Tanners’ humanitarian mission is not a one-way gift, but a 
two-way transaction, and she intends to use this knowledge to her benefit. She 
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understands that the Tanners’ choice to come to the “awful place” that is Korea to work 
with orphans was never purely selfless. If she can mold herself to fill the gap they are 
looking to fill, then she will win the prize of being taken back to America with Sylvie.  
June’s inversion of the dynamic of need and care that characterizes the 
humanitarian mission is one that Reverend Tanner cannot abide. In an argument with 
Sylvie one evening after an incident with June, Tanner apologizes to Sylvie for “[losing] 
control,” telling her that he “can’t stand [June’s] speaking to us like that” (163). When 
Sylvie responds that June is “only a child” who “doesn’t know what she’s saying,” he 
replies, 
“Oh please, darling! She’s smart as a whip. Nothing is an accident with her. When 
she said she would be sure to ‘take care’ of us it made me crazy. Her arrogance is 
astounding.” 
“But you couldn’t have been meaner,” she said to him, her voice low and hard. 
“To tell her that we would never need her.” (163) 
According to Tanner’s script – the standard script of transnational adoption – the 
American missionary “takes care” of the Korean war orphan. When June attempts to flip 
that script, he lashes out in anger and disbelief, giving utterance to the unspoken power 
dynamic at the heart of every exchange between missionary and orphan: you need me, but 
I will never need you. He is “astounded” by June’s calculation and manipulation, but he 
cannot imagine that she is actually empowered to “take care” of him or his wife in any 
real way.  
Later in his argument with Sylvie about June, Tanner explains that part of why 
they cannot adopt June is precisely her unmalleability. As he puts it, “The fact is, the girl 
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has already grown up. She’s who she is now, through and through. She’s not going to 
change” (164). Because he sees her as already fully formed, he believes her to be 
impervious to all of the Tanners’ benevolence, unable or unwilling to be molded and thus 
unfit to be one of his charges. When Sylvie protests that he doesn’t know “what she’s 
been through” (“If you did you wouldn’t talk like this,” arguing that June’s particular 
circumstances should be taken into account in judging her character, he answers,  
“I don’t know what happened to her. That’s true. But I know plenty about some of 
the others, as do you. None of them has a more profound story than any of the 
rest. Not in sum, at least. They all have nothing, and we agreed that we would 
start with them from this point on. It’s all we can do. There are thousands of 
needy children in this country. Maybe tens of thousands. And we’re only helping 
the orphans! We were warned by our colleagues, remember? What was their 
saying? ‘So many pretty stones in the river, but you can’t pick them all up’? How 
right they were—so many of them, right here with us. But you chose the stone 
that’s razor sharp.” (165) 
When Sylvie demurs in response, “She chose me,” Tanner accuses her of encouraging 
June “over all the others,” and Sylvie ends the conversation by declaring, “No one else is 
going to adopt her. They won’t and you know it” (165). Tanner sees all of the children at 
the orphanage as interchangeable, by definition: they all have an equally profound story 
of loss, and they all equally have nothing, and they are all equally worthy of care. But 
June is different. Because she does not assent to her own interchangeability as an orphan, 
she is less worthy of being, and ever less likely to be, adopted. In Tanner’s view, June’s 
cathexis to Sylvie is inappropriate, deluded, and distracting, and it marks her as an 
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improper object for his benevolence. Sylvie and her husband agree that June is 
unadoptable in her present state, but whereas Sylvie wants to give June the attention she 
seeks because of her difference, Tanner is concerned only with rehabilitating June into a 
better kind of orphan. 
Later in the novel, however, Reverend Tanner realizes that there is something that 
June can provide for him after all. He makes a special request of June, and it is only after 
this exchange takes place that June’s behavior changes. In a one-on-one conversation, 
Tanner asks June to keep Sylvie company and to let him know if she ever seems to be 
“particularly unwell,” which June interprets as a request for her to report to the Reverend 
about Sylvie’s illicit activities—namely, her drug abuse and her ongoing affair with 
Hector (328). But before she fully agrees, June has a request of her own for Tanner. She 
asks if he and Sylvie still want a family of their own, and he responds cagily that they are 
“still thinking about that” (330). She replies, “There are so many children here … You 
must meet so many children on your visits,” and he answers, “Yes, I do. So many. All 
worthy and good. Really every last one of you” (330). Upon hearing these words, June 
“took his implication whole; she went back to her chores with the conviction that 
Reverend Tanner had made a bargain with her,” a bargain to adopt her if she did what he 
asked (330). After this conversation, she follows and watches Hector and Sylvie during 
their trysts as per the Reverend’s requests. But along with this, she “[begins] to practice 
her new way”: in English class and Bible study, she “[surprises] him with a new 
enthusiasm and the demeanor of a girl who was respectful and demure” (378). She 
decides to “show him her restraint,” to show him that “she was a worthy girl at core, 
exactly the kind of hard soul he must be here to save” (378). Her change in outlook 
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represents not an awakening, but a “differing form of the same capacity for self-discipline 
and self-direction she’d always possessed and counted on,” a capacity she was now 
“applying…to self-reform,” a “jubilant feeling” (378). Tanner’s secret bargain with June 
transforms her into an exemplary Korean orphan. 
The terms of June’s transformation are perhaps starkest in a scene late in the 
novel, when the Tanners announce that the children are to be photographed one more 
time. At first, as in the earlier photography scene, June refuses to participate, “for there 
was no reason for her to do so, she was already spoken for” – that is, already spoken for 
by the Tanners – but she then decides she “ought to take every chance to better herself, as 
much as stay in line” (384). But rather than being photographed, it turns out that the 
children are to meet an American couple, Mr. and Mrs. Stolz of rural Oregon, who had 
traveled to Korea in order to adopt up a group of orphans. When it is June’s turn to be 
introduced to the Stolzes, a demure, well-behaved young woman is on display. Reverend 
Tanner notes that she is “self-possessed and highly independent,” and when they ask her 
whether she can speak English, she “answered that she spoke it well, surprising and 
impressing them” (385). June explains that her father had been highly educated and 
attended a top university in Japan – notably, the first time we ever hear June speak about 
any member of her family to anyone at the orphanage – and elicits “approving nods” 
from the Stolzes (385). The old June shows herself briefly when the Stolzes attempt to 
take her photo and her “instinct [is] to put her hand over the lens,” but her newfound 
discipline overcomes that unbecoming instinct (385). Far from the sullen orphan that “no 
one else is going to adopt,” June shows herself to be intelligent, mature, attractive, and 
friendly, and after this initial meeting, the Stolzes decide to adopt her. As a fourteen-year-
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old, they reason, she will be old enough to help them with the five younger children they 
will be bringing back to Oregon, and her excellent English skills will also make her a 
useful translator.77 
When the Stolzes come to June’s room to deliver the good news, however, they 
encounter a different child. Mrs. Stolz envelops June in a hug, and Mr. Stolz declares, 
“You have a family again” (388). Even before they speak, June is reduced to a “fallen 
pile of child, sobbing and shaking,” in their eyes a sure sign of her joy and relief at finally 
being chosen for adoption (387). Indeed, one of the only sentences June utters in their 
encounter is, “Nobody chose me before,” to which Mrs. Stolz coos, “We’re all the more 
fortunate, then!” and promises that June will “be safe and sound with us. You’ll always 
have our love and support” (388). Mrs. Stolz is stunned and confused, then, when June 
suddenly breaks out of her embrace, forcibly pushes her away, stomps on her husband’s 
foot, and runs away.  
What the Stolzes cannot understand is that even as they are announcing 
themselves as June’s new family, her mind is fixated on her own existing familial ties. 
Early in the novel, just before the death of her twin siblings, we see a younger June 
asleep on the roof of a train car and dreaming that her mother and sister are still with her. 
In her sleep, she “could still believe that all of them would eventually reunite,” since she 
                                                
77 In this scene, we see that June’s adoption is contingent on her domestic and intellectual labor – taking 
care of the other children, translating and teaching English – as well as her affective labor, thus evoking 
David Eng’s important work on transnational adoption and the affective labor of the adoptee. He writes: 
“…the consumption of the transnational adoptee by parents in the global North completes the ideal of 
newly emergent multicultural families as a supplement to capital precisely through the exploitation of the 
child’s affective, rather than wage, labor. In other words, while Third World women from the global South 
have traditionally been exploited for their wage labor in the manufacturing sector, their emotional labor and 
care work in the domestic sphere, and now their reproductive labor as birth mothers, the exploitation of the 
transnational adoptee is largely an emotional affair. She helps to consolidate the affective boundaries of the 
white, heteronormative middle-class nuclear family” (108). 
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never actually witnessed her mother’s and sister’s deaths or found their remains, nor did 
she witness the deaths of her father and older brother (26). She holds out hope, “despite 
the surety of her instinct,” that, for example, her older brother is “hiking north through 
the hills with the Communists, beleaguered but alive” (26). This is the “waking picture in 
her mind,” the picture of her own reunited family (26). Although we never see June talk 
or even think about her family during her time at the orphanage, the Stolzes’ sudden 
interest in adopting June seems to reawaken that picture of her family. Like the Stolzes, 
her parents were “country people,” and when the Stolzes come to her room to tell her 
they have chosen to adopt her, a “tide of longing unexpectedly washed over her” (387). It 
is this longing for her dead father, mother, sisters, and brothers, not relief at being 
matched up with a new family, that renders June “not mature or resolute or strong in the 
least but a fallen pile of child, sobbing and shaking” (387). When the Stolzes try to 
“choose” June, they cannot replace the “waking picture” of June’s family in her mind; 
rather, they reanimate it. 
June’s persistent attachment to her own family disrupts the normal process of 
adoption. Her enduring cathexis to Sylvie poses a similar problem. As we know, June has 
already “chosen” Sylvie as her family, and she fully believes that she will be imminently 
returning to the U.S. with the Tanners. After meeting the Stolzes, June is hurt and 
confused by Sylvie’s failure to let the Stolzes know that she is already, in her own words, 
“spoken for” (385). She wonders, “Did [Sylvie] know what the old couple was here for? 
… Was she hoping that someone like them would take her? Relieve her of this burden?” 
(387). As we have just seen, when the Stolzes do come to take her away, June is 
emotionally overwhelmed by the memory of her family, but it is Mrs. Stolz’s unwitting 
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invocation of Sylvie that finally triggers June’s physical outburst. Just before this 
incident, the Tanners had announced that they would be leaving soon, an announcement 
that June greeted by preparing her things for departure. While taking stock of her 
belongings, she takes special care with a butterfly-shaped tortoiseshell hair clasp that 
Sylvie had given her as a gift. She liked to use the clip to “remind herself to keep her hair 
and face and fingernails neat and clean, to be polite, even smiling and pretty, just as the 
younger girls who had been adopted before had been polite and pretty, so eager to please” 
(384). Here, we see June negotiating the reigning codes of adoptability at the orphanage. 
Secure in the knowledge that “her time here was truly ending, that her life was about to 
begin anew” (384), she disciplines herself into the kind of orphan who gets chosen for 
adoption: pretty, polite, accommodating. The hair clip is a sign of this conscious decision 
to change her behavior to align with what is expected of her. This transformation pays 
immediate dividends: out of all of the children at the orphanage, June is the Stolzes’ first 
choice. But at the end of their encounter in June’s room, as Mr. Stolz photographs his 
wife hugging June, Mrs. Stolz compliments June on her hair clasp. She strokes June’s 
hair and says, touching the clasp, “What a lovely thing…You know, it’s the first thing I 
noticed when I saw you. I thought it made you look so beautiful and graceful” (389). For 
June, this comment on the hair clip, a beloved gift from Sylvie, is the last straw. She 
breaks away from Mrs. Stolz’s embrace, stomps on Mr. Stolz’s foot, and literally runs 
away from the Stolzes as fast as she can. June’s brutal rejection of the Stolzes marks 
another refusal by June to abide by the script of adoption. The adoptee is not allowed to 
choose her adopter or to say no. June’s attempt to engineer her own adoption by the 
Tanners and her rejection of the Stolzes marks the culmination of her unadoptability.  
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After the Stolzes’ departure later that evening with six other children, June mulls 
over what to tell Sylvie about what happened. She decides that if asked, she will explain 
to her that  
despite the woman’s kindness and the very fine life she described, June had 
realized just in time that she was not meant to go with them. She would not be a 
part of any other family again. In a different lifetime she would have her parents 
back, her older brother and sister would be healthy, the twins happy and whole; 
but in this one she had been paired up, she and Sylvie aligned like twins 
themselves, if by one of them not quite acknowledged. (391) 
Needless to say, for June, there has been no “clean break” to facilitate her smooth 
adoption. She remembers her own family, and she has already chosen Sylvie as her new 
family. But just as June reveals herself to be an unfit adoptee, Sylvie has come to realize 
that she is, in the end, unfit to be an adoptive parent. Although she and Tanner have not 
explicitly discussed the matter, she knows that they will be returning to the United States 
alone. She had “always assumed that they would take four with them, or five, or ten, as 
many as they could. But now they could return childless, which, she could now begin to 
see…was a mercy for all” (405). The time Sylvie has invested at the orphanage has 
transformed her understanding of mercy: she now believes that electing not to bring any 
children to the United States is the merciful choice. 
 In the novel’s final scenes at the orphanage, we see a more mature June reflecting 
on her fate and that of the other remaining children: 
June watched the other children, and she thought how their numbers were 
thinning… because of their character, or young age, or plain luck, and that those 
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who remained would be only less fortunate, and grow older, simply settle ever 
deeper into the fixed molds of their selves, the selves that had already been passed 
over. (436) 
This passage highlights the “passed over” subjectivity of the unadopted orphan, unlucky 
but not unworthy. By the time it becomes clear that the Tanners will not be adopting any 
children from the orphanage, June has settled into the idea of being passed over as well. 
But even when the Stolzes announced that they wanted to adopt her, her first words were, 
“Nobody chose me before.” Min, a young disabled boy who is one of the smallest 
orphans at the orphanage, also remains among the orphans yet to be adopted at this 
point.78 From his point of view, the case for each of them is clear: he tells June that he 
knows that there is little chance of his being adopted—“not when there are so many 
others with nothing wrong with them” (439). When June responds, “There’s nothing 
wrong with me,” he counters, “You can say it ten thousand times over, but it’s not going 
to make it true. You’re the way you are. Everybody knows it. The way you’ll always be. 
You’re trouble, just like me” (439). He recognizes that from the perspectives of the 
orphanage and prospective adoptive families, there is too much “wrong” with each of 
them, physically or otherwise, for them to be desirable as adoptees. 
                                                
78 Ironically, Min’s disability occurred at the hands of his caretakers at the orphanage in an accident early in 
the novel, and it is precisely this disability that renders him unadoptable. His story thus serves as a parable 
of humanitarianism’s dynamic of rescue and harm: as Laura Briggs puts it, this dynamic entails a belief in 
the idea that “only US intervention could solve the problems that US intervention had wrought” (“Mother” 
187). The irreversible harm that Min suffers at the hands of his intended protectors leaves him in a 
permanent state of dependency. The injury that the orphanage causes him is material, marked on his 
physical person in his missing toes and the associated limp that will dog him for the rest of his life. But, 
Lee’s novel suggests, the orphanage inflicts less visible but no less damaging forms of harm on the other 
children as well as their caretakers.  
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The night of this conversation, June and Min of them sneak out of their bunks to 
sleep in the orphanage’s chapel, where they light a fire in the stove to keep warm. Min 
brings the footlocker containing his belongings to the stove and begins to throw things in. 
June follows suit, until she has burned up everything she owns save for a special book 
that Sylvie gave her. She offers it to Min, who replies that he doesn’t want it. After some 
hesitation, she asks Min to put the book in the stove, then immediately regrets it and 
fishes it out with her bare hands, badly burning the skin on her hands and arms. As they 
throw a large kerosene lamp into the stove, they huddle together, and June says to him, 
“We don’t need anyone …We’re going to stay here now” (444). The lamp in the stove 
creates an explosion and a conflagration that consumes the chapel. The Reverend, Sylvie, 
and Hector all run into the chapel to save June and Min; June drags Hector out of the 
wreckage as the walls cave in. They are the only two to emerge from the fire.  
In this final scene at the orphanage, although June and Min may have been 
“passed over” for adoption for the flaws they cannot change or correct, they prove that 
they can enact their own rejection of the orphanage by literally destroying it. Affirming 
that they do not “need anyone” or “want anything,” they first burn up the things that have 
been donated to them at the orphanage, then burn down the chapel that the Tanners and 
Hector worked so hard to erect in order to better carry out the orphanage’s mission, and 
finally attempt to annihilate themselves in the fire. In a final reversal of the script of 
humanitarian intervention, it is June, the orphan girl, who rescues Hector, the GI who 
initially found her starving on the side of a road and brought her to the orphanage. In this 
way, the novel completes the series of inversions that characterizes June’s tenure as an 
orphan: she takes care of the caretakers, refuses their gifts, rejects her prospective 
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adoptive family, and ultimately burns down the institution responsible for saving her life, 
all apparently without regrets. Having sabotaged her future as an adoptee, June must find 
another path. In the concluding section of this chapter, I turn to June’s unexpected choice 
to resurrect a narrative of humanitarianism at the end of her life, as she dwells upon the 
conditions that have produced her as a figure of war. 
 
IV. “This is our place”: Relocating the Refugee  
 
After June immigrates to the United States under circumstances not detailed in the 
novel – all we learn is that she marries Hector in order to gain legal status, and that he 
fathers a child with her before they separate and lose touch for decades – she finds a way 
to make a life for herself and her son in New York. She eventually remarries an 
American man and sells antiques at a store she owns in Manhattan, earning a good living; 
as I noted in the opening of the chapter, she maintains a deliberate distance from the 
Korean American immigrant communities in the New York area. But, in a dramatic 
gesture appropriately epic given the scale of this novel, when she is diagnosed with 
cancer after the death of her husband, June hires a private detective to locate Hector for 
her so she can enlist him in a search of their now-adult son Nicholas, who has 
disappeared somewhere in Europe. As it happens, June’s private investigator finds that 
Hector is living and working in the growing Korean immigrant enclave of Fort Lee, New 
Jersey, just across the river from upper Manhattan. Hector works as a janitor in a run-
down Korean mall for a Korean entrepreneur named Jung, whom Hector finds to be “the 
most slothful of their kind, a man who was, literally, born in a roadside ditch during the 
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war but didn’t remotely know or care a thing about it now” (102). That Hector has taken 
a menial job working at a modest Korean mall marks an irony not just of world history, 
as he notes, but of his own personal history too: thirty years before, Hector had stayed in 
Korea to work as a janitor and handyman at an orphanage run by American missionaries. 
Now, in New Jersey, he is cleaning up after the next generation of Koreans. His former 
status as a liberator has been reduced to a simple epithet—“GI,” “Joe,” or “Rambo.” The 
Korean Americans who populate New Jersey in the 1980s are, for the most part, recent 
immigrants like Hector’s boss, largely unconcerned with a war they cannot remember. 
But Hector connects the dots: even if Jung doesn’t “care a thing” about the war, Hector 
knows that the Korean immigrants of Fort Lee have ended up in the United States in large 
part because of the war that he helped to fight. 
But it is not so odd that Hector, the working-class white veteran from upstate New 
York, has chosen to settle in the Korean immigrant community in northern New Jersey. 
Like many GIs and veterans, he is himself an erstwhile member of an Asian American 
family, after a fashion, through his short-lived marriage to June. But June does not share 
his bemused take on the war’s disappearance from the American cultural memory. In 
fact, when the private investigator she has hired locates Hector, she instructs him to 
identify her as “June, from the war” (81). Hector’s response – “June, from the war. As if 
he could forget from where” (81) – indicates that June’s name and memory for Hector are 
in themselves so evocative of the war that no such identifier is necessary. Indeed, June’s 
very name indexes the war itself: June is the month when the war began in 1950, and 
June 25, the date when the war began, is often used metonymically by Koreans to refer to 
the war itself. It is clear that “June, from the war” has no desire to efface her roots.  
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In fact, it is a relic of her refugee roots that sends June and Hector on their voyage 
to Europe to find their son Nicholas. June suspects that he has gone to Solferino, a town 
in Italy that has a special significance to her. In their quest to find Nicholas, June and 
Hector travel to Solferino, this historic site of the Battle of Solferino, the decisive final 
battle in the Second Italian War of Independence in which allied French and Italian forces 
defeated the Austrians, contributing to the eventual unification of Italy. The tale of that 
battle is told in a book in June’s possession, A Memory of Solferino by J.H. Dunant. 
Filled with horrific descriptions of the wounded and dying on the battlefield, A Memory 
of Solferino offers, according to the narrator, an “account of the aftermath of a battle 
between two immense armies totaling 300,000 men, fought on the 24th of June, 1859, one 
army comprising the allies of France and the other the allies of Austria,” written from the 
viewpoint of Dunant, a “a young French-Swiss banker who was traveling in northern 
Italy” when he happened upon the bloody battle (140). For Hector, who reads the book 
while working at the orphanage after the war, these descriptions “[match] any number of 
his memories from the war” (141), memories he’s “dying to forget” (143). For Sylvie 
Tanner, the descriptions of the wounded also serve as a reminder of past violence she has 
witnessed. Inscribed “To our steadfast daughter. May you be an angel of mercy,” the 
book was initially a gift to Sylvie from her late parents, missionaries in Manchuria who 
were killed before her eyes by Japanese imperial soldiers (249). For the young June, the 
book constitutes a memento of her intense attachment to Sylvie during and after her stay 
at the orphanage. Stealing the book from Sylvie before leaving the orphanage, June re-
inscribes it decades later for her son – “To Nicholas, my dearest wayfarer. May you find 
great treasure and riches” – who in turn steals it from her when he leaves home as a 
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teenager (450). By the novel’s end, the tattered, charred book has survived a fire, passed 
from Sylvie in Manchuria to June in Korea to Nicholas in New York and Italy, and 
finally become a guidebook of sorts for June as she and Hector search for her estranged 
son in the town of Solferino itself.  
June first discovers A Memory of Solferino in her early days at the orphanage. 
When Sylvie assigns June the coveted task of cleaning the Tanners’ cottage, June notices 
A Memory of Solferino on Sylvie’s nightstand. Other books come and go, but that one – 
“the only book, besides the Bible and a hymnal, they had brought with them from the 
States” – always remains, piquing her curiosity (247). June asks Sylvie to read it aloud to 
her, but Sylvie refuses, telling her that the book is “not like poetry, or a children’s story, 
something to be enjoyed; it was an account of war, and she said that June didn’t need to 
read about it” (247). But June observes how Sylvie handles the book “with indeed a kind 
of enjoyment, a certain somber savoring,” and eventually steals it to read on her own 
(247). Because she is only just learning to read English, she must struggle through the 
text, particularly the sections that give dry historical background. But once the narrative 
of the battle begins, she becomes engrossed. She lingers especially on the discussions of 
the “unspeakable fate of the wounded” that haunted the author, who was distressed at 
“their privation and ‘perfect torture’ because of the grave lack of food and water and 
medical supplies, most of the caretakers being laypersons like himself or the local 
townsfolk, all willing to aid the survivors but frightfully incapable of doing so” (248). 
She reads about how “[all] the churches in the area surrounding the town called Solferino 
were filled with miserable soldiers, the air of their sanctuaries fouled with the stench of 
the dead and dying” (248). 
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Even after she is forced to return the book to Sylvie, who notices its 
disappearance after a few days, June continues to read the book to herself whenever 
possible. As she reads, June 
couldn’t help but imagine that it was Sylvie Tanner who was the witness and 
author of the book, as if she had seen with her own eyes the fierce fighting and 
wretched wounded in the churches, had toiled to alleviate the suffering without 
the aid of medicines or clean bandages or food. (249) 
This is perhaps the most explicit parallel that Lee draws between the suffering depicted in 
A Memory of Solferino and the situation of the survivors of warfare in his own book. 
Sylvie, of course, does toil to alleviate the suffering of the dozens of war orphans under 
her care; she has witnessed fierce fighting, and she cares for the wretched wounded in the 
church she and her husband build for that very purpose. In this way, she clearly sees 
herself as extending the humanitarian mission that Dunant calls for in his book. For June, 
gaining an understanding of Solferino as a historical background only augments her view 
of Sylvie as a heroine and savior, the steadfast “angel of mercy” that Sylvie’s parents 
entreat her to be in the book’s inscription. 
Months later, in the chaotic period when the Tanners are preparing to leave Korea 
for the States, Hector sardonically addresses the question of Sylvie’s benevolence during 
a fight:  
“You’ve taken pity on all of us, haven’t you? … Before you came this place was 
no better or worse than any other orphanage in this damned country. Which was 
just fine for the kids and the aunties, and even for me. There’s enough food and a 
roof and no more killing, and so what else is there to want?” (415) 
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Here, Hector lambasts the limits of her magnanimity: beyond food, shelter, and safety 
from physical harm, he implies, lies more. Her “pity” may have materially improved the 
lives of her charges, but it has had unintended emotional consequences as well. When 
Sylvie helplessly responds that she “[wants] to take every one of them” (416), Hector 
unexpectedly brings A Memory of Solferino into the picture: 
“Then take them!” he said … “Did you think you could come and go so easily? Is 
this what happens in that precious book of yours? I want to know. I thought it was 
about showing mercy to the helpless, to the innocent. But I think that book of 
yours is worthless. In fact, it’s worse than that. It’s a lie. It’s changed nothing and 
never will.” (416) 
In the hundred years since the Battle of Solferino, he continues, “How many people got 
slaughtered…? Got ground up to nothing? How many went up in smoke?” (416). For 
Hector, the problem is not just the failure of a lofty humanitarian ideal, but Sylvie’s 
fixation with and perpetuation of the lie of that ideal in the present. Comparing the book’s 
account of the Battle of Solferino to his experiences in Korea and the wars that have 
taken place in between the two, he finds that the humanitarian ideals that were first 
enunciated after Solferino have not relieved the pain he sees and feels a hundred years 
later in Korea. The distance between the originary moment for humanitarian aid in 19th 
century Solferino and Sylvie’s impossible attempts to reenact that moment in 20th century 
Korea collapses in face of the failure of both to achieve their supposed goals.  
A Memory of Solferino is a meaningful text not just in these characters’ lives, but 
also for the construction of the novel as a whole. What remains occluded in the 
circulation of this book across the decades and continents that span Lee’s novel is 
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precisely the world-historical significance of both the battle and the book in question. We 
don’t learn of the similarities between the historical contexts of the Battle of Solferino 
and the Korean War, both nationalist struggles for unification fought in the shadow of 
encroaching imperial neighbors. Nor do we ever explicitly learn that Dunant’s proposals 
in A Memory for the creation of a neutral organization to protect and assist the wounded 
in war and the institution of an international principle to serve as the basis for such a 
voluntary relief corps would lead to the founding of, respectively, the International Red 
Cross and the Geneva Conventions.79 (Dunant’s two crucial questions that lead to the 
founding of the Red Cross and the creation of the Geneva Conventions are as follows: 
first, whether it would be possible “to form relief societies for the purpose of having care 
given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted, and thoroughly qualified 
volunteers” and second, whether military authorities could formulate “some international 
principle, sanctioned by a convention and inviolate in character, which, once agreed upon 
and ratified, might constitute the basis for societies for the relief of the wounded in the 
different European countries” (“From the battle”).) In other words, while the novel 
dramatically stages the significance of the book for Sylvie, Hector, June, and Nicholas’ 
personal lives and relationships, its historical importance for the form of modern warfare 
itself – and for our conceptions of national sovereignty and the universal human subject – 
is obscured. Despite his inclusion of such a historically and politically overdetermined 
text in his novel, Lee resists any reading of A Memory of Solferino that would explicitly 
draw out its historical or political threads in relation to his own narrative. Rather, he 
                                                
79 See the documents “Solferino and the International Committee of the Red Cross” and “From the Battle of 
Solferino to the eve of the First World War,” both available on the website of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross. 
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emphasizes the circulation of A Memory of Solferino as a privileged object invested with 
intense affective meanings and histories. 
Lee’s embedding of A Memory of Solferino within his novel invites a kind of 
comparative eye across several axes, for example, Europe and Asia, past and present, 
soldier and civilian. By centrally locating a past European narrative of war and survival 
inside his own story of the Korean War, Lee could be said to participate in a pattern that 
Rey Chow has named “Europe and Its Others,” a hierarchical form of comparison in 
which the outcome of comparison is always predetermined to privilege European 
thinking and writing over their non-European counterparts. According to this logic, she 
argues, the rationale for comparison “hinges on the conjunction and,” which “signals a 
form of supplementation that authorizes the first term, Europe, as the grid of reference, to 
which may be added others in a subsequent and subordinate fashion” (77). Because of 
this subordinated status, non-European histories, cultures, and languages are doomed to 
“remain, by default, undifferentiated – and thus never genuinely on a par with Europe – 
within an ostensibly comparative framework” (77). Lee’s novel does engage in a form of 
asymmetrical comparison between Europe and Asia. but in my view, he reverses the 
terms of Chow’s framework. For Lee, the Korean War and its aftermath are the main 
story; the story of Solferino remains an obscure, though weighty, referent. The details of 
the historical context of Solferino remain hazy, and to the extent that Lee makes the 
Battle of Solferino a predecessor to and interlocuter for the Korean War, he does so to 
point out its failures. In this case, it is Korea that is the first term, the grid of reference 
that subordinates and gives meaning to Solferino. At the same time, Dunant’s naming of 
specifically European countries in his vision of an “international principle” of 
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humanitarian aid in A Memory raises the question of the true universality of the 
conception of human lives in need of protection that his book enshrines. If the vision for 
these “international” institutions in their inception was limited to Europe – and, by 
extension, to white bodies – then what happened when that vision was forced to 
accommodate nations beyond Europe? How would his humanitarianism account for the 
suffering of non-European peoples of color in war, as in the Korean War? 
The Surrendered largely stands as a document of the failure of the modern regime 
of humanitarianism inaugurated by Dunant’s Solferino in the context of the Korean War 
and other episodes of state violence that surrounded it. It also retells the story of the 
Korean failure to achieve national unification in the face of the geopolitical interests of its 
(neo)imperial protectors, rivals fighting the first “hot war” of the Cold War across the 
landscape of the peninsula at the cost of millions of lives. To the extent that Lee makes 
the Battle of Solferino a predecessor to and interlocuter for the Korean War, he does so to 
point out the utter failures of both to achieve a humanitarianism that succeeds in helping 
those in need. At the same time, by making Solferino the ending place both for June and 
for the reader of the novel, The Surrendered enacts a return of the violence of the Korean 
War to the grounds of Solferino, at once paying homage to and indicting the mission 
which it birthed. 
At the end of the novel, Hector and June stand inside la chiesa dell’ossario in 
Solferino, the chapel of bones consecrated in 1870 as a reliquary of the fallen soldiers of 
the Battle of Solferino, gazing upon the “grinning, grimacing dead” (468). At this point, 
June, afflicted with stomach cancer, is on the verge of death. After they enter the chapel, 
June, her vision faltering, says to Hector, “‘It must be beautiful. Is it beautiful?’” In 
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response, Hector whispers, “It is beautiful … This is our place” (469). All the drama of 
the novel, it seems, has finally culminated in bringing them – the war orphan and the 
savior GI, the war bride and the American husband, the rescuer and the rescued – here 
together. By figuring the resting place for the fallen soldiers of Solferino as the place 
where Hector and June both belong – our place – Lee brings the disparate remnants of 
Cold War violence to Solferino. If the Cold War entailed an outsourcing of violence to 
the grounds of Asia, then Lee’s novel plots a return of the suffering that resulted from 
that violence to the 19th century European source of the Geneva Conventions, the Red 
Cross, and the ideal of humanitarianism in wartime. But, as Hector protested decades 
before, it’s changed nothing: the survivors of Korean War violence belong there in the 
chapel alongside the bones of the war dead of the Battle of Solferino. One might read 
Hector and June – and the novel – as bearing witness in Solferino to the continuing need 
to alleviate the suffering of victims of war, to bring Dunant’s ideals to fruition even 
today. But I believe the novel instead asks us to read Hector and June as dwelling in the 
failures of humanitarianism in the Korean War and its aftermath. As a child, June burned 
down the institution whose humanitarian mission could never have saved her. Now, on 
her deathbed, she stands in another humanitarian chapel, bearing witness with the former 
GI who proclaims, “This is our place.”  
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